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Foreword 
The following papers were presented at the Second International Varna Seminar organized 
within the activities of the ERI Project. Fifty-three participants from West and East exchanged 
experiences and identified prospects for a further integration of this part of Europe into the 
world economy. It was concluded that national efforts and international support in introducing 
early convertibility would have to proceed hand in hand. 
I should like to express my sincere thanks to all the scientists and experts who contributed 
greatly to the success of this Conference. My gratitude belongs to The Bulgarian National 
Member Organization especially to Professor 0. Panov and Professor E. Razvigorova and to the 
organizers from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, especially to Dr. Ugrinov, for their 
excellent organization of the Conference and for providing the facilities necessary for the fruitful 
scientific discussion. 
F.  Schmidt-Bleek 
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The rapid changes in Central and Eastern Europe, although very young, already require a 
major shift towards maturity of the necessary political and economical institutional changes. 
This has to happen both nationally and internationally if stability and irreversibility of the 
transition are the percieved goal. The unexpected pace of these developments meant that 
politicians as well as scientists on both sides were, to a great extent, unprepared. Vigorous 
political action is accompanied by equally intensive efforts by scholars. National programs for 
the reforms emerge as a result of cooperation between the West and the East. 
One knowledge, that reforms must be of a comprehensive character and include al l  economic 
and social institutions, was accepted by the majority of the transforming countries. Hence the 
necessity of a systematic approach. 
Convertibility is one of the key issues in this reform. Its importance may acquire a dramatic 
character when faced with the accelerated disintegration within the CMEA market. Trade 
imbalances, raw materials and energy shortages, and changes in the modes of payment on the 
basis of convertible currencies, may cause mass unemployment, the collapse of enterprises and in 
the worst scenario of whole industrial branches or even economies. The political consaquences 
are hardly predictable. 
New trade and financial relations or a concept for the continuation of the existing ones under 
the new conditions will have a stabilizing effect not only for the eastern part of Europe. This new 
pattern requires an elaboration and an institutional network. The main objectives of the Second 
Varna Seminar were the exchange of views and information about the present economic situation 
in these countries, to exchange experiences and appraise recent economic policy measures and 
their impacts on trade balances, price stability and real wages, as well as to shape the auspices of 
the near future especially about the role and sequencing of convertibility in the reform process. 
Another main issue of interest was the present state and the future of trade and financial 
relations in Eastern Europe. The discussion of that topic could clarify the chances for any 
individual country in the region to master the reform process by its own efforts. 
SESSION I 
Session I dealt with the stages in the transition to convertibility, the main idea was to  compare 
the theoretical understanding with practical experience and to make feasible conclusions about 
the timing of the introduction. 
The major theoretical considerations were presented in the paper by Professor Portes, fol- 
lowed by an evaluation of the experience of Poland, Yuguslavia and Hungary and the concepts 
for introduction of convertibility of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania. A special case is 
the transformation in the former GDR as implemented in the Monetary, Social and Economic 
Union between the two German states. 
Following the argumentation of Professor Portes the introduction of convertibility will have 
several positive impacts. Creditors to Eastern European debtors will see it as a major step to- 
wards the normaliza.tion of the position of these countries in the world economy, thus facilitating 
the debt service. It is regaxden by them as a touchstorle of virtue. Moreover, the "critical mass" 
of rneaslires required to achieve credibility may have to contain convertibility. Another positive 
effect will come from the introduction in the Eastern countries of the so badly needed new price 
system and competition. F'reeing prices in a closed economy establishes only a monopolistically 
distorted equilibrium. Breaking up national monopolies and cutting hierarchical links between 
central allthorities and enterprises may be a long process. Convertibility, and in this way open- 
economy equilibrium prices and the introduction of external competition, will give substantial 
impetus to the system and prevent additional damage. 
The approach characterized as the "Big Bangn including in the initial package a total reform 
current accollnt convertibility for residents is only hypothetical as it is not possible administra- 
tively a.nd institutionally to implement all the required reforms a t  once. Another shortcoming 
of the prevailing recommendations is the insufficient attention paid to the interaction between 
the main components of the reform program. 
A reasonable sequencing within a given time-schedule seems to be the only feasible solution. 
Interdependencies have to be known and consequences eventually predicted (e.g., not to blame 
the failure of a convertibility step on an inadequate supply-side response, which is connected 
an the other hand to measures of incorporation and privatization of state owned enterprises, 
prices, taxation, etc.). Such a sequencing must be robust to external shocks and errors and must 
be credible as to  the achievement of its initially announced expected changes. Capital account 
convertibility has to be followed not only to avoid capital flight, but also to keep control over 
inward flows. 
If preconditions are required it is obvious that macroeconomic stabilization and hard budget 
constraints have to be mentioned. Solving the stock problem by an initial push in prices, the 
provision of attractive assets and the creation of employment uncertainties will lead to the 
reduction of the "monetary overhang", by preserving the encouragement of savings. In this way 
a confiscatory monetary reform can be avoided. The hard budget constraints on their side do not 
necessarily eliminate budget deficits and bring to a flow equilibrium. It seems equally important 
to avoid the "redistribution" of national income through the budget by introducing self-financing 
economic actors. Current account convertibility at  a fixed exchange rate is impossible without 
the establishment of financial discipline. Until this condition is met also currency auctions make 
little sense. A strong argument in favor of a single fixed exchange rate is that it will reveal the 
efficiency of firms and their activities. 
All partial measures (a centrally directed "price" reform, enterprise retention as part of 
their export profits, currency auctions in closed economies, etc.) are intermediate steps going 
more likely backward than forward. Convertibility is not just a question of microeconomics or 
a monetary issue. It is central to the process of transformation and has to be situated in the 
context of every specific country, depending mainly on the possibility to sustain it or not. A 
forced retreat will have, without doubt, a devastating effect on the credibility of the respective 
reform program. 
Moving to the presentations of the national experiences, the three countries that have intro- 
duced convertibility in different degrees until now-Yugoslavia (Nikic), Poland (Lutkowski) and 
Hungary (Boros) showed definite similarities, and as a whole a divergence from the theoretical 
hypotheses preconditioning macroeconomic stability for the introduction of convertibility. Es- 
pecially in the case of Poland and Yugoslavia when all other measures to stabilize the economy 
failed, convertibility was introduced as a last effort to  save the collapsing monetary system and 
to protect the state from insolvency. At the time of introduction of convertibility, December 
1989 for Yugoslavia and January 1990 for Poland, the monetary inflation in those countries was 
respectively 60% and 79%. The foreign debt was inserviceable in both countries. Introduction 
of convertibility was supported by international financial institutions. The policies pursued by 
the respective governments are quite similar and the consequences from the introduction of 
convertibility also show similar features which are, in fact, essentially divergent from the initial 
expectations. The experience of Polaild and Yugoslavia shows that measures for stabilization 
excluding convertibility are inefficient. A short comparison between the two countries supports 
these statements. 
Yugoslavia 
(1) Time of introduction of convertibility: December 1989. 
(2) Dominant macroeconomic conditions a t  the time of introduction: 
High inflation - 60% in December 1989. 
Existing currency black market. 
High foreign debt - 15 billion US$. 
Liberalized imports - 85% of total. 
Freedom of economic activity including foreign activity. 
(3) Exchange rate-fixed for a period of 6 months according t o  an agreement with the IMF- 
overvalued. 
(4) ~ h v e r n m e n t  policy: 
6 months wage freeze. 
Price control over some inputs (energy, transportation). 
Tight monetary policy. 
Reduction of governments expenditures. 
Arrangement with the IMF for rescheduling of the debt service and a stand-by credit 
in support of the stabilization program in the context of the reform program. 
(5) Consequences of convertibility in the context of the reform program. 
Reduction of inflation - 1,8% in August, 1990. 
Increases in the foreign currency reserves. 
Disappearance of the black market. 
Outflow of capital because of overvaluation. 
(6) Main problems: 
Sustaining the present exchange rate. 
Provision of capital resources for the necessary industrial 
restructuring. 
Poland 
(1) Time of introduction of convertibility: 1 January, 1990. 
(2) Dominant macroeconomic conditions a t  the time of introduction: 
High inflation - 79% in January 1990 
Currency black market. 
High and inserviceable foreign debt. 
Liberalized prices - over 90%. 
Liberalized imports (except services and capital transfers). 
Low uniform tariffs. 
Freedom of economic activity, including foreign activity. 
Abolished export subsidies and other forms of preferential 
treatment. 
Gradually devaluated national currency before 1 January 1990. 
(3) Exchange rate-fixed for a period of a t  least 3 months according to  an agreement with the 
IhIF-greatly underva.lued. 
(4) Government policy: 
s Budget discipline. 
e Tight control over money supply. 
e, Strict tax-based wage policy. 
a Suspended debt servicing received from the Paris club. 
e Agreement with the IMF for a stand-by credit in support of the stabilization program. 
(5) Consequences of convertibility in the context of the reform program: 
Price level: reduction of inflation t o  3% in August 1990. 
Real wages: fall by 40% in the first quarter and by 30% in the second quarter of 1990. 
a Production: a decline of 30% in state-owned industry compared with 1989; an increase 
in the private sector. 
o Unemployment: 800,000 in August 1990 (6% of the labor force). 
a Trade balance: from a deficit of 0,8 billion US$ in 1989 t o  a surplus of 1,97 billion US$ 
for the first 6 months of 1990. 
Foreign exchange reserves grew up until August 1990 by 3 billion US$. 
a Rate of exchange: stable and reaching equilibrium after the initial devaluation in the 
first quarter of 1990. 
(6) Main problems: 
* Recession. 
e Unemployment. 
* Decrease in living standards. 
Hungary 
Hungary is closest t o  the two states analyzed above concerning convertibility although the 
apploach is a gradual one. Since 1981 one exchange rate has been applied for all transactions 
and the value of the forint is determined against a statistically weighed basket of convertible 
currencies. The rate of inflation is considerably lower-25-30%. A two-tier banking system was 
introduced in 1987. Imports in 1990 were liberalized, some 65-80% in terms of volume. For 
1991, a 90% liberalization is perceived. -41~0 the majority of consumer prices (some 85% in 1990) 
are liberalized. Economic activity (private business activity and the building up of economic 
associations) is free. Monopoly on foreign trade is eliminated and replaced by a decentralized 
structure. Foreign direct investment is subject t o  permission only in cases exceeding 50% of 
companies' capital. A stock exchange exists. The foreign debt is very high, but serviceable, and 
an agreement with the IMF is in force. 
It is obvious that, by using these countries as examples, the liberalization of the economic 
life in a previously centralized economy leads t o  high inflation which is most probably caused by 
the monopolistic distortions, the closeness of the CMEA system and the deteriorated balance 
of payments. The introduction of convertibility has a stabilizing effect due t o  the introduction 
of an external measure of efficiency-the price system, and due t o  the reduction of the infla- 
tionary pressure on the tradables in the economy by the introduction in the national market of 
a highly tradable good-the foreign currency. The accompanying effect is high recession and 
unemployment. The rather strange similarities of the  macroeconomic consequences in the case 
of overvalued (Yugoslavia) and undervalued (Poland) currencies, may be an indicator for the 
already running process of restructuring between the different industrial sectors of the economy. 
Czechoslovakia 
Czechoslovakia is the next country closest to  the introduction of convertibility. The two pa- 
pers presented a t  the seminar (Ii'lima and Charap) are unanimous in the conclusion about the 
maturity of the country for the introduction of convertibility, but propose different strategies. 
Charap supports the introduction of a quick convertibility and not only on current, but also on 
capital accounts. The foreign direct investment will help the  country t o  immediately increase 
its consumption, now and in the future ( a  capital account surplus will finance a current account 
deficit). The recommendation is a quick and comprehensive reform including convertibility. 
Klima's paper discloses the reform program of the  Czechoslovakian government. For com- 
parability reasons the main subjects will be revealed in the  same sequence as for Poland and 
Yugoslavia, but also includes future prospects: 
(1) Time of introduction-1 January, 1991. 
(2) Dominant macroeconomic conditions: in the middle of 1990. 
r Increase of GNP by 1,3% in 1989. 
r Low inflation rate: 2-3% annually. 
r Relatively low external debt: 7,9 billion US$ in 1989. 
r Relatively small budget deficit 1988/1989. 
Slightly increasing export in convertible currency countries. 
(3) Exchange rate-unified, about 24 korun per dollar, or  a devaluation of 50%. 
(4) Government policy: to  be pursued. 
r Stabilization policy. 
r Tax reform. 
r Tight budgetary rules. 
r Privatization and demonopolization. 
r Liberalization of domestic prices as of 1 January, 1991. 
r Liberalization of foreign trade. 
r Adequate social safety net. 
r Adequate structural policy. 
(5) Main priorities: 
r Avoid unnecessary high inflation. 
r Avoid excessive external debts. 
r Avoid the transformation of the internal monetary surplus into an external debt. 
Unlike the other countries Czechoslovakia intends t o  follow a policy of active incentives for 
stimulation of exports (bonuses) and disincentives for imports (import surcharges, licensing, 
custom duties, etc.). A next step is intended to  be the introduction of a capital account con- 
vertibility. 
The final aim of the reform program is to  achieve the restructuring of the Czechoslovakian 
economy and its integration into the  world economy. This requires much closer contacts and 
coordination with the international institutions. 
The approach of the countries that  have not introduced convertibility yet (Bulgaria, Romania 
and the Soviet Union) was derived from the general concerns characterizing the macroeconomic 
considerations in the introduction of this step. A great emphasis was put on the  preconditions 
and i t  was pointed out that  their absence was a major obstacle. 
Bulgaria 
In the keynote presentation of Professor Valtchev he declared that  i t  was Bulgaria's aim t o  follow 
a policy for the introduction of convertibility in the sense of Article VIII of the IMF Agreement. 
As we saw in the  cases of Yugoslavia and Poland only residents were included, fulfilling in such 
a way only a part  of the requirements of Article VIII. According t o  Professor Valtchev, the 
present crisis in the country does not offer favorable conditions for the introduction of a quick 
convertibility. The economic system is characterized at  the moment by: 
r An administrative price system. 
e An absence of a monetary aid capital market. 
o An underdeveloped "state" banking system. 
s An absence of hard currency reserves. 
e A large external debt. 
e An initial phase of the economic reform. 
o A rate of inflation of about 1.0% mont.hly. 
These parameters of the system must be changed in order t o  achieve convertibility. The 
basic preconditions, defining also the  macroeconomic policy that  has t o  be followed include: 
Creation of a market economy. 
Creation of a modern monetary and credit system. 
Reform of the tax  and budgetary systems. 
Introduction of unified exchange rate. 
Gradual liberalization of imports, transfer of profits, rights t o  borrow loans abroad for the 
firms. 
Measures to stop the "dollarization" of the economy. 
Legal guarantees for foreign direct investment. 
Agreement with the IMF. 
Productivity growth due t o  econoinic reform. 
This policy has to be achieved in two stages: 
The first stage lasting about a year will include the issuing of a package of laws and general 
measures for economic stabilization. 
The  second stage will last between 5 and 10 years, depending on the internal and external 
conditions and will implement the above listed policies and will finish with the  introduction of 
convertibility, a t  a unified exchange rate. Regular auctions and centralization of all currency 
receipts a t  the National Bank together with gradual liberalization of imports will characterize 
that  period. 
Romania 
The  Romanian case (Bran) is characterized by an increase in the money supply of about 15% in 
July 1990, compared t o  December 1989 and a level of production of 85% of that  recorded one 
year ago. The  introduction of a two-tier banking system was initiated. Prices will be gradually 
liberalized consisting mainly of three groups-free, controlled and subsidized. 
The scenario for the transition t o  convertibility adopted by the Romanian Government in- 
cludes the following measures: 
Devaluation of the leu. 
Increase in productivity. 
e Limitation of money supply in order t o  strengthen the purchasing power of the  leu. 
Liberalization of payments in leu and currency for non-residents. 
a Permission for Romanian citizens to  take abroad larger sums of leu. 
a Transition t o  general convertibility. 
The fulfillment of this plan will depend on the interaction of real economic factors, monetary 
and fiscal policies and international support. Only an increase in the labor productivity and 
in the quality of the exported goods and services can bring the  positive effects expected from 
convertibility. Otherwise an accelerating inflation and a decrease in the foreign exchange reserves 
will be the outcome. 
The former GDR 
The case with the former GDR (Peruzzo), although unique, and inappropriate as a direct ex- 
ample, may be very useful for scientific discussion. If we assume that  generally, on the way to  
successful reforms in Eastern Europe, there are the following main obstacles: 
Lack of knowledge about the functioning of the market economy and about the transition 
process. 
Lack of capital necessary for the  reconstruction. 
Lack of stable political forces driving the  process. 
Lack of a modern, competitive industrial infrastructure, 
In the case of the GDR i t  was only the inherited industrial structure, tha t  is basically 
distorted and is a missing part on the way t o  a market economy. 
If we abstract ourselves from the  loss of national sovereignity, the reform approach in the 
GDR is that  of total integration into the economic, political, legal and social structure of the 
FRG. We could call this a Usubstitutionn strategy. The basic principles here are private own: 
ership, rivaling systems of performance, free pricing, freedom of contracts and free movement 
of labor, capital and services in the whole area. The basic social principles are the  freedom of 
association, works constitutions and collective agreements, co-determination, old age pension 
and insurance (sickness, accident and unemployment) schemes. 
The economic laws of the FRG are adopted and implemented completely and the D-Mark 
replaces the GDR-Mark. 
Basic attention has been paid t o  the industrial restructuring of the economy. Two major 
routes are followed: 
Stimulation of new investment through direct financing and government incentives. 
6 Direct investment in the creation of an appropriate infrastructure, mainly a t  a municipal 
level, stimulating the creation of small and medium sized enterprises. 
All cases for investment in the previous GDR state industry are treated and authorized by 
the  Trustees Agency. Under the above conditions, although many subsidies were abolished, 
the cost of living in the GDR one month after the introduction of the Union was 5,5% lower 
compared to  the previous year. 
The reform approach applied to  the GDR leads us t o  conclude that  the  main rationale for 
the economic reforms in Eastern Europe, besides the institutional changes and the stabilization 
of the currency, is the industrial restructuring of the economies that  will allow them a normal 
participation in the international division of labor in the world economy. Following a "substitu- 
tion" strategy allows the quickest transformation but is connected with huge expenditures and 
requires the application of external administration. 
SESSION I1 
The  second Session dealt with problems of the reorganization of the credit and monetary systems 
and the capital market. The introduction of convertibility requires the establishment of new 
markets and financial institutions. What  is making the present changes in Eastern Europe 
different from the similar processes after World War 11, is the almost complete absence of a 
market supporting the institutional and legal infrastructure in those countries. 
In his paper Dr. Dimitrov begins with a statement that  convertibility is a market relation 
and its introduction can not be achieved before market relations become dominant. This applies 
mainly t o  the creation of a monetary market. 
The economic crisis, the external indebtedness and the deteriorating conditions in CMEA 
countries are the ma.in obstacles for the introduction of the market economy in Bulgaria. The 
positive aspects are the general democratic changes, the relatively small size of the economy, the 
low rat.e of inflation until now and the expcrience gained from the other reforming countries. 
On the way to  convertibility several measures seem indispensable: 
9 Equal treatment of all forms of ownership. 
9 Recognition of the commodity character of the labor force. 
Broader monetarization of the economy by increasing the number of tradables and the power 
of money. 
Reduction of the monetary overhang. 
The approach for the latter is in the privatization of state assets and a consequent cancellation 
of that  money. The deliberate inflation aiming a t  the devaluation of savings, or a currency 
reform, are inappropriate because of their social costs. 
The actual reforms in the financial sphere have t o  be included in the budget, the tax system 
and the banking system. The budget is redistributing now (plan 1990) 90% of the  national 
income. It is characterized by tremendous expenses and taxes on companies' profits reaching up 
t o  80%. The budget system is suffering under a constant deficit-at present 15,5 billion leva. 
The accumulated internal debt and the practice of financing it through the monetary system 
are definit.ely inflationary. 
The main changes in this sphere must include: 
Cutting down expenditure. 
Excluding certain activities from the budget. 
9 Eliminating the direct financing of the deficit. 
The main objective of the reforms in the tax system has to  be the reduction of the level of 
levied taxes. This will have both qualitative (by increasing the companies independence) and 
quantitative (by reducing the inflationary pressure through the passing of the tax burden on t o  
the consumer in a monopolistic economy) effects. VAT has to  replace the turnover tax. The 
system of a general progressive taxation of the population has to  be modernized. 
The reform of the banking system has t o  begin with the elimination of the administrative 
funct.ions. The banks, a t  the moment, do not offer services, they take decisions and manage 
the monetary circulation often against the interests of the firms. The payment procedure is 
very slow and this increases the money demand in the economy. The system for servicing the 
population is underdeveloped and monopolistic. The low interests for companies' savings a t  
the banks-no more than 1%-are one of the main reasons for the under-monetarization of the 
economy, for the keeping of overstocks and for the slow introduction of innovations. The fact 
that  the interest rate does not secure a minimum return on the money in the banks in order t o  
compensate for inflation brings about a direct depreciation of the money. 
The reform should introduce a two-tier banking system: 
National Bank-independent and pure emission bank. 
Commercial Banks-with universal character. For the size of Bulgaria they should not exceed 
15-20. 
All functions and activities of the banks and their competence have t o  be regulated by law. 
The introduction of the two-tier banking system will facilitate the creation of an  interbank 
money market and also the creation of a market for securities. 
Characteristic for the Bulgarian vision was its predominant monetary orientation with a 
relative underestimation of the problems of the real economy and especially of restructuring. 
The main lessons the East European countries could learn from the Japanese experience 
during the postwar a.nd high growth period, were presented in the paper of Professor Takenaka. 
An agricultural reform, demonopo1izat.ion of the industry and a selective industrial policy, were 
the milestones of that  period. The strategy of high growth adopted a t  that  time implied, as a 
major vehicle, a high rate of capital utilization and a high investment replacement ratio. The 
policy of "cheap money" followed by the Bank of Japan kept the cost of capital (interest rates) 
low and the rates of return on capital were kept very high due t o  the speed by which technology 
progressed within the industry. At that  time Japanese corporations considered capital to  be 
the embodiment of new technology. According to  statistics 30-40% of annual growth in Japan 
appears to  be due t o  technological progress. This lead to dynamic changes in the industrial 
structure by moving resources t o  the most efficient industries, spurning even more technolog- 
ical progress. The existence of a plentiful, high quality labor force capable of adopting new 
technologies positively influenced the success. Extremely high investment rates were achieved 
accompanied by an  aggressive managerial posture adopted by the Japanese corporation which 
allowed a continuation of the investment replacement ratio a t  the high level of 12-15%. The 
high rate of savings represented the source for the invested funds. 
During all that  period a "cheap exchange rate policyn was followed which allowed an  increase 
in exports and protected fledgling industries. Trade followed a clear pattern of having deficits 
at growth periods and surpluses during slumps. A unique form of ties developed between 
government and industry. The creation of the Industrial Structure Council at the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry served as a forum where representatives from science, industry 
and administration discussed the future and worked out a vision of how industrial structure 
should stand. This represented a guideline for the corporations with a consensus behind i t  and 
reduced the uncertainties and risks involved in the individual managerial decisions. 
The fruitful interaction of monetary and real economic factors is the decisive condition for 
the timing of convertibility. In his statement Dr. Kagalovsky pointed out the social and political 
background of the present economic policy in the Soviet Union. The sharp politicization of 
economic decisions is accompanied by factors such as the revolution of expectations, social 
unrest and the dominance of populist ideas reflected also in the 500 Day Plan. He pointed out 
the transparency of the financial policy and especially the drafting of the budget with its deficit. 
As a way for fighting the hyperinflation he proposed a reconsideration of the objectives against 
a dollarization of the economy at  the initial phase of the reform process. 
The strong arguments supporting the early introduction of convertibility represented the 
core of Professor Bomhofl's presentation. 
r Introduction of an imported price system correcting distorted domestic relative prices. 
r "External financial disciplining", which will be probably impossible t o  introduce, through 
domestic political decisions. 
r Avoidance of corruption and black market activities. 
r Reducing bureaucracy and its bias in favor of big firms as well as bureaucratic allocation of 
foreign exchange. 
The introduction of conve;tibility, high or stable interest rates, and a secure savings institu- 
tion are of major importance for economic development as they will secure a high savings rate 
and will prevent capital flights. A solution with a concentration of foreign exchange in a central 
state agency will have negative results. 
The second major problem is the fixing of the exchange rate. If undervaluated i t  will stimulate 
exports, but hamper small firms t o  buy abroad and, consequently, have a negative effect on the 
restructuring. The difficulties in defining the proper exchange rate and the general bias against 
a floating exchange rate will be qualified as a lack of discipline in the monetary and fiscal policy. 
This supports a solution with an exchange rate fixed for relatively short periods of time but will 
have this disadvantage, that  it will require a very tight monetary policy and hamper the supply 
of money--economic growth and restructuring will suffer. 
Professor Starodubrovsky supports the opinion that early convertibility is not possible and 
market relations can not be introduced without prior stabilization. The proper timing for the 
introduction of convertibility will be a t  the end of the stabilization period and a t  the beginning 
of the introduction of the market mechanisms. 
SESSION 111 
The third session dealt with the problems of payment balances and currency reserves, the ex- 
ternal debt and the international support in favor of convertibility. 
The case of Bulgaria was presented in the keynote paper of Professor Tzarevski. He analyzed 
the present state of the country's foreign debt, the policy justifying borrowing and the necessary 
measures for restoring the financial health of the country. 
The present amount of the debt is about 10,4 billion US$ according to Government infor- 
mation. The country has to  pay annual interest of about 700-800 million US$ and must meet 
annual maturities of about 2 billion US$. The real annual receipts from exports in hard currency 
amount to about 2 billion US$. The servicing of the debt is not possible at  the moment. It grew 
by 7 billion US$ during the last five years. The receivables of the country, as per June 1990, 
from credits given to other countries accounted to 2,2 billion US$. 
An analysis shows that more than 80% of the loans were used for productive and personal 
consumption as raw materials, intermediate goods, spare parts or consumer goods. Only 20% of 
the credits were used for the purchase of equipment and machinery, mainly in not very efficient 
plants, for heavy machine building, metallurgy or heavy chemistry (which is also due to  the 
basic Marxist concept for the primarily development of heavy investment industry as well as 
the "dual" character of many industrial enterprises in CMEA countries.-Nikola Totzev). As a 
result of this inefficient credit policy the loans did not contribute to the creation of competitive 
productive facilities which could have returned invested currency. 
The basic assumption underlying the borrowing in the past was in their profitability by 
later payments in inflation-caused devaluated currencies. Indeed, the devaluation of the foreign 
currencies can be favorable for the debtors, provided they are used efficiently and, at  the time of 
devaluation, there is an increase in the prices of the exported products. That is the case normally 
with technology intensive products. The Bulgarian export goods are not predominantly of that 
kind, but the share of technology intensive goods is higher by imports. As a consequence the 
terms of trade deteriorate. The internal measures that have to be undertaken are connected 
with the overall improvement of the productivity and the growth of the economy. Particularly 
the debt should not be kept secret any more and all the terms of the particular credits have to 
be publically announced and controlled. 
The restoratioil of the financial health of the country requires a long-term program including: 
A system for evaluation of the taken credits-shift towards credits with a concrete industrial 
application. 
r Negotiations with foreign monetary institutions for the rescheduling of payments and for 
new credits. 
r Negotiations with CMEA countries on the conditions of trade after January 1, 1991 when 
payment in convertible currency will be introduced in the CMEA countries. Like some of 
the other small East European countries Bulgaria is expecting a deterioration of the terms of 
trade and a general reduction of exports to  the Soviet Union and the other CMEA countries. 
Additional difficulties are connected with the Gulf crisis. The problems can be solved either 
on a bilateral basis, that will distort further trade in this region, or by a new concept for 
trade in this part of Europe. 
Creation of favorable conditions for foreign direct investment will have, in the long-run, a 
positive effect on the financial situation of the country. The second keynote paper presented 
by Dr. Williamson dealt with general theoretical problems of foreign exchange constraints in a 
liberalizing economy. The problem of additional foreign financing if not received as aid or via 
debt reconstruction has to be considered under the aspect of the national interest in foreign 
borrowing. Such an assessment has to balance: 
r The benefit of relaxing the foreign exchange constraint. 
a The benefit of building up reserves. 
The cost of eroding creditworthiness and precipitating a debt crisis. 
Expenditure switching or a shift of foreign expenditure towards domestically produced goods 
is another way of improving the financial situation of the country. Possible sources are: 
Tighter import controls. 
A more competitive real exchange rate. 
Improved non-price competitiveness. 
Whereas the first measure can give quick results, in the long-term it has negative impacts by 
precluding foreign competition, distortion of resource allocation and erosion of the Government's 
fiscal position. Improving the non-price competitiveness means restructuring of the economy. 
This is the key to the problem of convertibility, but the process is a very long one, ranging 
from 2 to 20 years, depending on the industrial sectors involved. The combination of real 
devaluation and liberalization of import controls will determine the short and medium term 
policy of these countries. An ultra-competitive exchange rate will be highly recessional if it is 
not accompanied by a monetary expansion (of Poland) because of the real balance effect and if 
monetary accommodation is added, the effect will be hyperinflation (e.g., Brazil). 
With regard to import liberalization, an absolute abolition (convertibility), promises long 
run gains a t  the cost of short term difficulties. There are two problems here: a Government 
ready to take the risk and a population confident of the irreversibility of this step. Because an 
incredible convertibility invites an import surge (stocking up of foreign goods by the public as 
observed in Latin America), which makes the maintenance of convertibility impossible. 
The realistic case is that of gradual liberalization of import controls. Domestic import com- 
peting enterprises are given the possibility to adapt to the new situation they face, including a 
large increase in prices of materials, products and energy. Unnecessary social tension and unem- 
ployment can be avoided. The gradual liberalization has to be accompanied by the introduction 
of new tariffs and a following gradual reduct:on of those tariffs. For example, until the final 
day when the whole package of measures for the transition to a market economy will come into 
force. 
The third oil shock will have dramatic consequences for Eastern Europe and without foreign 
aid and debt reconstruction no feasible solution can be achieved. Of course these countries 
have to accept a lower level of output until such a time as exports rise or the oil prices fall. 
Independently of the present difficulties, convertibility seems to offer much greater advantages in 
Eastern Europe today, than it did in Western Europe 40 years ago, where the basic infrastructure 
of a market econonly was already in place and there was no comparable need to import a price 
structure. 
SESSION IV 
The new financial institutions and opportunities for economic transition and the future of re- 
gional economic cooperation in Eastern Europe concluded the discussions. In his keynote paper 
Dr. Richter characterized the introduction of payments in convertible currencies from 1 January, 
1991 as the end of the CMEA era. The consequences for the small East European countries 
will be huge deficits with the Soviet Union. They will have to compete with Westerners for the 
Soviet market and often the price will be below the production costs. 
The main problem is how to deal with the emerging trade deficits and imbalances in Eastern 
Europe. Analyzing the idea of an East European Payment Union constituting a multilateral 
clearing system with financial support from the West, he saw the composition of the Union as 
a crucial problem. There are three possibilities: 
Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. 
The above countries & Bulgaria and Romania. 
The above countries & Soviet Union. 
Supposing the last composition is chosen, it will actually mean financing the Soviet Union's 
imports from Eastern Europe, because of the lasting Soviet surpluses that are expected. This 
may be a feasible solution in respect of keeping employment and social stability in the smaller 
countries, but there will be no positive structural effects because of the fact that the majority of 
export intensive enterprises in this direction are old fashioned, noncompetitive state enterprises. 
Other solutions may include Western support for: 
An ease in the debt service burden. 
a The setting up of special funds for the promotion of small and medium sized enterprises. 
Any kind of solution has to be oriented around the crucial factor for Eastern Europe-the 
restructuring of its trade and the increasing part of trade with the West. Under such conditions 
mutual trade in Eastern Enrope, after a temporary reduction, will increase but with a different 
composition. 
The discussion that followed dealt profoundly with options other than the integration of 
the East European countries in the EFTA or in the EEC. Both possibilities were considered 
unrealistic because of the uncompetitive industrial structures and performances of the East 
European countries. Professor Portes warned against exaggerated expectations from trade with 
the EEC, or, even file applications. He underlined the necessity of a tremendous amount of 
thinking about the future of Central and Eastern Europe. Professor Schmidt-Bleek raised the 
idea for the creation of Central European Economic Market comprising 120-150 million people 
with a dimension large enough to allow competitive industrial structures and an innovative 
industry. 
William Witherell suggested the idea of a Common European Economic Space also as a 
guarantee for the irreversibility of the process. He stated that the situation in Eastern Europe 
calls for rapid action by a closely coordinated program. All Western experts but one supported 
the idea of an early convertibility (including Bulgaria) in the context of the reform program 
and stated that it has to be supported by a vision abouA the economic integration in Central 
and Eastern Europe. The opposing opinion of Valtchev, Dimi trov and Williamson advocated a 
gradual approach taking into consideration the present economic situation of Bulgaria and its 
ability to move to convertibility without external support. 
In conclusion, it can be stated, that the present changes have a unique character. The 
Socialist concept of the two world economies failed and two parallel processes were initiated- 
the one of rapid disintegration of the ex-socialist system and one of an effort for its integration 
in the world market system. 
Almost equal economic structures that have existed in the two systems for years now have 
to be unified on the principle of comparative advantages. Lack of transparency due to generally 
unstable macroeconomic conditions, bad information and communications systems, and the lack 
of institutional settings for coordination hamper the process. 
A general approach allowing the quick transplantation of overall conditions, principles and 
institutions from the world marketplace to the transforming countries is the only peaceful way 
of restoring the equilibrium. Convertibility is a key issue in this effort. A lot of intellectual 
investment is necessary not only to replace worn out social and economic dogmas, but also 
to create new visions for the future. This will save a great deal of accompanying additional 
destruction while having a positive effect on the restructuring of probably underestimated di- 
mensions. Providing that a general framework and conception about the future of Central and 
Eastern Europe is created, individual businesses will find their ways to cooperate by rationaliz- 
ing capital investment and fully exploiting existing resources and will achieve restructuring at 
comparatively low costs. 
The choice is still open. 
Convertibility in the general framework of national reform programs subject to international 
support and understanding is no doubt a step in the right direction. 
The participants agreed that the third Varna East-West Seminar in 1991 should discuss "The 
reform of the financial system and new financial institutions in Eastern Europe". 
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Stages in the Transition to 
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Conditions and Stages of the 
Transition to Convertibility of the 
Bulgarian Lev 
T d o r  Valtchev, 
Institute of Economics, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences 
The disappointment from the results of the centralized planning of the economy is so deep that  
all political parties in Bulgaria declared themselves t o  stand for a transition t o  a market economy. 
They have, of course, different views as to the time limits, the methods and the ultimate goals of 
the transition. Some of them propose shock measures while others prefer more gradual changes. 
The transition t o  a market economy is organically linked with the problem of convertibility 
of the Bulgarian lev. The scientists are unanimous when they point out the widely known 
advantages of convertibility, as i t  will connect the national economy with the global economy, and 
will increase the external competition which will force the local producers t o  improve the quality 
of their products, to  introduce innovations and t o  lower their production costs. Convertibility 
wi'l create more attractive conditions for the inflow of foreign capital, new technologies and 
new products. Investment will be directed t o  those branches in which the country has certain 
advantages, and this will gradually lead t o  a more rational structure of both production and 
exports. 
Convertibility is important also for tlie ordinary people. After a long period of strict control 
on the use of foreign currency, when the people were not allowed t o  keep and to  export foreign 
currency and were held responsible t o  the law for breaking the regime for foreign currency 
operations, now they view the convertibility as mainly an opportunity to  travel freely t o  other 
countries and t o  buy goods from tlie Western market. 
In this generally favorable psycliological environment and in the presence of obvious advan- 
tages of convertibility, i t  is natural that  some people look with interest and hope a t  the ideas of 
national and foreign economists for an immediate transition to  convertibility of the  Bulgarian 
lev, using as a basis the rate that  has been formed on the "black market" and on the auctions for 
foreign currency, which is about 10 leva per dollar. Others, however, put forward the  objection 
that  the national economy is in a crisis and there are no conditions for convertibility-they have 
t o  be created now and this should be done systematically and quickly. 
When we analyze the problem it  is necessary t o  first of all make clear what convertibility 
Bulgaria could aim a t  now and in the future. 
The term convertibility itself has undergone a considerable evolution. Various interpretations 
of the term exist. Apart from this, i t  is often used with various modifiers: some speak of full and 
partial convertibility, others of convertibility for residents and for non-residents, of convertibility 
in current payments and in capital transfers, etc. After the reforms in Poland and Yugoslavia, 
the term "internal convertibility" became popular though i t  is not quite clear what i t  means. 
The American economist Ricliard Cooper prefers to call it "residents' convertibility for current 
payments". 
With this variety of interpretations and terms, it is possible to  avoid misunderstanding only 
if we accept the term convertibility in the sense irz which it is used in the Arl'icles of the IMF 
Agreement. The matter is discussed in several texts majn1.y in Articles VIII and XIV, but also 
in Articles XIX and VI. These texts and definitions may not be perfect from a strictly scientific 
point of view, but they are accepted by the largest financial organization in the world and have 
been applied for several decades now without essential changes. 
According t o  the Articles of the IMF Agreement, currencies are convertible of those coun- 
tries which have declared that  they will stick t o  the statute of Article VIII, 552, 3 and 4. uNo 
member shall without the permission of the Fund impose restrictions on the making of pay- 
ments and transfers for current international transactionsn. This means that  both residents 
and non-residents may exchange and use freely the respective currency accounts, i.e., for trade, 
transport, insurance, tourism, personal transfer, etc. Inconvertible are the currencies of those 
countries which have adopted the statute of Article XIV. The latter allows them t o  preserve 
temporarily the existing limitations and control on current payments. As members of the Fund, 
however, these countries must aim a t  removing these limitations when the economic conditions, 
the balance of payment, and the monetary reserves improve t o  a degree which will make this 
possible. 
According to  the Article of the IMF Agreement, for one currency to  be convertible i t  isJnot 
necessary that  i t  should by all means be usable also for capital transfers. The member coun- 
tries "may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international capital movementsn 
(Article VI). 
In the group of current payments, however, the IMF has included also some transfers which 
essentially are closer to  the international capital movements, for example the "normal short- 
term banking and credit facilities in connection with foreign trade and payments of moderate 
amounts for amortization of loans and for depreciation of direct investment" (Article XIX). 
Finally it is necessary to  mention the fact that the Fund does not allow the countries that 
have declared \,heir currency convertible to  turn back to  the statute of Article XIV when steady 
unbalances and disproportions appear in their economy. They may only temporarily and with 
the permission of the Fund introduce some control and limitations in the current payments. 
If we accept the IhlF interpretation of convertibili ty i t  becomes clear that  with the declaration 
of the Bulgarian lev for convertible (i.e., with the declaration that  Bulgaria accepts the statute 
of Article VIII) the country will undertake a heavy responsibility. Such a step should not be 
made lightly and not without the necessary preparation. 
Hn this respect we could draw some lessons from the history of the convertibility during the 
postwar period. We need not recall the crash which Great Britain experienced in 1947 with the 
hasty attempt t o  restore the convertibility of the pound. More convincing is the fact that  the 
majority of the IMF member countries took a long time t o  prepare the convertibility of their 
currencies. The first ten most developed and largest West European countries made this step 
only in 1958 and 1961, Spain and Portugal only after their entry into the European Community 
and Turkey in 1990. It is now more than half a century since the Bretton Woods conference 
took place and the number of countries with officially convertible currencies is 68. However, 
if we look more carefully a t  the actual facts we notice that  a t  least 27 from the developing 
colintries (included in the 68 countries with convertibility), have actually infringed the statute 
of Article VIII, having imposed, with or without the permission of the Fund, various restrictions 
on current payments for long periods of time. Such countries are Bolivia, Argentina, Ecuador, 
etc. This means that the number of the countries with convertible currencies is really about 40. 
Even now the majority of the IMF member countries have inconvertible currencies. One can 
assume that  they have serious economic reasons not to  accept the statute of Article VIII (and 
that  this is due not only to  conservatism and love for administration in the monetary field). 
The present crisis in the Bulgarian economy does not pose favorable conditions for an im- 
mediate transitiotz to convertibility. The major part of the prices for goods and services are 
determined administratively, and not on the market. There is no money and capital market. 
The interest rates are fixed "on the top". The central bank is still strongly dependent on the 
government and seems t o  continue t o  finance the budgetary deficit through money emission. 
The country has no money market if we do not take into consideration the rare and irregular 
auctions for foreign currency and the "black market". The monetary coefficients are canceled, 
but there are still multiple currency practices. The country has no monetary reserves, i t  has a 
big external debt and has declared a moratorium on the payment of amortization and interests. 
The economic reform which must secure the transition t o  the market economy is only beginning. 
It is possible t o  say that  the conditions for the introduction of convertibility in Bulgaria are more 
negative than they are in Hungary, Yugoslavia, Poland, and the CSFR. 
As a country which will probably soon become a member of the IMF, Bulgaria is naturally 
obliged t o  stick t o  the Articles of the IMF Agreement and to  do everything possible in order 
t o  make i ts  currency convertible. However, taking into consideration the present economic 
conditions, i t  would be wiser if Bulgaria chooses, for the time being, the statute of Article XIV. 
This means that  we shall be able t o  preserve the existing monetary restrictions and controls, 
but we will not be able t o  introduce new ones. 
I t  is necessary t o  bear in mind that  the restrictions in Bulgaria are, on the one hand, 
unnecessarily severe, and on the other hand-they are not sufficient. It is not difficult t o  cancel 
or soften the unnecessary restrictions. At the same time, however, we must introduce some 
additional restrictions which will secure the balance of payments. For example, Poland did so 
when, parallel with the announcement for "internal convertibility" of the zloty, i t  increased the 
customs duties in order t o  make imports more expensive and t o  achieve an active trade balance. 
Apart from customs duties i t  may prove necessary t o  also impose other restrictions like import 
taxes, time deposits in the import of some goods, limits on the sales of currency for private 
travel, etc. 
As t o  the additional monetary and other restrictions which we could introduce, i t  is necessary 
t o  start  consultations with the IMF in order t o  prevent the danger of going too far in that 
direction. The IMF will ~ ~ o b a b l y  be understanding, realizing that  this is not a part of a long 
term policy for protection, but only a necessary step on the road t o  liberalization. 
Liberalization could start almost immediately, for example with regular monetary auctions 
accessible t o  all kinds of organizations and persons, or by the liberalization of the imports of 
consumer goods and by means of production for the private companies, or by allowing the 
organizations t o  receive loans from foreign firms and banks for production and export, etc. 
All these measures, however, will be only a partial liberalization. It is more important to  
start systematic preparation by creating the conditions for introducing convertibility of the lev 
in the spirit of Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement. The measures could cover: 
a market reform, privatization and demonopolization; 
creation of a modern banking system, a money market and capital market; 
balancing the budget and a tax reform; 
introduction of a unified exchange rate and normalization of the monetary regime; 
4 balancing the balance of payments and re-scheduling the external debt; 
4 creation of conditions for attracting foreign capital; 
4 securing international support for the introduction of convertibility, etc. 
The first absolutely necessary condition for convertibility is the creation of a market economy. 
In Bulgaria the transition t o  such an economy is only beginning. The majority of prices are 
fixed centrally. The prices of basic food stuffs are kept low through subsidies which take 20% 
of the budgetary expenditures. The means of production are distributed administratively and 
therefore there is no market for the mea.ns of production. The majority of the wages are fixed. 
The illusion about the worker's self management and that of the resultative nature of the salary 
a.re not fully overcome. In spite of the reduction in the volume of output the factories are slow in 
reducing the labor force. The number of people employed in the administrative and bureaucratic 
structures is also reduced too slowly. 
This shows that there are nu conditions for convertibility, as there are no developed market 
relations. It is not possible t o  have a normal money market unless the markets for goods, 
services, labor force and capital are developed a t  tlie same time. 
The market reform, however, will be barred if the monopoly structures are not destroyed 
by administrative and legal means. There are still whole branches in which there is only one 
enterprise-dealing with production, purchasing and sales. The demonopolization will proba- 
bly start  with separating state monopolies into smaller companies and will continue with the 
privatization and the revival of private and cooperative organizations. 
However, privatization in Bulgaria is also just beginning. Indeed a process of spontaneous 
privatization started, which had some elements of plundering the state property a t  prices too 
low by persons connected with the party and the state machine. This process was temporarily 
stopped, a t  the request of the democratic opposition in Parliament. A law of privatization 
is forthcoming, but i t  will probably provoke long discussions in Parliament. I t  is planned t o  
transform large enterprises into stock companies, but i t  is not yet decided in what form they 
will be privatized later on. The problem of the ownership of the land which has never been 
nationalized in Bulgaria is extremely difficult. There are different opinions. Some propose that  
the land should be given back to  the former owners or their successors, others recommend that  
the land should be a collective property and should also be leased t o  private farmers, and oth'ers 
stick to the principle that  the land should belong to  those who cultivate it. Probably in the  next 
few years the arable land will not be purchased and sold freely. 
Under these circumstances i t  is obvious that  the transition t o  a market economy in Bulgaria 
will take a long time. This does not mean, however, that  the problem of the convertibility of the 
national currency must be postponed until the market reform is completed. It will be sufficient 
if the market reform starts and reaches a certain critical point, when the market relations will 
have a rather big share. Only then will tlie first condition for convertibility be available. 
The second condition is the creation of a modern monetary and credit system. If judged 
by Western standards, the banking system in Bulgaria is probably one of the most backward 
spheres. For a long time i t  has been performing extrinsical functions-on the one hand i t  used 
t o  exercise strict control on the enterprises, depriving them of their initiative, and on the  other 
hand i t  used t o  accumulate the free money of the population not so much for financing the 
production process as for financing tlie state budget. 
One of the first measures in reforming tlie banking system will be the creation of a bank really 
independent from tlie Government central (national) bank as an emission institution responsible 
for the stability of the national currency and regulating the money supply. 
A decision t o  do this has already been made, but i t  is not yet realized. Already started, 
but still in its initial stage, is the process of setting up a system of universal commercial banks 
and specialized banks (farmers', cooperative, mortgage, etc.) and joint stock companies. I t  is 
necessary to  also eliminate the monopoly of the State Savings Bank which was, until recently, 
the  only bank authorized to  keep the deposits of the population. 
The interest rates are still fixed centrally. Due to  increased inflation in the last few months 
they have become negative. In order to  stimulate the accumulation of capital and t o  decrease 
the inflation pressure of the purchasing power of the population, i t  is necessary t o  move t o  
market-fixed interest rates and t o  their transformation into positive interest rates with the  help 
of their regulation by the National Bank. 
The  creation of a market of stocks and bonds will take more time. The  country has almost 
no securities. Naturally, there is no stock exchange either. However, a draft law for the stock 
exchange is in preparation. 
The monetary and credit policy and privatization could contribute to  the harnessing of infla- 
tion which (having been rather moderate until recently-about 5% per year) increases strongly 
and is now more than 10% per month. The presence of inflation is not an insurmountable bar- 
rier against convertibility. However, it is by no means a factor which favors the transition t o  
convertibility. 
At the beginning of the year the inflation potential was estimated t o  be about 15 billion leva 
(one part of the free savings of the population). It seems however t o  have increased considerably 
in the last few months. Until recently its compensation seemed possible through the attraction 
of free savings in the banks (with the assistance of positive interest rates) and through pumping 
out a part of the money mass from the population (by selling small pieces of state property- 
shops, workshops, hotels, land, etc.). With the speeding up of inflation, the task became more 
complicated and i t  is possible t o  expect a currency reform accompanied by temporary freezing 
or high taxation (confiscation) of a part of the bank notes available in the population. One way 
or another, the harnessing of the  inflation process and the reduction of the inflation rate is badly 
needed with a view t o  the future transition t o  convertibility. 
Bulgaria has not yet started the w r y  important =form in the budgetary system and tazation. 
Presently too large a portion of the national income (almost 90%) is distributed through the  
budget. Until this percentage is lowered t o  about 50%, no market processes will be possible 
as there will not be a terrain for them. In order t o  decrease the  role of the budget, i t  will be 
necessary to put an  end t o  the practice of covering the budget liabilities through the emission 
of money and from savings kept in the State Savings Bank. The budget must be freed from the 
subsidies that  are too large. 
Bulgaria is awaiting a tax reform too. Taxes are too high-they exceed 50% and reach 97% 
of the profit. This prevents the self-financing of enterprises and bars technological innovation 
and extended reproduction. Laws for introducting VAT and an income tax for the population 
are under preparation. 
In order t o  create conditions for convertibility, it is necessary t o  normalize, as soon as possible, 
the exchange rate and the monetary regime. This does not yet mean convertibility, nor that  we 
have adopted the statute of Article VIII. 
Coefficients were removed in Bulgaria, but there are still multiple currency practices. There 
are three official rates: a basic rate, an exchange rate and a rate used in auctions, and there is 
also a "black market" rate. The country must accept a unified rate as soon as possible, in a11y 
case long before we accept the statute of Article VIII. 
There are different opinions as t o  whether the unified rate should be based on the black I 
market rate or on the auction rate (which are similar), or i t  should be oriented t o  the purchasing 
power parity. It is also argued whether the rate should be fixed or floating, and if i t  is fixed- 
t o  what monetary unit i t  should be bound ( to  the dollar, t o  the ECU or t o  the DM). There 
are discussions which reveal some advantages of using the unified rate which is close t o  the 
purchasing power parity, with periodical devaluation corresponding to  the rate of inflation. 
It is impossible t o  think of convertibility unless some exchange market is created. Such a 
market does not exist a t  the moment. It is possible t o  start with regular auctions accessible for 
all agents, and t o  reach a t  a later stage an interbank money market under the  stronger or the 
weaker control of the National Bank. 
I t  is also necessary t o  take measures in order to  stop the "dollarizationn of the economy. The  
dollar is increasingly coming into the circulation of money and operates as a second, parallel 
currency. Unless the prestige of the lev is improved (and i t  is undermined by the presence of 
a parallel currency) there are no chances for the lev t o  become convertible. The approaches 
t o  the elimination of the parallel currency include increased interest rates of deposits in leva, 
administrative restrictions on the use of the dollar in internal circulation, anti-inflation policy, 
creation of a regular money market with relatively steady rates of foreign currency in the Central 
Bank. This would facilitate the demand for foreign currency for current payments. 
For a long time Bulgaria was considered a first class client by Western banks. In the last 
few years, however, for various reasons which will not be analyzed here, the current balance of 
payments became passive, the reserves of foreign currency sharply decreased and the country was 
forced to  declare a moratorium a.nd t o  temporarily stop the payment of interests and amortization 
on the foreign debt. 
The situation became still worse for several reasons: the Kuwait crisis, the increased oil 
prices, and the transition that as from 1991 payments to  the East European countries and the 
TJSSR would be in hard currency. 
The Kuwait crisis was a great blow to the current balance of payments. Iraq owes Bulgaria 
a considerable amount (1.2 billion dollars), and according to  the agreement this debt had to be 
paid with deliveries of oil. After Bulgaria joined the international embargo, the oil deliveries 
were stopped and the country has to  purchase these quantities from other sources, a t  the high 
current prices. 
The decision of the CMEA countries to  move, starting from 1991, t o  trade a t  global prices in 
dollars will have a negative effect on Bulgarian exports. Our most important trade partners-the 
USSR, the former GDR and the other East European countries (whose share in the Bulgarian 
trade exceeds 90%) will partially orient themselves t o  other suppliers. The reduction of the Bul- 
garian exports will force limitations on the imports of raw materials, fuel, machines, equipment 
and industrial goods from the USSR and the East European countries. Opportunities still exist 
to  reduce this negative effect by concluding multilateral (and more probably bilateral) agree- 
ments between the CMEA countries for payments in clearing dollars. The problem, however is 
not yet settled, though 1991 is a t  the door. 
After the declaration of the moratorium it  became practically impossible to  obtain new bank 
and firm credits. For this reason the country is already experiencing a shortage of raw materials 
and spare parts. Industrial production was lowered by 15% and it seems that the downward 
tendency will continue, which in turn lowers the export opportunities of the country. 
It is absurd under these circumstances-a passive balance of payments, zero reserves and a 
moratorium on the external debt-to think of moving to convertibility. Efforts must be directed 
to  concluding agreements wit11 the consortium of Mrestern banks for the re-scheduling of the 
debt. When Bulgaria becomes a member of the IMF and works out a stabilization program 
complying with their requirements, it is possible to expect the first loan from IMF. This would 
contribute to  a normalization of relations with commercial banlrs, for reviving their trust in the 
solvency of Bulgaria, and for obtaining reasonable new loans. 
The new loans, together with the growth of production and exports (as a result of the steadily 
implemented economic reform) would contribute t o  the balancing of the balance of payments 
and the servicing of the external debt, and also for the rise in the monetary reserves. 
A certain role in this respect is expected from the inflow of foreign direct and portfolio 
investments, with legal guarantees for the remittance of profits and repatriation of capital. 
This would lead to  another important condition for the introduction of convertibility. 
Finally, it is necessary to  provide for international assistance. Hungary and Yugoslavia 
obtained credits from the Ih4F and from other sources. Poland even created, with Western 
assistance, a special fund of 1 billion dollars, whose aim is only to  guarantee the stability of the 
new rate of the local currency. Bulgaria has not even started negotiations for such international 
support without which convertibility is impossible. 
The negative general economic conditions and the lack of fundamental conditions deter- 
mine the durntion, the peculiarities and the stages of the eventual progrnms for a tmnsition to  
convertibility of the Bulgarian lev. 
Two stages are expected: institutional preparation and creation of a real market economy. 
During the first stage, which will last about one year or a little more, a package of laws will 
be prepared and adopted-of ownership, privatization, banking, taxation, foreign investments, 
etc. At this stage the necessary minimum steps will be taken for stabilizing the economy-first 
of all for restricting inflation through the reduction of money emission and increasing salaries, 
reducting the budgetary deficit, and other similar steps. It is also important to  take measures to 
secure the supply of raw materials for industrial production and for the provision of food stuffs 
and other necessities. If these stabilization measures are organized in a special program, which 
stabilization program must be closely linked with the creation of market mechanisms, and it 
should by no means consolidate the administrative methods for economic management. 
The second stage covers the process of creating a market economy. It is longer, covering 
several years, and as already mentioned, includes: 
Full liberalization of prices 
Creation of a modern monetary and banking system 
Balancing the budget and a tax reform, and 
Re-scheduling the debt and balancing the foreign payments 
Within the second stage, which will create the framework and the conditions for convertibil- 
ity, it is necessary to implement step-by-step a policy of libemlization of the regime for foreign 
currency. It would be wrong to start with the adoption of the statute of Article VIII or with 
the introduction of "internal convertibilityn of the type of those in Poland and Yugoslavia, as 
the required conditions are not available. It is impossible, to outline at  this moment, the exact 
sequence of the steps for money liberalization, but one possible arrangement could look like this: 
Regular auctions for foreign currency, hoping to gradually come to the balanced rate, at the 
start; 
When the auction rate becomes relatively stable (within one or two years), the multiple 
currency practices are stopped, and it is possible to move to a unified exchange rate; 
In order to create conditions for attracting foreign capital already at this stage, repatriation 
of profits is guaranteed, however, keeping control on the origin of the leva amounts which 
are remitted. 
It is desirable that all currency receipts should be centralized in the National Bank, as was 
done in Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia, but for a certain period of time the National 
Bank will have very limited reserves and will not be able to meet the demands for foreign 
currency for current payments, it would be reasonable to allow the loci4 enterprises to keep 
for themselves a certain part of their currency receipts from exports. They will have the 
right to use it for imports and for sales at  the auctions, but not to operate with it on the 
domestic market, which would have a "dollarizing" effect. 
Mrhen a relative balance in the current pa.yments is reached and the currency reserves are 
increased, without unnecessa.ry delay it is possible to introduce "internal convertibility" of 
the lev, i.e., for residents, for current pa.yments. At this point centralization begins of all 
currency receipts in the National Bank, and the latter ensures the internal convertibility 
(i.e., for residents) at  the unified rate. For non-residents the limitations for the purchase of 
currency against leva (with unknown origins) remains. Also limited are the possibilities for 
non-residents to obtain certain assets (stocks, bonds, real estate) against leva, as the danger 
of selling out a part of the national wealth at  a knock out price exists. This restriction 
remains in force until the prices of these assets on the domestic market become normal. 
Next come the measures for creating an interbank currency market and for liberalizating the 
regime for non-residents, with the right to obtain stocks, bonds and real estate against leva. 
This actually fulfills the requirements of Article VIII of the Articles of the IMF Agreement. 
The leva becomes convertible for current payments both for residents and for non-residents. 
The duration of the process of liberalization until the adoption of the statute of Article VIII 
is not possible to be defined in advance. It depends on the success of the economic reform as 
a whole, and also on the changing external conditions. In case of a favorable development in 
Bulgaria and in Europe, which is unlikely, the foreign currency sphere in Bulgaria could be 
liberalized quicker, a.nd the statute oi Article VIII could be already adopted in the middle of 
the 90s. 

Stages in the Transition to 
Convertibility for Eastern Europe 
and the USSR 
Richard Portes, 
Centre for Economic Policy Research, UK 
How quickly and by what route should currency convertibility be approached by the economies 
in the process of transformation from socialist central planning t o  market capitalism? I t  is likely 
that  more has been written on this issue than on all others involved in the transition except 
perhaps for privatization. 
There are some obvious reasons. The creditors of the East European debtors see convertibil- 
ity as a major step towards normalizing the position of these economies in the world economy 
and thus facilitating debt service. The international financial institutions naturally put the 
highest priority on one of their own major objectives (Article VIII). Potential investors regard 
convertibility in general as a touchstone of virtue, though they may not distinguish between its 
various forms. And for many Eastern economists and policy-makers, convertibility is almost 
equivalent to  legitimacy, a badge that  will entitle them to sit a t  the table with Western finance 
ministers and central bankers on a par-so t o  speak-as long as i t  lasts. 
All this may help to  explain why some argue there should be no stages in the transition t o  
convertibility: tha t  i t  should come a t  the beginning of a. comprehensive reform program, at least 
in the form of "internal" convertibility (on current account, for residents). This view was not 
merely implemented in the Polish effort t o  exit dramatically from hyperinflation, but is also a 
feature of the radical version of the Czechoslovakian reforms. Many Hungarian economists too 
want convertibility first, questions later. 
A qualified version of this approa.ch is that  there is a minimal initial package of reforms 
necessary to  establish a credible change of economic regime, and that  this package must include 
resident convertibility on current account. The strongest version is the extreme "Big Bang": that  
i t  is necessary t o  do almost everything simultaneously, because i t  is well known in economics 
that  everything depends on everything else. This is after all what we learn in basic general 
equilibrium theory. Dynamics is difficult, made even more so by the increasingly popular notion 
that  the outcome actually depends on the path (hysteresis). The easiest strategy, i t  seems, is t o  
ignore it. 
Some would do so by saying that  if you want to  go there, you should not start  from here-no 
path will make it. But these economies are indeed here-burdened with the multiple legacies and 
distortions of decades of central planning and comprehensive state ownership. The difficulty is 
that  i t  is impossible t o  test the hypothesis that  a purist "Big Bangn is the most effective road from 
here to  there-an efficient, dynamic market economy with predominantly private ownership. 
The hypothesis is not testable simply because i t  is administratively and institutionally im- 
possible to implement all the required reforms a t  once. Hence the failure of any program can 
always be blamed on wha.t i t  left out or implemented inadequa.tely. If, as in Poland, convert- 
ibility is the keystone of the initial package, and even a.t the ma.cro level that  package does 
not seen, to be delivering on i t s  promises, its architects may claim that this is because a micro 
level supply-side response was necessary (assumtd"), and this required immediate privatization, 
whicli the system did not deliver. 
There is a weaker version of the assertion that "stages" is just a euphemism for indecision 
and delay when comprehensive action is required. At recent OECD and IMF seminars, it was 
concluded that the academic literature on "sequencing" was just that--"academic9' in the sense 
of being an unhelpful intellectual rationalization of the inability to  prescribe clear, practical 
programs for action (IMF Survey, August 1990). 
I believe, on the contrary, that the notion of "robust sequencingn is not merely relevant 
but must serve as the organizing framework for any serious, implementable reform program 
("Introduction" to  European Economy 43, March 1990). It is hard to  spend more than half 
an hour analyzing any major component of such a program without asking what must precede 
it  and what other measures i t  will make possible that would otherwise not work. Indeed, the 
*Shatalin Plan" may give insufficient attention to  the interactions among the main component 
measures; the sequencing is there, but only temporal, not economic. 
The chosen sequence of stages must be robust t o  external shocks and errors in assessing 
behavioral responses. It must be credible-preferably announced ex ante as a comprehensive 
sequence that clearly changes the economic regime and thereby changes expectations radically. 
The problem here, as always, is how policy-makers can credibly pre-commit themselves to a 
time-inconsistent program. Will they really control credit and avoid tax-subsidy concessions if 
that will cause many bankruptcies? Will they maintain controls on nominal wages regardless 
of how far real wages fall? Will they stick to their chosen nominal exchange rate if i t  quickly 
becomes drastically over-valued and convertibility itself is threatened? 
This line of reasoning leads to  the conclusion that convertibility should come towards the 
end of the sequence because it appears that there are so many preconditions for i t  t o  succeed. 
For this very reason, however, a commitment to early convertibility, backed by international 
institutions and perceived as a key element of the political-economic program, raises the stakes 
and may itself help to push the "preconditions" through. And the "critical mass" of measures 
required for credibility may include convertibility, for which the necessary conditions need not 
be preconditions. 
Just as it is impossible to implemeilt all the necessary reforms simultaneously, so I cannot 
in a brief introduction cover all the relevant issues. We shall discuss exchange-rate policy and 
debt later in the conference. Maintaining convertibility a t  the pegged rate requires a realistic 
choice of exchange rate, adequate reserves, and a sustainable debt burden; and it helps to 
choose properly the currency (basket) to which to peg. The alternative of floating must be 
evaluated: My remarks below on the importance of macroeconomic stabilization should not be 
taken to  mean that these countries must achieve (for example) the EC inflation rate (adjusted 
for differential productivity growth) so as to  maintain a fixed parity with the ECU. 
I take i t  as given that commodity convertibility is a prerequisite for current account con- 
vertibility, and I do not discuss capital account convertibility. It clearly must come after the 
freeing of current account transactions, not only to avoid capital flight, but also conversely, to  
keep control over inward flows. Newly independent domestic firms, households and banks may 
borrow irresponsibly; excessive capital inflows may not be absorbable and may in the short run 
lower the price of tradeables and discourage production for export, while in the long run proving 
unserviceable. It seems unlikely that inconvertibility on capital account will be a significant ob- 
stacle to  desirable foreign direct investment, as long as current account convertibility guarantees 
the freedom to remit profits. 
Finally, I shall not consider intermediate forms of convertibility. There has been much dis- 
cussion of proposals for an East European Payments Union analogous to  the postwar EPU, as  a 
successor to CMEA (ECE, Economic Survey of Europe 1989-90; CEPR Bulletin 40; P. Bofinger, 
CEPR Discussion Paper No 458; P. Il;e~le~l, IMF). One could envisage a looser, informal pay- 
ments union without credit facilities, in which trade surpluses would actually be Utransferablen 
(Nuti). 
The issues here are analytically and empirically interesting, but there are limits to the 
analogy with postwar "gradualists" approaches to convertibility. The multiple legacies of central 
planning are different from and deeper than those of a war economy, not merely because the 
former has lasted so much longer. The Eastern countries undergoing transformation need totally 
new price systems and a massive injection of competition. It is hard to  see how to  do this quickly 
except through a radical opening of the economy to  trade, which would include current account 
convertibility a t  a unified exchange rate. That would overcome some (by no means all) of the 
inherited distortions. 
But this open trade policy is not sustainable without domestic macroeconomic stabilization 
and substantial price responsiveness of import demand and export supply. Restoring macroe- 
conomic equilibrium is both a stock and a flow problem. The stock dis-equilibrium in most, if 
not all, of these countries can probably be eliminated without a confiscatory currency reform, 
through a combination of initially pushing the price level up sharply, providing a reasonable 
portfolio of assets a t  attractive returns, and creating sufficient uncertainty about employment 
prospects to  encourage precautionary savings. The flow dis-equilibrium is in most countries due 
to  budget deficits which must be eliminated by quite conventional measures. 
It is claimed that imposing financial discipline ( a  "hard budget constraint") on enterprises is a 
necessary and/or sufficient condition for macroeconomic equilibrium and hence for convertibility. 
It is clearly not sufficient, since the government budget can remain in deficit for all sorts of other 
reasons that keep revenues low and expenditures high. Nor is it necessary: the macroeconomic 
(strictly, monetary) position in most of these countries was sustainable until the mid- 1980s, 
when it deteriorated sharply in the USSR, Bulgaria and Hungary. Poland has always been more 
inflationary and had a burst a t  the beginning of the 1980s, but the slide into hyperinflation did 
not begin until late 1988 (or even perhaps early 1989). 
There is a strong case for the view that the deterioration was due partly t o  external shocks 
(especially a rising burden of debt service) and policy aberrations (e.g., the Soviet anti-alcohol 
campaign that reduced excise revenues), but mainly to partial and inconsistent decentralization, 
which eroded the enterprise "tax" base and weakened central (and bank) control over enter- 
prise expenditures. If the "soft budget constraint" and all its nefarious consequences had been 
characteristic of the centrally planned economies from the outset (early postwar), it would be 
remarkable that the.denouement was so long delayed. Moreover, the "levelling" characteristic of 
the standard, unreformed CPE system of enterprise finance and "taxation" involves not merely 
subsidizing loss-makers but also siplloning excess (above-plan) profits away from profit-makers. 
Part of the recent problem comes from giving the enterprises control over those excess profits. 
It is nevertheless clear that current account convertibility is not sustainable if enterprises can 
borrow unlimited amounts of domestic currency a t  low real interest rates in order to  purchase 
foreign currency, without a credible medium-run solvency constraint. This is also a compelling 
objection t o  foreign currency auctions until financial discipline is established; but when i t  is, there 
is a strong argument for adopting a single fixed exchange rate that will make i t  transparently 
clear which activities and firms are profitable and which are not. 
Most of this is consistent with a fairly conventional sequencing (Nuti): 
(1) Monetary restraint with budgetary discipline. 
(2) Letting prices vary to  clear markets. 
(3) Establishing competition by breaking up monopolies. 
(4) Instituting financial discipline and elimina.ting "levelling" across enterprises. 
(5) Cutting the hierarchical links between centra.1 authorities and the enterprises. 
(6) Opening to international trade at  a unified excha.nge rate. 
(7) Current a.ccount convertibility. 
(8) Capital account convertibility. 
But some of the arguments above suggest a rather different program, in which current account 
convertibilii,~ does indeed come arruch earlier. Is ~ i o t  the top priority to  establish a reasonably 
rational price structure? Wliy free prices only to  establish a closed-economy, monopolistically 
distorted equilibrium? How long will i t  take to  break up the monopolies? How much longer 
thereafter will i t  take to  move from the closed-economy equilibrium t o  something approximating 
the open-economy eqnilibrium, and how much damage will have been done in the  meanwhile? 
Both views--or a t  least my own-reject a wide variety of partial measures. Partial, cen- 
trally directed price "reform" however much i t  used "world market prices" as a reference point; 
enterprise retention of part of their export earnings; restricted and necessarily distorted foreign 
exchange markets, in particular auctions in the context of a basically closed economy with ir- 
rational prices and firms (a t  least some) not subject t o  financial discipline; all these would be 
intermediate steps more likely t o  go backward than forward. 
I t  is clear that  convertibility is for these countries not simply a question of international 
macroeconomics, not a monetary issue. It is central t o  the process of transformation and must 
be situated within that  process in a way appropriate t o  the  particular country concerned, which 
may depend heavily on whether i t  will be possible t o  sustain convertibility once introduced. 
Certainly a forced retreat would be devastating t o  the credibility which is indispensable for any 
reform program. But sustainability is not merely a matter of when convertibility is implemented, 
but also how. There is considerable scope for discussion of this throughout the conference. 
Recent Polish Experience in 
Monetary Convertibility 
Kaml Lutkowski, 
Advisor to the Ministry of Finance, Poland 
On January 1, 1990, a package of new economic legislation came into force in Poland, which 
represents the basic groundwork for the first stage of the program of monetary stabilization 
and of long-range institutional change, inaugurated on the same day. The program, known as 
the "Balcerowicz Plan", was designed to transform Poland into an open modern type market 
economy and included, from the very beginning, the intent to introduce the convertibility of the 
Polish zloty t o  the broadest extent judged warranted under the circumstances of the moment. 
Thus, the Polish currency has been convertible since the beginning of the year in the sense 
of Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement (convertibility on current account with some 
restrictions on services and capital movements) on the basis of the stable and practically uniform 
rate of exchange of 9500 zloty = 1 dollar. 
The purpose of the present paper is, first, t o  provide a brief outline of the new foreign- 
exchange mechanism as  circumscribed b~r  the foreign exchange law forming part of the afore- 
mentioned package, second, to  highlight the role ascribed to  convertibility in the Balcerowicz 
Plan and, finally, to  make a tentative assessmeilt of the results achieved so far. 
The Present Polish Foreign Exchange System 
In order t o  bring out the characteristic features of the new system more clearly, a short re- 
minder of some basic traits of the foreign exchange mechanism typical of the centrally managed 
economies may be appropriate here. Those traits included: foreign trade and foreign exchange 
monopoly, quantitative controls, a system of import licensing and foreign exchange permits on 
the one hand, and differentiated subsidies to  export, income tax reliefs, preferential rates of 
interest on export credits, on the other hand. Rates of exchange, usually fixed at artificial 
levels, exerted little or no influence on the internal price structure and correspondingly little 
influence upon the physical volume and structure of trade as independent determining factors. 
Even though in the wake of successive reform attempts the above mentioned features lost much 
of their sharpness as mechanisms of control became more flexible (e.g., retention quotas, for- 
eign exchange auctions, greater scope of free decision a t  the lower levels, more flexible pricing 
policies), the basic traits such as foreign exchange rationing, direct controls and isolation from 
the immediate influence of the world market remained in Poland, as more or less everywhere in 
Central and Eastern Europe, until the collapse of the old system. Obviously, the degree of disar- 
ray in Poland was compounded by some a.dditiona1 circumstances like rapid inflation, prolonged 
stagnation, exceptional degree of social discontent, etc., which seemed to  make Poland the least 
probable candidate for an ea.rly introduction of convertibility, at  least if one views the problem 
in a traditional perspective. However, the present reform 11a.s taken the plunge in spite of all the 
uncertainty and risks involved. The structure of the new moneta.ry mechanism is based upon 
the following fundamental premises: 
4 Prices of goods constituting '10% of the G N P  have been completely liberalized 
a All quantitative restrictions OJI imports as well as almost all on exports have been dismantled 
a, A pretty uniform tariff has been introduced, kept-with some exceptions-a.t quite a low 
level; during the past months custom duties on 
4,500 items have been completely silspended (production inputs) and the remaining items 
are subject t o  5% custom duties on the average, after several successive reductions designed 
to  stimulate import activity 
s The principle of a foreign trade monopoly has been abolished and all sectors (state-owned, 
cooperative and private) have been put on the same footing. No special license t o  open up 
a foreign trade enterprise is necessary, merely registering. Access t o  foreign exchange for 
import purposes is not subject to  any limits on fulfilling the above mentioned condition. 
Thus, introducing convertibility has been combined with extremely radical opening in the 
sphere of trade policy in general and with breaking some long cherished prejudices and monop- 
olies (like the celebrated "foreign trade monopolyn). It should be added, that on the same day 
all subsidies t o  export, all tax exemptions and reductions, as well as all preferential treatment 
of export in the sphere of credit policy, were abolished. 
The system of retention quotas has been abolished and all exporting units were obliged 
to convert their foreign exchange proceeds into national currency. However, the deposits held 
by the enterprises on January 1, 1990, were freed from obligatory conversion. The enterprises 
continued to dispose of them freely until their depletion. As a matter of fact, export proceeds 
are converted automatically by the banks, through which the business is transacted. Contrary 
to  initial fears, automatic conversion turned out to be rather painless to  enterprises and one 
does not hear any complaints, as the rate of exchange has remained stable and enterprises have 
had no problem of obtaining any amount of foreign exchange they wanted, if they had to  make 
a legitimate payment. 
As to  services directly connected with foreign trade, they are subject to the same rules as 
trade in goods, i.e., payments are liberalized. Otherwise, however, services-though forming part 
of the current account-remain regulated by the system of general and specific permits. Capital 
transactions are, oi  course, subject to  controls: granting as well as taking credit is regulated 
on traditional principles. Direct investments and payments connected with them (remittance 
sf profits and salaries) are free within the limits determined by the present legislation on joint 
ventures. That legislation is now under review and will soon be radically altered: complete 
freedom to transfer profits and the abolishment of the cumbersome system of licensing will 
probably become a fact very soon. 
In contrast to  "economic  unit^'^, households (private individuals) are allowed to  keep foreign 
exchange deposits with Polish banks and are not obliged to sell foreign currency, which they 
acquire. Foreign money withdrawn from bank accounts may freely be carried abroad without any 
limit or permission. Individuals can also purchase foreign currency legally on the parallel market. 
However, there is a limit on the amount of foreign currency, which one may carry abroad, if the 
money in question was not taken from the bank account, but acquired in a different way. The 
limit at present is 500 US dollars. Carrying greater amounts is possible under the permit system. 
Polish currency may not be used as a means of international payment and carrying it  abroad is 
subject to restrictions. Thus, free convertibility under the present system is, strictly speaking, 
limited t o  current account transactions and is of the "internal" or "domesticn type. It must be 
added, however, that it appears to be working technically very smoothly and I must personally 
say that in the debate currently going on in the Polish press on many controversial aspects of the 
government's economic policy I do not recall having encountered any serious complaints about 
how the system is working. This is in glaring contrast with the period immediately preceding 
reform, when the fire of criticism was concentrated primarily on that aspect of the new Program. 
The move to convertibility was commorlly judged to  be the most risky part of the attempt, 
deemed to end in disaster very soon. Technically, a t  least, it turned out to  be probably the 
most successiul piece of the reiorm exercise, although-from a different perspective-one may 
always challenge that  assertion on other than technical grounds (e.g., by raising the question 
whether the price paid for the achievement has not been excessive, as some critics maintain-I 
shall briefly revert to  that  point later). 
The foreign exchange market in Poland is a t  the moment composed of the unified bank 
market, through which payments to  and from abroad are channeled, insofar as they are connected 
with foreign trade and other transactions (under the permit system). Up to  now, banks are 
selling foreign exchange a t  the official rate to  Ueconomic units" only for import and related 
purposes. At present, households may buy foreign currency merely in the counter (parallel) 
market. The parallel market is allowed t o  float within the band of 10% in relation t o  the official 
rate. However, i t  has moved merely within the range of 2-3% until now, remaining a t  first 
under upward pressure, as a result of the initial sharp devaluation. Thus the rate of exchange, 
though formally not fully uniform, has in practice stayed virtually uniform, with the central 
bank intervening marginally on the parallel market a t  some moments. Splitting the market 
into two parts (similar t o  introducing obligatory sale of the currency for export) was initially 
designed as a safety valve t o  reduce potential speculative pressures on the zloty. The danger has 
not materialized up to  now and the authorities are considering the idea of unifying the market 
fully by allowing private individuals not only to  sell but also t o  buy currency in banks. I t  is 
worth noting too, that  in mid-1990 the "Pewex" (hard currency) shops have started t o  sell goods 
t o  private buyers not only against foreign currency, but also against the Polish zloty. 
Of course, the above mentioned liberalizing moves refer to  hard currency trade, as the CMEA 
trade this year is still being conducted through the traditional channels with the rate of the zloty 
fixed a t  2,100 = 1 ruble. 
The Role of Convertibility in the Reform Program and the Results Obtained 
So Far 
The shap~: of the Polish program of reform was s t r ~ n g l y  influenced by the situation in which 
i t  was elaborated-the most serious threat to  the nation's economic security a t  the moment 
stemmed from the monetary disarray. The country was clearly slipping into hyperinflation and 
the monetary system was already on the verge of collapse. Thus, monetary stabilization was 
decla.red to  be the most urgent task and the precondition for more fundamental structural and 
institutional reforms. 
Creating a macroeconomic framework for stability implied imposing severe budget discipline 
and tight control over the supply of money. That  has been the core of the stabilization program. 
However, a hyperinflationary situation with its strong inertial factors (expectations) made i t  
advisable t o  provide the stabilization package with "nominal anchors", designed t o  break the 
inertia forces a t  play, which could otherwise transform the initial ("correctiven) jump on prices 
into an explosion of wage-price spiral. In the course of negotiations with the IMF, which offered 
the possibility of a stand-by credit in support of the stabilization effort, i t  was decided that  
there would be two such anchors: a strict tax-based wage policy, and a stable rate of exchange, 
which should be kept fixed for a t  least three months. 
Thus, from the very start,  convertibility a t  a stable rate of exchange became crucially impor- 
tant, even the central element of reform. On the one hand, i t  was t o  act as an  important factor 
of correcting the price structure, thereby laying the foundation of restructuring the economy, 
and-at the same time-reintegrating the country economically with the outside world. Apart 
from that  long-term task, it had a more immediate, though not less important task in the short- 
term to  perform: to act as a factor strengthening the confidence in the value of the zloty, and 
t o  cushion-through imports-the shock of price liberalization. What, I think, distinguishes 
convertibility a t  a stable rate of exchange from all other important elements of the stabilization 
package (such as wage policy, budgetary and monetary policy) is that its powerful psycholog- 
ical impact a t  the critical moment is positive in nature, while all other factors contributing to  
stabilization have a negative psychological effect in the sense of creating hardship and inflicting 
pain. H personal experience is. of ariy value as evidence, I would say, that  in the  early weeks of 
January, when prices were exploding much more steeply than expected, wages were held down 
and enterprises watched in horror as the monthly rate of interest on credit was being raised 
to the level of 36%, the free convertibility, its continued stability and the news that  exchange 
reserves are actually growing, not falling, was probably the only glimmer of light over the  dark 
horizon, and the only stable point on which to  pin one's hope, that  the process of monetary 
sanation would end in the  zloty's recovery. 
This should not distract attention from the important fact that  the stabilization package 
forms, and should form, a logical whole, in which all elements depend on each other and are 
mutually supportive . In tha t  sense, convertibility depended on the other elements and held good 
because these other elements held good, as well as the other way round, so tha t  i t  is difficult t o  
say how much praise (or blame) should unequivocally be ascribed t o  this or  that  element of the  
program, as far as the results are concerned. Still, I believe that  the introduction of convertibility 
was most important at the  moment, precisely because of the psychological connections which i t  
brought into play a t  the decisive and extremely risky phase. Of course, the above remark is fully 
relevant in a hyperinflationary situation only, otherwise i t  may be subject to debate, although 
even in different circumstances a case can be made for an early move t o  convertibility on the 
grounds of considerations known from textbooks in supply-side economics. 
As to  the Polish experience, let me add that the move t o  convertibility was preceded by 
certain preparatory steps: in the secoild half of 1989 the zloty was 512 zloty = 1 dollar. In late 
December 1989 the rate was already 
6,500 zloty = 1 dollar, which means the price of the dollar was by then 12 times higher than in 
January. By comparison, the  growth of the price level over that  year was LLmerely" around 600%. 
However, a t  the start  the zloty was clearly strorlgly overvalued, although the  "parallel" market 
(already legal but not regulated) vastly exaggerated the zloty's overvaluation-in December the 
parallel rate was around 12,000 zloty, i.e., it was twice as high as the official rate. On January 
1, 1990, the zloty wac devaluated from 6,500 zloty = 1 dollar to 9,500 zloty = 1 dollar ( that  is 
around half) and became convertible. 
Before commenting upon the provisional outcome of the Polish experiment in convertibility, 
here is some background information on the performance of the  Polish economy under the 
stabilization program up t o  now: 
The Price Level 
The initial jump in prices as a result of price liberalization, devaluation and growth in interest 
rates was much stronger than expected: 79% in January alone, but subsequently fell sharply 
and reached 3.5% in June. Although the financial policies have been extremely tight, in some 
respect much tighter than assumed in the Program (with the state budget showing a surplus 
of 3% GNP instead of 1% GNP deficit in the first half of the year, while the real value of the 
money stock declined almost by half) the inflation path was much higher than aimed at. Over 
the  first half of the year prices rose by 172%, i.e., more than twice as fast as assumed under the  
program. In July and August inflation stayed around 3% and the situation tended t o  stabilize. 
Real Wages 
Fell much more sharply than assumed initially, although the statistical figure is obviously ex- 
aggerated, because of imperfection on the price index itself as well as because of limited ap- 
plicability of the term "real wage" to  the situation in which a considerable part of the money 
stock had no backing in goods. The price shock brought equilibrium t o  the market, eliminated 
waiting lines before shops and all other typical traits of the "economy of shortages". Still, statis- 
tically, the fall in real wa.ges-because of the tight wage policy and because of "corrective" price 
shock-was around 40% in the first quarter. I11 the second, and especially in the third quarter, 
wages recovered somewhat so that  the present statistical index is closer t o  30%, as compared to  
December 1989. 
Production and Employment 
Also the decline in production as a result of restrictive monetary policy and tight budget con- 
straints turned out to  be much deeper than expected: the value of the production sold by 
the socialized sector fell by 30%, when compared t o  the corresponding period of the last year. 
That index should also be corrected for growth in the private sector activity and in agriculture, 
although both sectors (agriculture and handicraft) complained most loudly about monetary con- 
straints, The most recent data  (for August) indicate that  there is a moderate movement upward 
in the index of production, but i t  is still too early t o  judge whether the trend is steady. 
In contrast, unemployment grew only slowly at first, then started t o  soar and is now at the 
level of 800,000 people (5% of the labor force). To sum up, a sharp reduction of inflation and 
relative monetary stabilization within the first 7 months of 1990 was achieved, but at a price 
which'turned out t o  be at least twice as high as expected with respect t o  the price shock, decline 
in production (3  times as high) and unemployment. The standard of living of the society suffered 
pari passu with the drop in the level of production and the divergences in income distribution 
widened sharply. 
And now, here are some basic data most directly connected with the convertibility problem: 
Balance of Payments 
The strong monetary squeeze and the sudden appearance of the buyer's market combined with 
deep devaluation induced many enterprises to expand export and reduce import. Here is one of 
the areas of the economy, where the response t o  reform has been rapid and unexpectedly strong. 
In contrast t o  last year, the balance of trade has shown strong surplus until now. In the first 
half of the year exports grew by 22% as compared t o  last year and imp0rt.s fell by 20%. The 
trade surplus with the convertible currency area grew from 0.25 billion dollars in 1989 t o  1.97 
billion dollars in the first half of 1990 alone, and continued t o  grow, though more slowly, in the 
third quarter. The current account balance (trade plus services plus unilateral transfers) turned 
from a deficit of 0.8 billion dollars in 1989 to  a surplus of 1.1 billion dollars during that  period. 
Of course, the la.test oil shock will certainly modify the final outcome of the year, but still the 
balance will remaill as a substantial surplus for the year as a whole. It is to  be noted, however, 
that Poland enjoyed a period of suspended debt service towards the Paris club members this 
year, so that  the strength of the Polish balance of payments over the past 8 months was probably 
a passing phenomenon, not t o  speak about other shocks t o  come (oil as well as a new system 
of payments with the CMEA countries). Still, the switch t o  convertibility a t  a realistic-if not 
unquestioned-rate of exchange did produce a powerful and positive effect upon the  country's 
payment position, a t  least in the short run. 
Foreign Exchange Reserves I 
Foreign exchange reserves grew this year by 3 billion dollars, both because of the trade surplus 
as well as because many economic units, which found themselves short of cash, had t o  sell part 
of their foreign exchange deposits t o  the banks against zlotys. 
Rate of Exchange I 
The rate of exchange remained stable and the developments on the parallel market indicated 
that the zloty was somewhat undervalued, a t  least in the first quarter. In any case, the bank 
felt confident enough to  keep i t  stable for much longer than required by the agreement with 
the IMF. On the whole, the mechanism worked surprisingly smoothly. There has been no 
moritent of nervousness on that front and this certainly contributed to  strengthen the confidence 
in the national currency, so that  the trend toward a double-currency system has been reversed. 
Techlaically, the stable rate of the zloty with convertibility has probably been the most successful 
piece of the new economic mechanism in operation. As one of the high-ranking officials from 
our ce~itral bank put it ,  this is the "jewel in the crown" of our reform. 
Coneluding Remarks 
The question may legitimately be put, of course, whether the "jewel" has not been acquired at 
an excessive price in terms of output lost, the sharp drop in the standard of living and growing 
unemployment. Any answer will probably contain an unavoidable element of subjectivity rooted 
in value judgment. However, I think that  there are good reasons t o  assume that  the mechanism 
was worth having. As t o  social costs of introducing and maintaining convertibility, i t  is true 
that  i t  had t o  be supported by firm financial policies. However, exorbitant social costs of 
implementing those austere policies was, I think, connected more with suppressing inflation 
(hyperinflation) under conditions of highly monopolized economy with state ownership as the 
dominating form of property, rather than with convertibility as such. Having no such instrument 
t o  strengthen confidence ("anchor") the costs of suppressing inflation could be much higher, 
becau.se.the inertial element of inflationary expectations would be stronger. Besides, the zloty 
might, perhaps, be excessively devalued at the outset, i.e., the initial devaluation was perhaps 
too deep. That  could ha.ve strengthened inflationary pressure and the cost of suppressing i t  was 
thereby raised. The problem of deciding upon an appropriate size of devaluation is, however, a 
separate though important question. 
All in all, short-term advantages of having an effective nominal anchor in hyperinflationary 
situations as well as long-term efficiency considerations seem t o  lend strong support t o  an early 
introduction of convertibility in the case of an economy in transition like Poland's economy, all 
the accompa.nying difficulties notwithstanding. 
Stages in the Transition 
to Convertibility 
Imre Boms, 
Hungarian C ~ d i i  Bank Lid 
Introduction 
The prime concern nowadays in all ex-socialist countries-which includes also my country, is 
the following-what is the necessary and shortest way of building up market economies, and 
how can these economies be integrated in the world economy. In building market economies the 
restoration of convertibility of the national currency seems t o  be inevitable. This short paper 
tries t o  examine how convertibility can be reached; what type of further changes are necessary 
t o  happen in the economy soon; whether the modest reforms of the past decades in Hungary, 
especially those introduced in 1988 and 1989, were useful from the point of view of a future 
convertible national currency. 
The Past Years-Do they help us now? 
The past twenty years or more of communism in Hungary were quite different compared t o  all 
other Eastern and Central European countries of the Soviet influence area. Those differences 
were characterized by a number of features including the following: 
Land and agriculture became never fully nationalized. 80-85 per cent of production came 
from private and cooperative sectors. They were owned and managed by their members. 
There was a low level of state regulation. 
The majority of residential property was always privately owned: flats, houses, weekend 
houses, etc. 
The private sector was never completely liquidated in some sectors. However, in services and 
food processing its importance has been growing since 1968. 
State owned units were given some independence in 1968. This meant that  they were allowed 
t o  decide on some basic questions of their business activity. 
Changes also took place in the macro financial systems of the country which then became 
elements of a market economy. 
As of 1968 the country gradually abandoned multiple exchange practices. Since 1968 there 
are only two rates: one applied for commercial and one for non-commercial transactions vis 
a vis convertible currencies. Since 1981 only one exchange rate is applied for all transactions. 
Since 1981 tlie value of the domestic currency is determined against a statistically weighted 
basket of convertible currencies most frequently used by Hungarian foreign trade and financial 
transactions. 
Domestic values of the basket are determined by tlie Government through the Central Bank. 
Cross rates, however, follow the movemelit of the world currency markets on a daily ba- 
sis. Due t o  these practices official and black ma.rket mtes of the currencies are closer than 
anywhere else in the CMEA States. 
Since 1985 the banks quote forward currency rates for the Hungarian companies, which they 
can use t o  eliminate their foreign exchange exposure. Forward rates (swaps) are calculated 
on the interest rate differentials of the convertible currencies and Hungarian forints. (In the 
case of Hungarian forints interbank rates are used.) 
The majority cjf consumer prices are liberalized. (Some 85 percent of the products.) Prices 
contain VAT type taxes since 1988. 
A growing part of the Hungarian imports (at present some 65-80 per cent on volume terms) 
is liberalized. Importers of those goods do not need any permit from authorities for imports 
or the purchase of hard cilrrency. 
From a truly monopolistic foreign trade structure the country is smoothly moving to  a decen- 
tralized system. According to  tlie law all companies can carry out foreign trade transactions 
if they can prove their technical capabilities to  do so. If technical capabilities are available 
authorities can not refuse permits. 
The Communist Party postponed bank reform since 1968 several times, but since 1978 a 
gradual positive change of events has taken place. 
In 1978 tlie first joint venture type off-shore bank started operation. 
In 1987 the Central Bank delegated all domestic businesses t o  newly created commercial 
banks. 
Joint venture banks have fill1 bank license for both domestic and foreign operations since 
1987. 
In 1990 twelve commercial banks were lice~lsed for trading related to  foreign exchange oper- 
ations. 
During the legislative period between 1985-89, especially in 1988 and 1989, the Parliament 
has passed very i~nportant  la.ws. Ba.sed on those laws transformation of the economy could 
accelerate. 
Law of Associations-Year 1988 
This law redefines the forms of companies and arranges tlie basic right for citizens to  be members 
of Associations or to set up companies without any previous permit of the authorities. 
Two important forms of companies were redefined in the law. These are: 
r Limited liability company (Hungarian abbreviation Icft ) 
* Share company (Hungarian abbreviation Rt) 
The law sets the minimum capital requirement for 1 million HUF in the case of a Co. 
Ltd. (some 20 000 US$). At least 30 percent should be paid in cash before courts register 
those companies. Contribution in kind can also be accepted. Companies have t o  be fully 
capitalized within three years, either using their profits earned or with additional payments of 
their shareholders. 
Law on Foreign Investment-Year 1988 
This 1a.w applies the following major regula.tions: 
a Foreigners (companies and individuals) can be partners (shareholders) with Hungarians 
(companies and individuals) in limited liability and share companies. 
r Foreigners are allowed to  form fully foreign owned companies in Hungary. 
e Only majority foreign owned co~llpa~iies need a permit from authorities. Authorities are 
obliged by law to  a~lswer ~vitllin 90 days all requests in the case of foreign majority. 
Companies with foreign participation a t  least 20 percent and a minimum amount of 5 million 
HUF are entitled a profit tax refund of 20 percent. Those over 30 percent (minimum 5 million 
HUF) are entitled to  a refund of 60 percent in the first five years of operation. In selected 
branches of the economy companies can enjoy a 100 percent profit tax refund in the first five 
years, and 60 percent in the next five years. 
Reinvested profits can also be deducted from the tax bill. 
There is no need for a permit to  repatriate profits earned. 
Commercial banks execute the transfer on the instructions of the customer. 
Law on Securities and 
Securities Trading-Year 1989 
This law gives the rules of issuing and trading with securities on the stock exchange. On the 
basis of that  law the Budapest stock exchange was reopened on 21 June, 1990. 
Foreign businessmen can also easily participate in stock trading because: 
All stock exchange members can execute their orders. 
Registered shares can be transferred abroad without any limitations. 
Conversion of bearer to  registered shares is in the majority of cases in the competence of the 
management boa.rds of the companies concerned. 
The answer to  the question whether the past helps the country in achieving the convert- 
ibility is affirmative. The critical volume of reforms in the past 20 years makes the concept of 
convertibility a close and pragmatic goal t o  be achieved. 
Further Necessary Steps. 
Possible Difficulties. ,Scheduling 
Further measures have to  be undertaken on the way to convertibility. Some doubts are also 
present and some difficulties may appear, which could slow down the process of reform. In the 
second part of this paper I will try to  summarize those factors. 
Floating Exchange Rates 
The necessary change in the prevailing system is symbolic. Instead of a fixed relationship of 
the currency basket vis a vis the national currency, the value of the basket would change also 
the Central Bank's role from a purely bureaucratic one into a market conform one. Instead of 
the heavy fights Central Bank officers had with the Government, whether and t o  what extent 
the basket should be reevaluated, Central Bank would be a natural participant of the market 
showing its interest through interventions for or against the national currency. With some 
courage government Central Bank could iiltroduce an exchange rate float soon. 
Foreign Exchange 
(Reserves and Convertibility ) 
Law level of foreign exchange reserves are very frequently used as an argument against convert- 
ibility. It is my very firm belief that  a speculation, which is dangerous for reserves, could be cut 
back substantially by iiltroducing floating rates. Speculators slow down the flow of incoming 
foreign exchange receivables and accelerate outgoiilg currency payments on rumors of devdua- 
tion as it has also been shown in tlie la.st quarter of 1990. Floa.ting exchange rates, however, 
give always the chance to Central Banks to disappoint spcculators from time t o  time. Experi- 
ences around 1993 before the Smithonion Agreement came into force confirmed the same in the 
international currency markets. The level of foreign exchange reserves in Hungary really did not 
change substantially compared to  that of a year ago reserves, however, improved substantially. 
A year ago reserves of the National Bank of Hungary (Central Bank) were nearly fully offset by 
short term borrowing from foreign banks. Nowadays, nearly all the currency reserves are covered 
from domestic sources (currency deposits of private individuals and joint venture companies). In 
a panic situation, which causes a run on currency reserves, the central bank is in a better position 
t o  stabilize the domestic sources. In credits, the majority of those foreign exchange reserves are 
used as collateral for domestic credits guaranteed by the same central bank. Experience gained 
during 1982 and several times since then, has shown that short term foreign bank debts are the 
most dangerous for the financial stability of a country. Concerning the necessary minimum level 
of reserves in the case of convertibility in our case I could recommend the following formula: 
Liquid foreign exchange reserves = R 
next 3 months outstanding financial payments of the country = F 3  
expected foreign trade cash flow for the next 3 months = T 3  
Under liquid foreign exchange reserves to  be considered: 
Total foreign exchange account holdings in currency of all Hungarian units including precious 
metal accounts 
e Fixed time deposits of all Hungarian units abroad maturing within the next three months 
e Cash and cash type cheque holdings of all banks in Hungary. 
The figure (R) floats, however from t o  time the range can be estimated a t  1,200-1,900 million 
US dollars in the ca.se of Hungary. Fluctuation can be caused by following reasons: 
Exchange rate changes of hard currencies 
Fluctuations in the expected financial and trade cash flows of the country. 
As a consequence of the a.bove I see a good change that calculating also a certain level of 
courage from the government--convertibility is a realistic perspective for Hungary soon. 
Convertibility and Trade Within the Ex-Comecon Area 
Ex comecon countries start  trading in ha.rd currencies form 1991, which automatically increases 
theri demand for hard reserve currency as a consequence of increased trade volumes (transaction 
money). Lack of foreign exchange reserves can break down trade flows in the area dramatically 
with a1 those well known side effects (fall of production, unemployment, etc.). 
Those countries where national currency can be offered as  an alternative for trade related 
invoices and cash flows can get rid of those grave problems easier. Hungary could be in the 
group of countries standing on the sunny side with its potential t o  make Forints convertible very 
soon. Delay in reaching a decisioin t o  make the currency convertible puts additional pressure on 
reserves, which can be used as a ubrilliant" argument to  further delay convertibility for years. 
The right timing seems t o  be decisive, which of course depends entirely on courage of government 
and central bank. 
Convertibility: 
The Yugoslav Experience 
Gomzd Nikic, 
Institute of Economics, Zagreb 
In December 1989, the Yugoslav Federal Government proclaimed the convertibility of the Dinar 
for all current transactions and pegged it to the Deutsch Mark at the rate of 7 Dinars to 1 Mark. 
The Government declared its intention to keep this rate unchanged at least for 6 months and 
backed it with measures such as: 
a A 6-months wage-freeze and 
a Price control of some inputs (energy, transportation). 
It has committed itself to pursue a tight monetary policy and to substantially cut Government 
expenditures. 
Convertibility and the associated measures were proclaimed after nearly a ten year effort 
to consolidate the domestic economy which had been heavily shaken by foreign liquidity and 
the debt crisis in the early 80s. At the same time, the successive and profound changes in the 
institutional framework were enacted to provide a genuine market environment. All restrictions 
concerning ownership were abolished and in addition to the market of goods and services which, 
more or less, existed already, conditions for the introduction of a capital and labor market were 
also established. 
After the proclamation of convertibility of the Dinar, the foreign exchange black market 
has ceased to exist virtually overnight and price inflation dropped from 60% in December 1989, 
(retail prices, on a monthly basis) to 37% in January, 13% in February, 4% in March and to 
1.8% on a monthly average until August 1990. At the same time, foreign exchange reserves have 
increased from 6,2 billion US$ at the end of 1989 to 8,2 billion US$ at the end of August 1990. 
Despite the fact that since the proclamation of convertibility, domestic currency has become 
increasingly overvalued, the Government commits itself to keep the exchangerate unchanged. 
Justification for this commitment is based on the fact that foreign exchange reserves keep in- 
creasing and that the export performances are still good. The high growth of foreign exchange 
reserves is rather surprising particularly in the light of overvalued currency. However, it could 
be explained by a tight monetary policy which has forced the business sector to export to main- 
tain liquidity, by advance payments for exports and credits for imports, by seasonal increase in 
proceeds from tourism and from sales of foreign exchange by the household sector. 
The growing overvaluation of the Dinar along with an easement of the monetary restrictions 
in July and August 1990, are creating an uneasy concern for of the monetary restrictions, are 
creating an uneasy concern for the Government's ability to maintain continued price stability, 
high foreign exchange reserves and a fixed exchange rate. The concern is even greater if one takes 
into account that considerable problems with the adjustment processes in the basic economic 
structure are ahead. These processes will be accompanied by a very strong resistance to the 
restrictive monetary policy. In this paper, however, I will restrict myself more to high-lighting 
the main steps which were undertaken and the coildi tions which were created on the way t o  con- 
vertibility than speculating about future prospects. In addition, I will address three important 
issues: 
(1) Changes in the development strategy. 
(2) Problems of the foreign debt and external liquidi1,y. 
(3) Changes in the foreign trade and foreign exchange system. 
The Yugoslav strategy of development in the postwar period was basically inwardly oriented, 
with consequent deficits in the balance of payments and net import of capital. Consequently, 
there was a constant propensity t o  pursue a policy of overvalued domestic currency and the 
foreign exchange market was replaced by various arrangements of foreign exchange distribution. 
Improvement of economic relations with Western market economies in the 60s and 70s resulted 
in an increase in the surplus on the balance on non-factor services, workers' remittances and 
unilateral transfers with a simultaneous growth of deficits on the balance of merchandise. Foreign 
debt outstanding was stea.dily rising but remained easily serviceable. The problems appeared 
during the 1976-1980 development plan with extremely ambitious investment undertakings. In 
1979 a record postwar deficit in the balance of payments was recorded (3,6 billion US$). Overall 
foreign debt increased from 6,6 billion US$ a t  the end of 1975 t o  18,9 billion US$ in 1980 and a 
debt-seivicing ratio started rapidly increasing. Foreign debt continued to  grow until 1982 t o  the 
amount of 21,l billion US$ mainly due to  short-term borrowing. Since the short-term position 
was not sustainable, Yugoslavia entered that year with an open foreign-liquidity crisis. 
After the record balance of paymelits deficit in 1979, tlie Government declared that  domestic 
consumption had to be radically curtailed, that exports of goods and services had to  be increased 
and an active exchange rate policy be consequently pursued. The switch from a deficit t o  a 
surplus on tlie balance of payments 1ia.d become tlie major goal of the economic policy. 
In the following four consecutive years real wages decreased and by 1983 they were 25% below 
the 1979 level. Financing of ~iivestnients was under tight scrutiny and a very sharp reduction 
on imports was introduced. As a result, the growth of GDP decreased and a negative rate was 
recorded in 1983. A surplus on the balance of payments a.ppeared in this year however, the first 
one in nearly ten yea.rs. 
Thus, the problems wit.h the foreign sector were not solved. Deterioration in the overall eco- 
nomic a.ctivity diverted a rather considerable part of exports from the convertible t o  the clearing 
area while the debt-servicing ratio kept growing. The overall debt-servicing ratio attained 40% 
and in respect to  the convertible exchange proceeds to even 60% in 1983. Problems in the 
external liquidity 1ia.ve produced a t  least two severe constraints: 
(1) To the full capacity utilization and thus t o  the growth of GDP, and 
(2) To the inflow of capital needed for financing the adjustments in the basic economic structure. 
The stand-by arrangement with the IMF was therefore unavoidable, and i t  was signed in 
1983. The next year, 1984, a 3-year agreement was signed with the IMF and with two groups 
of creditors, a consortium of commercial banks and a group of governments. 
These arrangements substantially alleviated foreign liquidity constraints and the economy 
was on an upswing in 1984. Yet, this upswing produced a false impression that  problems were 
solved and in 1986 the government's economic policy softened i ts  grip over domestic consumption 
and monetary policy. Acceleration of inflation and the recurrence of foreign liquidity problems 
(the overall debt which had started to  decrease was mounting again) forced the government t o  
resort again to  restrictive measures. An additional arrangement with the IMF was signed in 
1988 and is still in force. Since 1983 foreign perforinances have steadily improved. The market- 
share of Yugoslavia's merchandise esports (which dropped from 0,33% in 1978 to  0,25% in 1981) 
in OECD countries has increased t o  0'43% in 1987, and the market-share in the EZ countries 
has changed from 014S%f t o  0,35% and O,G3% in the respective years (the OECD foreign trade 
state statistics). In 1988 and 1989, for which OECD data was not available, the overall export of 
goods and services t o  the convertible area increased by 13% and 10% respectively. Consequently, 
the debt-servicing ratio started t o  improve and the burden of the foreign debt t o  diminish. 
Due t o  these results, the  Federal Government was getting high marks for its successful 
execution of austerity measures and for improvement in the foreign liquidity position from the 
IMF and OECD. However, since the opinion which prevailed in these institutions was that  the 
external debt and liquidity problems were essentially caused by the mismanagement of demand, 
i t  seems that  they have failed to  realize that  even after the demand had been put under control 
and after the  balance of payments and foreign liquidity had improved, the  basic problem of 
the  socialist economy characterized by a large government sector and soft-budget constraint, 
still remains-the distorted basic economic structure. In a distorted and heavily paternalized 
economic structure, adjustments on the demand side do not necessarily result in adjustments 
on the supply side. Besides, if prices are not kept under tight control inflation may start  
accelerating. Tha t  happened in Yugoslavia. The annual rate of inflation increased from 89% in 
1986 t o  nearly 200% in 1988 and 1.250% in 1989. Yet, acceleration of inflation did not prevent 
the  introduction of convertibility. On the contrary, convertibility has opened the way t o  price 
stability. The fact that  foreign exchange could have been bought in unlimited quantities a t  
a fixed rate, the only constraint being disposable funds of domestic currency, has practically 
curtailed further escalation of inflation. At the same time i t  has become quite clear that  the 
lasting price stability is closely linked to  the hard budget constraint. Tha t  is something that  
socialist economies are not used to. However, faced with the need t o  adjust the  basic economic 
structure in such a way that  i t  becomes more efficient, i t  is an open question whether monetary 
expansion can be kept under control and whether convertibility can be sustained if inflation 
and consequent periodical adjustments in the exchange rate appear again. The question of 
how t o  finance and carry out the adjustment process in the basic economic structure is getting 
highly important. It seems, therefore, that international institutions, particularly the IMF and 
IBRD, should give equal coilsideratioil to the problems of financing adjustments in the basic 
economic structure, 3s t o  the restructuring of demand. Consequently, important questions arise 
with respect to  the collection and distribution of funds needed for the financing of structural 
adjustment processes and how t o  condition the use of these funds. This is particularly important 
in light of the appearance of the world debt crisis, because the flow of capital has reversed and 
has left the  indebted countries without funds to finance adjustments in the basic economic 
structure. Also, the rapidly increasing debt-servicing ratio has caused a weakening of overall 
economic performances and has radically reduced domestic savings. 
Rescheduling of the Yugoslav foreign debt has become indispensable for keeping the economy 
running and for making improvements feasible in foreign trade performances. Even so, after 
rescheduling the debt repayments, the debt-servicing ratio remained high: in 1987 i t  was 29% 
(without rescheduling it would have amounted to  42%) and in 1988 and 1989 i t  only decreased 
t o  24% and 20% (including rescheduling). It is estimated that  if the export of goods and services 
increase by 10% in 1990, the rescheduled debt-servicing ratio may be reduced t o  roughly 15%. 
The improved external liquidity position has opened the possibility of beginning t o  repurchase 
the foreign debt on the secondary financial markets, entering into debt-equity swaps and radically 
diminishing the  position of short-term credits. The overall foreign debt thus has been reduced 
from 21,9 billion US$ in December 1978 to 17,9 billion US$ in September 1989. 
Along with the existence of the foreign debt a rather considerable internal debt in foreign 
currency has also developed. Since the beginning of the 60s, Yugoslavian citizens were allowed 
t o  keep foreign exchange accouilts with the banks. The sources of foreign exchange which were 
allowed to  be kept in the bank accoullts were limited t o  the workers' remittances and a few 
other less important sources, but never strictly controlled. Due to the considerable amount of 
workers' remittances and proceeds from the foreign tourists which have been increasing since the 
mid-GOs, the foreign exchange saving accouilts were rising and had reached 19 billion German 
Marks in 1982. In this year, due to  the external liquidity problems, the government limited 
withdrawals from the foreign eschange saving accounts. In spite of the fact that this restriction 
was lifted rather soon, foreign exchange savings with the hanks in the subsequent years did not 
increase any more. As a matter of fact, the level of foreign exchange savings with the banks 
has remained unchanged, with some fluctuations, until now. But, since there were no external 
reasons which would influence workers' remittances and proceeds from tourism to  diminish, one 
could specnlate that considerable funds of foreign exchange have piled up in the mattresses a t  
homes. At the time of accelerating inflation in 1988 and particularly in 1989, a wide currency 
aubsti tution, though illegal, has taken place. When convertibility was proclaimed, the amounts 
of foreign exchange kept a t  home and planned to be used for purchases of goods and services, 
were diverted from the black market to the bank counters. It seems that sales and purchases 
of foreign exchange by private parties have been roughly balanced by now. Anyway, fears that 
foreign exchange reserves may get depleted after domestic currency is proclaimed convertible, 
turned out to  be groundless. 
Along with the introduction of austerity measures, in the early 80s, the political establish- 
ment in Yugoslavia started t o  reconsider the entire economic system. Basic parameters were 
defined in order to  redesign the institutional framework in a way that i t  would be appropriate 
to  the market conditions of operations. The result was-changes in the Constitution and pro- 
mulgation of a set of laws covering issues important for the running of the economy. However, 
changes in the legal regulations of the foreign tra.de and foreign exchange system (including 
operations of the foreign exchange market) started much earlier. 
The foreign exchange system, which was in operation a t  the time when the balance of pay- 
ments and foreign liquidity crisis emerged, contained a provision that exporters were entitled to 
retain a certain portion of their foreign exchange proceeds in convertible currencies for their own 
needs. Such an arrangement appears attractive in planned economies when firms are acquiring 
certain independence as a stimulus to  increase exports. In an economy which is burdened with 
a chronic propensity to overvalue its currency such an arrangement is a kind of reward for ex- 
porters and an incentive to  continue to export. It is only natural that such a system opens the 
possibility +hat foreign exchange a.ppears in comrner~i:~l transactions not only between domestic 
and foreign residents but among domestic residents as well. This possibility was not so visible in 
Yugoslavia a t  the time prior to  the balance of payments and external liquidity crisis. However, 
after 1980, due to  this arrangement, the nature of the existing system gained new characteristics. 
The right to retain a portion of foreign exchange proceeds turned into the rule that the exports 
were the conditioil of imports. As the access to the foreign exchange became more difficult, 
particularly for non-exporters, the role of foreign currency in dealings among domestic residents 
in the formal sector increased. Various legal forms of such dealings existed, but as a rule they 
were on a bilateral basis. Therefore a multiplicity of equilibrium 'exchange-rates, with a wide 
range of effective ra.tes, existed parallel to the official "market" exchange rates. 
This foreign exchange system clearly illustrated the reality of the existence of two different 
markets: the official market to  which exchange proceeds were surrendered a t  the official rate 
(used for repayment of government debts and for some other public needs) and the other market, 
non-transparent and unorganized a t  the time with numerous equilibrium exchange rates, which 
served various needs of the firms. One solution to  improve the situation was t o  organize, in addi- 
tion to  the official market, a second market with a single equilibrium exchange rate. That would 
mean the existence of double exchange rates as a temporary and transitional solution. However, 
the idea which prevailed was to  establish a limited foreign exchange market immediately with a 
single exchange rate for all transactions. 
In December 1985 a set of new laws were passed regulating external economic relations. They 
proclaimed free trade as the general basis for the foreign tra.de and foreign exchange system, 
and convertibility as the ultimate goal of the new system. Particular attention was paid t o  the 
mana.gement of demand a.t the foreign exchange market. 
All imports were to be carried out by the authorized firms in accordance with the balance 
of payments projection for the current yea.r. To keep the dema.nd for foreign exchange within 
the balance o i  pa.yments projection, all imports were framed within certain import regimes: 
(1) Free imports. 
(2) Conditionally free imports. 
(3) Quotas. 
(4) Imports on a permanent basis. 
The regime "conditionally free importsn was a remainder of the former system where imports 
were conditioned by exports. Initially only approximately 5% of total imports fell within the 
regime "free importsn and the rest were regulated by the more restrictive regimes. Roughly 45% 
of total imports were regulated within "quotas" and 45% under "conditionally free imports", 
while the rest were on the "permit" basis. Along with the improving foreign trade performances 
and increases in the foreign exchange reserves in 1988 and 1989, the regime "free importsn was 
encompassing an even greater part of the total imports and a t  the time of the proclamation of 
convertibility, around 85% of total imports were free. In August 1990 only 10% of imports were 
under control, mainly within the "quotasn regime. 
Concerning the foreign exchange market, it has been conceived as an integrated whole con- 
sisting of three different levels of activity. First, it relates to all foreign exchange transactions 
between subjects belonging to non-bank sectors and authorized commercial banks. Second, it 
relates to transactions among authorized commercial banks, and third, to transactions between 
authorized commercial banks and the Central Bank. The transactions between the authorized 
commercial banks and the Central Bank take place through regular-interbank meetings which 
are held every working day. 
Banks are obliged to sell the foreign exchange funds needed by the firms and other eligible 
persons for their legitimate external payments. 
In order to keep the foreign exchange market operations under control, all authorized banks 
are obliged to submit their daily foreign exchange position to the Central Bank. These positions 
contain data on the working balances held by each authorized bank with their correspondent 
bank abroad. Each autiorized bank is obliged to keep its foreign exchange position within the 
defined upper and lower levels. These levels are defined according to a formula developed by 
the Central Bank for each authorized bank. I11 addition to reporting their foreign exchange 
positions daily to the Central Bank, all authorized commercial banks must report the amounts 
of expected inflow payments and planned outflow payments. These reports constitute the basis 
for daily estimates of the commercial banks' new foreign exchange position. 
The relationship between the expected inward and outward foreign exchange payments is 
such as to bring the foreign exchange position of a certain commercial bank below its lower limit, 
then such a bank is still allowed to buy the lacking foreign exchange funds (for legitimate orders 
of its customers) on the exchange market. If, on the other hand, the projection of expected 
inward and outward payments is such as to bring the position of a particular bank above its 
upper limit, then such a bank is obliged to sell the exceeding part of available foreign exchange 
funds to other banks. Finally, if the foreign exchange position of a particular bank remains 
between the lower and upper limits, the authorized bank is allowed to use all foreign exchange 
in excess of the minimal level for payments abroad according to the legitimate needs of its clients. 
The key obligations of the Central Bank are: to monitor all transactions which pass through 
the market, to intervene with foreign exchange sales and purchases in order to  maintain an 
equilibrium on the foreign market. 
There has been no change in the method of operation of the foreign exchange market since 
the proclamation of convertibility of domestic currency. However, because the provisions which 
have accompanied the proclamatioil of convertibility have substantially liberalized conditions of 
engaging in foreign trade operations, the range of parties authorized to participate in the foreign 
exchange market has increased. 
Table 1. BaJance of payments of Yugoslavia (in iriillions of US $). 
-- 
1976 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
f- Receipts 9288 14526 18172 22281 19439 17033 
1. Exp. of merchandise 4878 6794 8978 10929 9914 10254 
2. Exp. of services 4025 7352 8794 10922 8748 6592 
3. Transfers 385 380 400 430 450 527 
II. Outlays 9123 18187 20463 2303 1 19903 16759 
1. Imp. of merchandise 7367 14019 15064 15757 13334 12154 
2. Imp. of services 1726 4128 5357 7224 6514 4545 
3. llansfers 30 40 42 50 55 60 
111. Current transactisils +I65 -3661 -2291 -750 -464 +274 
1V. Net foreign debt 7018 14012 17347 1951 1 18547 18653 
-- 
of which: short-term 100 929 2050 2322 1817 1147 
-- - .- 
- 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
I Receipts 17356 17726 19721 20451 22953 26499 
1. Exp. of merchandise 10254 10622 11084 11425 12779 13560 
2. Exp. of services 6502 6454 7922 8202 9271 11931 
3. Transfers 600 650 715 824 903 1008 
11. Outlays 16852 16893 18621 19203 20466 24072 
1. Imp. of merchandise 11993 12223 13096 12603 13329 15002 
2. Imp. of services 4794 4600 5450 6512 7048 8975 
3. Transfers 65 70 75 88 89 95 
111. Current transactions +504 +833 $1100 +I248 +2487 +2427 
I V .  Net foreign debt 18283 17935 18429 19549 16830 15214 
of which: short-term 1051 1015 1365 1300 1121 795 
Source: Bulletin of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, No. 5-6/1980 and 9-10/1989. 
Table 2. h4a,in economic indicators (annual indices) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
1. GDP 103,9 108,O 106,9 107,O 102,3 101,5 100,5 
2. Employmenta 103,5 104,5 104,6 104,3 103,3 100,9 102,3 
3. Consumers 
Prices 111,6 116,7 114,3 120,3 129,9 141,O 131,8 
4. RealwagesAv 103,2 103,l 105,9 100,O 90,8 95,4 94,l 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
1. GDP 99,O 101,9 100,5 103,5 99,O 98,4 
2. Employmenta 101,9 102,l 102,5 103,l 102,2 100,2 100,O 
3. Consumers 
Prices 141,l 153,3 173,4 189,O 230,O 296,O 1060,l 
4. Real Wages Av 89,O 93,6 103,4 109,O 93,O 92,O 
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1979, 1982, 1989, Federal Statistical Bureau, Belgrade 
"Social sector 
Stages Towards 
Convertibility in Romania 
Paul Bmn, 
Advisor to the Prime Minister, Romania 
Introduction 
In the context of the transition t o  a real market economy, money is gradually acquiring the 
leading part in managing and influencing economic activity. Its functions must be reconsidered 
both theoretically, penetrating the core of all economic concepts, and in practice, monetary 
instruments being used, t o  the full, by macro- and microeconomic policy. 
Currency's Functioil of Conveying Informatioil 
In an economy, currency--or, generally speaking, money-is fulfilling a complex function of 
communication between people, as econonlic agents, conveying information on the value and 
utility of various goods and services. On the c:her hand, the matcrial part of money-the so- 
called monetary standard-helps t o  express the significance of value under the form of prices, 
and, on the other hand, money as a social token, preserves and conveys information in time and 
space, on the created and distributed economic value. 
During all the phases of the commuilication process through money (or currencies), objective 
and subjective distortions may appear, altering the quality of economic information, of the 
monetary mechanism and money itself. 
This possibility arises from the specific traits of every phase of the monetary communication 
process: 
(1) Reflection of value 
(2) Incorporating the meaning of economic value into money as a symbol 
(3) Interpreting (or translating) the respective meaning (sense) by those utilizing money 
(4)  Regulation of the communication process by credit or by changing the monetary standard. 
Any period of social and economic transition, especially in Romania today, is very rich in 
influences affecting the quality of the monetary communication process. 
Changes in the Way of Interpreting the Role of Money 
In East European countries, there is a clear necessity to accept the changing character of both 
economic value and of currency. This new vision of money, rather hard t o  achieve for those 
accustomed to  fixed prices and a rigid monetary standard, is also leading to a change in economic 
behavior, implying quick decisions and risk sharing. 
At the same time, it is necessary to  understalld and evaluate the role of money not only on 
the economic basis of its purchasing power, but also by taking into account multiple influences 
exerted by social, political, or even military factors. 
' f i e  penetration sf non-economic influence5 illto the core of money is possible or even prob- 
xble .,~.specinlly in periods of c cir,j,;, revolutionary transition or social unrest. 
'H'he Situation of Currency in Romania 
The E)ec~mber Revolution in i 983 found the Romanian economy in a state full of contradictions. 
The tespzcted positive effects of the clearing out of Romania's foreign debt were annihilated by 
the ewtrernely grave state of ihe economy (obsolete products, technology and information) and 
of t h ~  entire social system (rigid ~tructures,  various and deep disequilibrium). 
Frorn a monetary point of view, money supply was relatively constant; people's savings were 
aathw high representing about 10% of the social product. 
Im the first eight months of 1990, economic, social and political events had both an  extensive 
and profound impact on currency circulation: 
o T'he decrease of production and its quality, with ever increasing prices a t  the same time. 
r Many strikes and other forms of social struggle with a view t o  obtain increases of wages and 
Alaries 
s wage and salary increases accepted by Government and enterprise management in contra- 
diiction with the results of prnduction. 
tin this situation, for examplv in July 1990, industrial production was only about 85% of its 
levd recorded a year ago while the money supply was forced to  increase because of a 4 billion 
lei dale in wages and salaries over the 1989 level. 
Cmnsequently, the present econo~nic reform faces a currency worn-out by various types of 
inflatiion (first of all demand-pull and cost-push inflation). Money supply increased by about 
15% axompared t o  the end of 1989, while production decreased substantially. As a result, pressure 
on priites has been quite powerful. 
Premequisites of Implementing Monetary Reform 
The &rst componeilt of the monetary reform that has already been accomplished consisted in 
reorganizing the banking system. Since September 5, 1989, our National Bank has detached 
itsdf7:from crediting activity, becoming a bank of issue (similar to  Western Central Banks). 
I%e credit and discount operations have been taken over by a new bank, called the Romanian 
Commercial Bank. All the o t h e ~  banks become commercial banks and private or cooperative 
ones. 
8. second prerequisite consisk In making healthier money circulation by increasing and di- 
versi&ying the supply of goods and services (from houses and buildings to  shares and bonds, 
plant ~ n d  equipment). 
&X the same time, the money supply will be under more rigorous control by trying t o  achieve 
a closer correlation between the ev~lut ion of wages and salaries and the fulfillment of production 
 norm:^ and quotas (taken into account by future regulation of wages and salaries). 
A third condition of monetary stability is the reform of prices by which new real dimensions 
of t h ~  monetary standard should Re identified according to  the laws of market economy. The 
prices will be gradually liberalized, in several stages and on different categories of products. In 
this respect the reform project is taking into consideration three main types of prices: 
(1) Free prices for the goods supplied by a t  least three manufacturers. 
(2) Ctgntrolled prices by Government for the goods manufactured in the branches of national 
ecxorromy wit11 manopolistic or oligopolistic structure. 
(3) Srdbsidized prices-by Govenlment-for the goods which meet the basic needs of the popu- 
Fa$tion. 
Tihe above mentioned compo~lents of ~nonetary reform will be accompanied by the gradual 
imprcn~~rement of the leu/dallar exchange rate, based on several devaluations. 
The Scenario of Transition to Convertibility 
In the reform scenario, taken into account by the Government, convertibility of our national 
currency (leu) is t o  be carried out in several stages as follows: 
Changing the present 21 lei/$ rate in order to  bring the official exchange rate as close as 
possible t o  the level of the free market rate. 
Strengthening the purchasing power and the exchange rate of the national currency by 
increasing production and limiting money supply. 
Liberalization of payments in lei and foreign exchange for non-residents (foreign tourists and 
investors), probably beginning in the first half of 1991. 
Setting up the legal framework for Romanian citizens to  take abroad larger sums of lei. 
Passing from limited to  general convertibility by liberalizing payments in lei and foreign ex- 
change according t o  international practice (analogous to  neighboring countries which already 
have convertible currencies, such as Yugoslavia), stage envisaged for 1992. 
The fulfillment of this schedule will depend both on the evolution of our country's economic 
recovery and on the way in which Romania will benefit from monetary and financial assistance 
from the interna.tiona1 and regional specialized institutions. 
At the same time, the nlonlellt and the quality of reaching the target of convertibility depend 
on the way in which monetary and "real" factors interact. 
Thus, the international experience gained by many countries, with different economic po- 
tentials, structures and development levels, proves the existence of complex, sometimes even 
contradictory, correlations between the exchange rate of convertible currencies and the evolu- 
tion of balance of payments. 
One may consider the following model reflecting the interdependence between convertibility 
of a certain currency and the situation of the balance of payments: 
(1) The effective transition to convertibility is generally favored by the state of equilibrium in 
the balance of payments. 
(2) In its turn, the devaluation (or depreciation) of the national currency coiltributes t o  obtaining 
a surplus in the payment balance which will provide foreign exchange reserves. 
(3) This effect will last only if an increase in 1a.bor productivity and in the quality of the exported 
goods and services is achieved. 
(4) If the expected action of the economic fundalnental factors is missing or delayed, convertibil- 
ity will lose its beneficial implications and will tend to  bring about inflation and a decrease 
in foreign exchange reserves. 
Conclusion 
The measures envisaged in our Government's Program are favorable to  the recovery of the 
Romanian currency and to  the transition to convertibility. In the view of the Council for 
Reform, convertibility is both a means of stimulating economic agents t o  adapt themselves to  
the market economy's requirements and, in the longer run, a consequence of some favorable 
economic and monetary conditions. 

Monetary, Economic and 
Social Union 
Guido Peruzzo, 
Permanent Reprrsentative of Germany at the 
Commission of the European Communities 
Basic Elements 
Introduction 
The treaty concerning the creation of a Monetary, Economic and Social Union between the FRG 
and the GDR came into force on July 1, 1990. This treaty is aiming for the political unification 
of Germany. It is a kind of a guide t o  a social market economy for the GDR. 
It creates a homogeneous monetary area on the territory of the FRG and the GDR with 
the DM as a common currency. Hereby the GDR resolves a strong and worldwide esteemed 
currency as a solid basis of a new economic sta,te. 
The treaty guarantees a secure 1ega.l basis for a social market economy in the GDR and 
hereby a homogeneous economic system in the two German States. The essential principles of 
the economic union are: 
Private ownership 
Rivalling system of performance 
Free Pricing 
a Freedom of contracts, and 
Free movement of labor, capital, and services in the total monetary area. 
The treaty guarantees the unity between the Social Union and the Monetary and Economic 
Union. I t  is characterized by a labor law system according t o  the social market economy and 
a comprehensive system of social security which is based on justice and equalization of social 
burdens. 
Monetary Union 
Regulations concerning the monetary Union are confined in Chapter I1 of the treaty. The prevail- 
ing principle is that  price stabilityin the whole monetary area must be guaranteed. Competence 
and responsibility of the Deutsche Bundesbank covers the whole monetary area. 
Moda l i t i e s  of  Convertibility/Replacement: 
1. 1 1  3 wages, salaries, scl~ola.rsl~ips, rents, leases, pensions 
2:l 3 other claims and comlnitments 
1:l p e r s o ~ ~ s  who are living in t,he GDR: 
2.000,- - 14 years 
4.000,- - 59 yea.rs 
6.000,- -+ nlorc than 59 yearb, 
higher m11ount.s --t 2: l  
3 : L  ==e- persons nrot living in the GDR 
2. The treaty also mntains  regulations against a.tuses: 
obligatory use afi %anks, no cash or changa. 
application, no arutoma.tic exchange 
assets younger Clfrrtn 31.12.89 - 3:l 
Economic Union 
Chapter I11 of the treaty describes the shaping of the Economic Union. The GDR guarantees 
that  all economic and fiinancial measures taken are ir dacconlance with the social market economy. 
Rretmiling principles m e :  
ns Stability of pr ice  
e High employment ra tes  
G Balanced externa'erconomic equilibrium and 
6 Self sustaining ecanromic growth. 
The GDR adopts and iilr~plements all economic laws af the FRG. 
h r t h e r  regulations canvcern some points of structurcl adjustments: 
a External economic ~relat,ions 
0 Companies 
e Agriculture 
e Environment. 
The treaty itself does n.mt regulate all necessary measures, but it describes the principles: 
Reliance on validiQ- of contracts in external relations 
a Restructuring of m p a n i e s  to  new market conditions and 
e Quick realization ai.?.an environment union. 
Social Union 
Chapter IV deals uvitB: r h e  social union. Here again. the FRG system is adopted by the GDR. 
Basic elements are: 
a Freedom of associakbn 
a Works constitutive and collective agreements 
Co-determination 
Protection against bermination of labor contracts (for the labor law system) 
e Old age pension 
-a Sickness insurance wbhemes, accident insurance and unemployment insurance (for the social 
system). 
There are temporary esenlptions, subsidies t o  certain insurances or special grants t o  GDR 
citizens t o  eliminate dP i t iona l  burdens by the social union in the starting phase. 
First Assessment (Success/Disappointment) 
Political Development 
On July 1,1990-the d t  of coming into force of the treaty concerning the Monetary, Economic 
and Social Union,--nobrndy would have thought that a Gernznn Unification Treaty would come 
into force only 3 months later, on October 3, 1990, the reunion-date of the GDR to  the FRG. 
On that  day all paralyzing uncertainties associated with the date of accession ended. 
From 3 October, the focal point of future activities were: a quick set up of an  effective 
administration in the territory of the GDR which is responsible for economic questions and 
problems. We must speed up bureaucracy to  make available land property for industrial use. 
The GDR needs consultants for administrative problems. 
Very important is a quick classification of open ownership questions. The principle must be: 
decision in favor of the investor! Only so can we create new jobs. Problems with ownership 
rights must not paralyze the reconstruction of the GDR. If there are any doubts left, the badly 
necessary availability of land property must be reached by ways and means of compensation. 
Tkansition: Plan to Market 
The transition from a planned t o  a market economy is not easy. The introduction of a market 
economy at one stmke is painful. But i t  is the shortest and most honest and sincere way 
t o  new economic perspectives and increasing welfare. Naturally, in the GDR nowadays very 
hard adjustment processes are going on. It is particularly difficult in industry and agriculture 
t o  survive under the new conditions of effectiveness and competition. In the two treaties-- 
Monetary, Economic and Social Union and German Unification-we built enough bridges to  
bring the GDR economy on a secure way from the precipice of a planned economy t o  the safe 
shores of a market economy. 
The Unification Treaty expands our regional assistance to  the territory of the GDR. Industrial 
investments call be subsidized up to  23%. To this amount a further 10% can be added by 
investment subsidies without regional bias. To make i t  very clear: investment subsidies of 10% 
are not charged to  the regional assistance (23% maximum) and are insofar additional investment 
incentives. Investmeilts in the GDR territory are better promoted than on the traditional FRG 
territory on the border t o  the GDR or elsewhere in the FRG. Also investments in economic 
related municipalities or local infrastructure are promoted by grants up to  90% within our 
regional assistance scheme. And there will be a credit program for municipal investments in 
following the amas: 
Development of industrial area.s 
Investment in environmental protection 
Energy saving/conservation 
Transport infrastructure 
Urban renewal 
Investments in hospitals 
The program will mobilize a credit volume of approximately 10 billion DM. It will help the 
municipalities to  bridge a time of low income. It will support the creation of infrastructure which 
is very important. During the last months lack of electricity, water or sewage or also transport 
and communications has prevented the creation of new industries. We must not forget that  all 
municipal activities will promote the regional SME which have been recently created and which 
depend or orders. Last, but not least, we want to stop the decay of cities and municipalities in 
the GDR. That is why we are promoting renewal activities in this area. 
Apa.rt from the ownership problem the so-called &inherited burdens" are important invest- 
ment barriers, namely the pollution of the environment and the indebtedness of many companies. 
As far as environment is concerned there are possibilities t o  be exempt from any liability for 
inherited burdens. 
hla.ny GDR-firms are indebted without any fault of their own only because of the official 
SED economic policy. These debts shall not impede capital investment of an external partner. 
Therefore the Unificatioil Treaty allows partly or comprehensive debt release to  restore com- 
petitiveness. Tile green light for the debt relea.se only can be given by the so-called "Treuhan- 
danstalt". 
There is a twofold econonrtc. task on the territory of thz GDR: to  build up SME and to  make 
the industrial basis competitive. The first is doing well due to assistance to new entrepreneurs. 
Already before the Economic Union there were 100,000; in July alone, 36,000 additional. Much 
more difficult is the reconstruction of old industries. State owned enterprises must be privatized 
as soon as possible. Those which are bankrupt must go into liquidation. To revamp market 
economy the most inherited burden of the SED-Regime must be abolished: the intellectual 
burden. Readiness to  take responsibility and initiative have been suppressed for 40 years. Now 
they must be the  engine for the up-swing in the GDR. We know that  this is difficult for many 
of our compatriots and that  it needs time. Still too many people expect too much from their 
government. On the other hand, the start of the GDR into a market economy was not bad. 
The  replacement of the GDR-Mark by the DM did not encounter many problems. The  DM is 
stronger than ever before. Though many subsidies have been abolished the cost of living in the 
GDR did not rise extremely. On the contrary: consumer prices in July were 5.5% lower than a 
year before, 
Financial Aspects 
Let me finally touch upon finance. Apart from all national efforts partners from all over the 
world are invited t o  invest in the GDR and create new jobs. A lot is already in the  pipeline. 
Many negotiations are nearly finished or are submitted to  the Treuhandanstalt for authorization. 
For example, our French friends have already started more than 60 investment projects. The 
GDR-market should not be left to  German giants! In the interest of competition also SME must 
have the  chance to settle down in the GDR. Here the Treuhandanstalt has an important task. 
Regarding financial aspects the German tar payer is also asked. It was clear from the 
beginning tha t  German Unification would not cost anything. But as Germany is booming there 
are additional tax revenues, so nobody has t o  pay more than before. On the  other hand, i t  is 
justified t o  take additional credits to  finance the German Unity. For us the German Unification 
is the most important investment in our history. Insofar it is justified t o  also make future tax 
payers pay for the Unity-this is the consequence of additional credits. 
A last remark: we can aflold it! The ecoi~olnic growth in the FRG will be % 4% this year. 
Our business community is able to  invest in the GDR due to  excellent profits. Foreigners are 
welcome and should come. Germa.ny is a good location for investment and nobody can afford 
not to  participate in the Germa.n reconstruction. Investmellts in Germany will have their effects 
in the EG and on Eastern European markets. And where else is there such a potential of good 
skilled and willing labor as in the GDR? 
To conclude: the Monetary, Economic and Social Union was the beginning. German Unity 
on October 3, 1990 is not the end. A market economy on the territory of the GDR is the  aim. 
We shall reach it! 
Session I1 
Reorganization of the Credit and 
Monetary System 
and the Capital Market 

Convertibility of the Bulgarian Lev: 
Economic and Inst it ut ional 
Preparation for Convertibility 
Vencislav Dimitrov, 
Member of the Bulgarian Parliament 
Convertibility is a market relation. I t  would be a delusion, a t  least in our country, to  expect that  
convertibility could be reached out of the context of introducing market relations in the national 
economy. A rather strong economy, with high quality products and advanced technologies, 
having therefore good opportunities for exports, or an economy which is extremely rich in 
valuable resources (as is the case of the oil countries) can introduce convertibility applying 
a centralized, administrative approach. Then the state is able to  fulfill the demands of the 
population and the companies for hard currency. On the other hand, if the population is 
extremely poor and backward (the case of feudalism), then again the problems would not be 
quite severe. It is a different matter whether i t  is a t  all possible to  reach a good level of 
intern:~tional competitiveness if market relation.$ are absent. However, in the case of a poor 
country with a relatively small export t o  the global (and not to  the "socialist") market, in which 
the internal financial market is not developed and where money constantly lowers i ts  value, i t  is 
practically impossible t o  introduce any form of convertibility whatsoever, except in such a way 
which will affect quite negatively the interest of the population and of the companies. The only 
thing Bulgaria could do a t  the moment is to  introduce a market economy and market relations. 
Is i t  possible t o  introduce a free market for currency only, in the absence of other markets (for 
products, capital and labor)? If the ma.rket is left to operate only within this field, i t  could lead 
to  a certain balance between supply and demand. However, the exchange rate obtained in this 
way, will certainly be considerably higher for foreign currencies. For these reasons the following 
assumption seems reasonable: the way t o  convertibility is via market relations, and the speed of 
their introduction will determine the rates a t  which we will be moving towards convertibility. If 
market relations are dominant, i.e., if the share of these relations exceeds some "critical point", 
then we could start  to  introduce some measures aiming a t  convertibility. The problem, however, 
can be posed also in a slightly different way. The question could be: Is i t  possible t o  obtain 
convertibility before market relations have become dominant? Here is an answer which I offer 
for discussion: Not before they have started t o  dominate, but maybe a t  the moment when they 
start  t o  be dominating (the Polish case). 
If we start  from the assumption that  convertibility is a part of the market, then all basic and 
indispensable elements of the market reform are also indispensable conditions for the introduc- 
tion of convertibility. Examples are the changes in the forms of ownership, the abolishment of 
monopolies, agrarian reform, reforms in the tax policy, in the budgetary policy, in the system 
of pricing, in the 1a.bor market, and of course, in the monetary system. Because convertibility 
is a characteristic of money, the main attention should be directed to  the creation of a money 
market-a real market of money and capital, t o  the functional and institutional changes, etc. 
However, this does not mean a t  all that  this can be a.ccomplis11ed without some of the other 
basic elements of market reform. The exclusion of even one of them would mean a failure of the 
whole reform. This also refers t o  an eventual decision to  postpone some of these reforms. In 
Bulgaria the situation became worse by the following circumstances: first, the deep economic 
crisis of our economy which requires urgent anti-crisis steps; second, the external debt of the 
country which lead to  suspension of our payment (until recently some people used t o  declare 
that we are still first class debtors!); and third, the deteriorating conditions with CMEA. 
In this difficult situation our strong points are: first, tlle democratic changes in the country 
which open opportunities for taking the road t o  a market economy; second, the fact that  we 
are a small country; and third, the fact that  we do not have galloping inflation yet, and i t  will 
not come unless stimulated by the government. Probably there is one more a d v a n t a g e t h e  
opportunity t o  learn from the experience of other countries-Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia and 
thus avoiding negative developments. 
The market economy is an organic unity of commodity markets (including those of the means 
of production which are distributed a t  the moment in a centralized way), capital markets (of 
capitals and money) and labor markets. 
The principle of equality and equal treatment of all forms of ownership requires that  the 
incomes from capital should by all means be considered rightful, i.e., that  the owner of capital 
should have the right to  obtain from his capital such an income that  will create his interest 
to save, in order to  be able t o  reproduce and extend his capital and the assets of the business 
unit. At the moment this is not allowed by the dominating economic system. In reality not a 
single form of ownership, not even state ownership allows the formation of income from capital. 
In this context the declaration about the equality and equal treatment of the various forms of 
ownership is meaningless because in practice it. means that all other forms of ownership will 
be treated in the same way as state property, and the latter does not create for his owner- 
the state-any income from capital. In this situation cooperative and private property cannot 
develop. This means that  in the transition period to a market economy, i t  will be necessary t o  
have preferentia.1 treatment for private property which is the basis on which the other forms- 
cooperative, joint stock, institutional, mixed, etc.,--are formed. On this basis i t  is possible t o  
create various economic interests in the market agents, a.nd these interests are the essence of 
market relations. 
Ailother important aspect in the forma.tion of a market and market relations is the assump- 
tion tl1a.t the la.bor force is a commodity-an assumption which requires social recognition. If 
the commodity character of the 1a.bor force is acknowledged, all discussions about the character 
of the social system-whether it is capitalism, socialism, etc., becomes meaningless, and many 
phenomena become their explanation. The recognition of this fact would lead t o  a general de- 
nial of the illusioll that  tlle wage is a resultative value, i.e., that  the workers should be held 
financially responsible for the competeilce of the business manager. The worker must receive 
payment corresponding t o  his particular abilities and skills, the price should be paid by the 
management, and ultima.tely by the owner. This assumes also the abolition of the thesis of 
the workers' self-management as i t  is not in keeping with the market principles and is rather 
populistic. The interest of the worker is directed to  the current, immediate payment, and not 
t o  the economic consolidation of the business unit, improvement of its competitive positions 
on the market, investment and reproduction. This does not exclude the possibility for a real 
participation of the workers in the ownership in their capacity of rightful owners. 
Convertibility is a characteristic of the money, and money is present in all markets. Money is 
the one side of the commodity market (including the market for services) and the labor market, 
and it is the two sides of the monetary and capital markets. Therefore, in defining the necessary 
conditions and changes in the different fields, we shall give special attention t o  the role of money. 
The starting point here is the understanding t1la.t it is possible t o  have convertibility only on 
condition that  there is sufficient co~lfidei~ce in the national monetary unit. And this confidence 
must be not so much quantitative, but ina.inly qualita.tive. In other words, confidence must come 
not so much from the qua.ntity of our illoiley a.s from tlle quality. I will come back t o  this idea 
later. When we speak of inflation, or even the rate of inflation, or inflation growth, we think of 
quantitative differences and quantitative relations. However, when talking about monetization 
or demonetization of our economy, we have in mind a new quality, i.e., tha t  in our country, 
for a variety of reasons, it is possible to  buy fewer things for money-products, services, land, 
capital, labor f o r c e t h a n  for foreign currency, hard currency in particular. Here i t  is necessary 
t o  accept, as a general principle, the need for monetization of the economy, or-to put i t  in 
other words-the need t o  increase the power of money, however vulgar this may sound. The 
greater this power is and the higher the level of monetization, i.e., the monetary economy is well 
developed-something of critical importance for our country from the point of view regarding 
the stage of development in which we are: the quicker the monetization is, and the more field i t  
covers, the easier i t  will be t o  fight the inflation and the number of safety valves accessible for 
application will increase. 
To sum up, market reform creates important conditions for the introduction of convertibil- 
ity in two ways: first, qualitative conditions-monetization of the economy, increased power of 
money, extended domain in which they operate, i.e., the economic logic replaces the command 
relations. Second, quantitative conditions connected with the increased confidence in the na- 
tional currency. In the first place these are the steps connected with the reduction of the free 
money, the so-called "wandering-money": the savings of the population and the free money 
available which account for more than 27 billion leva. What share of this are company assets is 
not clear. Let us hope that  the bank will a t  last publish information and will thus stop acting 
as an obstacle t o  economic studies. From these two aspects it is possible t o  analyze the separate 
necessary elements of the forthcoming economic reform. 
The Reform in Relation to Property 
The reform will have a strong influence on both sides of the relations in question. The accent on 
the transformatioil of the state property, on the privatization and enhancement of the private 
property serves in the first place as a powerful tool for attracting the savings of the population 
and directing them to  business activities. In this field the state is not poor a t  all. On the 
contrary-i t is extremely rich, having practically almost all the property, including the municipal 
one, in its hands. This is a very large reserve for sales, and it will not be exhausted in the next 
decade or so. 
It would be most efficient in the secoiid aspect, the qualitative one, to start immediately 
with the sale of small property: shops, restaurants, small hotels and other facilities in the 
service sector, work shops, machines, etc. The people will be inclined t o  buy such property 
because they can easily work out what profit they could expect. At this stage they will be more 
inclined t o  buy a shop than to  enter a partnership for the purchase of a chain of shops through 
stocks. It is in this direction that  the fear, constantly instilled by the governmental economists, 
from an uncontrolled future inflation operates. The people are afraid for their money and would 
readily invest immediately, and in large amounts in physical property. 
The privatization of large firms will act in the same direction. However, i ts  full force should 
be expected a t  a later stage of the reform. 
In both cases the following principle is valid: the more money the buyer pays in cash, the 
better for the economy. It is important t o  understand that  the state or the municipality does 
not loose anything from this sale. There are groundless fears about eventual sales a t  a knock 
out price, or about the lack of a methodology for the evaluation of the assets liable for sales. If 
there is real competition between the potential buyers, the price will be realistic. 
The same effect should be expected from an eventual sale of state-owned land t o  private 
farmers (for example, the lands of the former state farms which were formed on patches of really 
nationalized land). 
In order to  realize the principle of increasing the confidence in our national currency, i t  is 
very important to  see what will be done wit11 the mone? obtained from the sales. The best 
thing would be t o  consider this xnoney as a debt of' the state t o  the population, and t o  put an 
end t o  the question by invalidation of the money after the debt is paid. In this way the debt of 
the state to the population, the deterred consumption, will really disappear. On the contrary, 
if the state accepts the assumption that this money, should be used for other purposes, i.e., 
should be reinvested, this will act against the principle of increased confidence in the lev. A 
compromise could be reached in this case: for example, a part of these incomes, but only a rather 
small part--not more than 20%-could be used for purposes directly related t o  privatization: 
for development of infrastructure, etc. 
Is there any danger that  the process of privatizatioil could become a new source of inflation, 
i.e., that  i t  could start t o  act in the opposite direction? Certainly there is, and i t  consists of the 
following: if the approach to  privatization that  will be chosen relies on allowing bank credits 
to  the buyers and they use them in order t o  buy out the state property. Of course i t  is very 
important here what scheme will be applied for refinancing of the credit banks, but in any case 
the money obtained by the state will be a source of inflation. Therefore such schemes have to  
be avoided. When they are really necessary, then crediting should not be directly done by the 
banks, hiit by the governmental (municipal) institution that sells the property-i.e., it agrees 
that the property will be paid in installmeilts within a certain period of time. The  money 
obtained from privatization must be treated correspondingly, i.e., the major part of i t  has.: to  
be cancelled. Now we have production facilities whose value may exceed 100 billion leva- 
or 50-60 billion leva, t o  be more realistic. The inflation potential created from the saving of 
personal money-27 billion leva-is about half of this amount, i.e., i t  is 12-13 billion leva. This 
means that with the privatization of only a small pa.rt of the common property in the country 
this inflation potential could be considerably reduced. This is a very important condition for 
increasing confidence in the lev through the crea.tion of a more normal ratio between goods 
and money. The other alternatives-the deliberate inflation aiming a t  devaluation of savings, 
or a money reform will create so many a.dditiona1 problems that  it will hardly be possible to  
implement a market reform. 
From this point of view with respect to quality, privatization is one extremely necessary step. 
First of all i t  enlarges the sphere in which money opera.tes, i.e., the monetization of the economy 
increases through the extension of the markets, and the means of production become a part 
of the ma.rket. And not only that  but they go to  the market still having a considerably more 
realistic and normal value than they have had so far. Because the private interest will eliminate 
the arbitrary pricing. This refers both to  the means of production and t o  the circulating assets. 
The reduction of the scope of the present purchasing practices and of the centralization 
investment process will a.ctively assist for the monetization of the economy. 
Reform of the Tax System and the Budget 
The fundamental transformation of the tax system and the budget is necessary for the correct 
functioning of the whole economy on the basis of the market principle both from the point of view 
of the population, and from the point of view of the companies, but also from the point of view 
of the role of the state, At the moment the state redistributes through the budget already more 
than 90% (according t o  the 1990 plan) of the national income. Even if all subsidies are reduced, 
the part that is redistributed remains very high-about 67% of the national income. Clearly, 
with such a strong interference on the part of the state no market reform could be implemented. 
In Poland for example the part that  is redistributed this year was cut down t o  30% of the 
GNP, which means approsimately 45-50% of the national income. In order t o  finance these 
tremendous expenses the state ha.s to  collect money, and it does this from all possible sources? 
even from sources that the state kilows it should not touch. The major part of the budgetary 
incomes of the sta.te come from the taxes levied on the production units, and a considerably 
lower part, less than lo%, coine from personal iilcoine taxes. I11 practice this means that  the 
enterprises cannot realize their independeilce with the taxes so high. All kinds of taxes are levied 
and money is extracted from them in various ways: through income tax, prices, the  system of 
profit distribution, credits, and deposits. But any taxation acts anti-productively and has no 
stimulating effect. When this principle is applied, even the principle of equality of the kinds 
of property does not work, as the  property, or the capital does not create income, and without 
income the property cannot preserve itself, nor can i t  reproduce and enlarge. The economic 
stimuli move back, leaving space for the administrative ones. This is the general picture. 
For the state in particular the budgetary system is characterized by a constant deficit. The 
budget deficit as such has not been accounted for many years, i.e., the people have been deceived 
deliberately in order t o  draw their attention away from this serious problem. The internal debt 
accumulated at the moment is  a problem whose solution is impossible until the  present forms 
of relations with the National Bank and other financial institutions are preserved. What  is 
dangerous is not the dimension of the  internal debt, but the approach to  i ts  coverage. Now 
according t o  official information from the Ministry of Finance the internal debt is about 15.5 
billion leva. However, this is not i ts  real size. I t  is necessary t o  add to  i t  the irrevocable credits- 
about 8 billion leva, and also the potential future obligations of the Ministry of Finance t o  the  
Foreign Trade Bank which will emerge because of the difference in the exchange rates. How 
big will they be? It depends on the system of defining the exchange rate that  will be applied 
in the next few years. If we assume that  the exchange rate is fixed a t  about 8 leva per dollar, 
this will mean that  the budget has to  cover the differences of 7 leva t o  the Foreign Trade Bank 
for each dollar paid. And every year the budget has to  transfer to  the bank the amount of 6.5 
billion leva for interest amounting to  800 million leva. Where will i t  find this money? At the 
moment there is no reasonable answer to  this question. The sum becomes terrible, but there 
is no way out. The practice applied so far for financing the deficit is definitely inflationary, 
this is an important factor which creates inflation, and unless it is changed, the nature of this 
influence will be preserved, and this will act against the eventual introduction of convertibility 
in any form. Furthermore, the accumulated internal debt will continue t o  act inflationary. It is 
in this sense that  wt must consider the possibility for cancellation of the money obtained from 
privatization. No matter if a balanced budget could be reached within one or two years, the 
"sins" from the past will always be a potential for inflation. 
Of course the main problem of the budget is not only the deficit, but mainly the  amount 
of the income centralized by the state. This amount cannot be easily reduced, but the main 
barrier here are the expenditures that  have to be financed from it. Their sharp reduction will 
have extremely negative consequences for the national economy. It is also necessary t o  take into 
consideration the heavy social problems which this process will create-the least will be the 
unemployment of a part of the civil servants. There are also the subsidies, premiums, etc., of 
any kind. 
What  must be done t o  the budget system, in order t o  prepare i t  for the introduction of 
convertibility? A number of steps must be undertaken: reducing expenditures, and extracting a 
number of activities from the budget; eliminating the direct financing of the deficit and the  whole 
debt from the monetary system. The only way out here, apart from privatization, are the  state 
bonds, not only t o  cover the current deficit, but also t o  reduce a part of the accumulated debt, 
This debt, because of the strange conditions in which it has been financed, is constantly creating a 
great potential for irresponsibility and bad economic management in the whole national economy, 
as money which is borrowed without interest or  a t  a very low interest, never creates a stimulus for 
the  person who is using i t  for investment. In this sense the accumulated debt acts in a direction, 
opposite t o  convertibility both in terms of quantity and in terms of quality. This refers even 
more t o  the debts covered on an anti-econoinic basis-debts without interest, irrevocable credits 
and strange methods of covering differences by means of the difference in the exchange rates. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to  make a fundamental reform in the tax system-this will have 
more qualitative consequences as only this can give real freedom to  the market forces. Of course 
we must avoid the illusion that a tax system can exist that could paiillessly finance a budget equal 
to  90% of the national income and do this in a market en\.ironment. This must be understood 
as soon as possible by tho.;e who wish t o  make such a reform, or iather who pretend t o  think 
about such a reform. The seduction of t l ~ c  taxes levied on the companies is a qualitative step, 
as i t  allows the realization of their independence irrespective of the form of ownership, i.e., i t  
allows them t o  operate on s market. This, however, has also s quantitative s i d e i t  allows a 
reduction of the inflationary pressure, because in such a situation, in which a number of firms 
are practically monopolies on the market, a liberalizatioil in prices will allow them t o  pass the 
tax  burden onto their counterparts and ultimately onto the consnmers, i.e., this will lead t o  a 
growth of inflation as a result only of the irrational tax system. 
The tax reform must be directed t o  reducing the tax burden for firms t o  a rather acceptable 
level, the introduction of VAT and a general progressive taxation of the population by signing 
a tax declaration. In order t o  observe the principle of equality of the forms of ownership, i t  
is necessary both for the state-owned and for the private firms t o  apply the same rules for the 
realization of incomes and reinvestment. To do that ,  i t  is necessary t o  fix a maximum limit of 
tax on personal incomes which should be in line with the taxation of the companies that  are 
legal persons. What  can be expected from such a reform? The  effect is a transfer of the tax 
burden from the firm t o  the population, as VAT will not only replace the present turnover tax, 
but  i t  will also take over a part of the burden coming from the taxation of profits; but the main 
burden will fall on the consumers as ultimate taxpayers. 
Reform in the Financial System 
The changes in the financial system a.re closely related to  convertibility and this is, for under- 
standable reasons, because convertibility is a quality of money. This does not mean, however, 
that  the changes in this sphere are sufficient for the introduction of convertibility. They have t o  
be considered only as a. part,  an important part of the formation of the market. 
The existing system is rather underdeveloped compared to  global standards. There is no 
other sphere in our economy in which the u~lderdevelopment is so great and clear-not even 
labor productivity. Here the ~ n o s t  importailt unsolved (or insufficiently solved) problems are 
the distribution of functions in the banking system and in i ts  relations with the enterprises, 
the compa.nies and the population, the structure of the banking system itself, the payment 
mechanism, the relations with the world, the interest rates, the information, etc. 
The most serious problem a t  the moment is the elimination of the administrative functions 
of our banking system. There are no other countries where the banking system performs such 
functions. This is a quality typical for a system which is moving away, and the longer i t  
stays the more we shall delay the introduction of convertibility. The latter is incompatible 
with a.dministration on the part of the banks. The present total control by means of the lev 
presumes a total control on all transa.ctions related t o  the circulation of money. The  bank is 
now using its privilege to  be the only channel for money circulation and not only controls but 
also decides whether a certain transaction should be made or not. This means that  not the 
company management, but the bank decides what is right and what is not. The banks do  not 
give services, they make decisions and manage, sometimes against the interest of the companies 
and those of the state, or rather in the interest of the apparatus. The whole process is performed 
on the level of the low-level bank officials, so the consequences from this "Service" are clear. 
Instead of being a real partner of the firms as they are in the developed market economies, the 
banks have become additional administrative units which prevent the companies from taking 
decisions. Because of this "total control through the lev" the bank bars the monetization of 
the economy--the funds of the enterprise do not have "internal convertibility", i.e., one lev in 
one fund is not equal to  one lev kept in another fund. In practice the firms cannot dispose 
of their funds as they wish. Instead of directing its attention to  whether a certain payment is 
consistent with the laws or not, the bank gives an opinion about whether i t  should be made. 
This is facilita.ted by the ~lumerous rules and regulations issued. 
Another serious problem is the slouj payment procedures. Often a payment between two firms 
takes 15-20 days. The main reason is the accepted form of payment, though here the problems 
concern money and with money all delays should be paid by somebody. What  is funny is 
that  i t  is the banks that  cause the delays. Recently the process began t o  become still more 
complicated. With the creation of the system of 70 independent banks the technical difficulties 
increased. Besides, the trend is not towards the building up of a system of commercial banks 
with branches in the country. 
In the field of servicing of the population the problems are not less serious. In most countries 
the population is the main source of savings. The situation in our country is similar, but the 
savings are not normal savings. To a large extent they are forced savings, and therefore are a 
measure of what is called deferred consumption. 
Fkom the approximately 20 billion leva accumulated in the State Bank, the population is 
using about 4 billion leva in the form of various credits (the figures are not exact due t o  the 
lack of relevant information). As a rule, all these 20 billion bear an  interest of 1%. The interest 
on the credits given t o  the population is about 3% (the loans for housing) reaching up t o  7% 
(on the loans for consumption). This is a system introduced in 1974. I t  was a decision of the 
Council of Ministers and the interest rate has not changed since. A new project is expected in 
the near future. Worth mentioning are also more than 1 billion leva installments for the purchase 
of cars which are kept separately in the State Savings Bank (SSB). The excessive 16 billion in 
the SSB are oriented along one single channel-they are allowed as a loan t o  the National Bank 
of Bulgaria with 2% interest. Thus the profit obtained goes t o  the state budget. There i t  is 
considered a secure and pre-planned income. The low rate makes an inefficient usage possible 
of these credit resources of the National Bank of Bulgaria. One part of i t ,  in a way which is 
considered quite natural by all our pseudo-esperts, goes directly to financing the deficit in the 
state budget. Even for many years this financing was calculated in the income part of the budget. 
In the practice of the developed countries the direct finailcing of the deficit through the Central 
Bank is always considered to  be generating, inflation. Characteristic for the way of thinking 
of our pseudo-experts on all levels, including those in the highest positions, is the assumption 
applied in the current law of the budget, that  in order to  limit the so-called "credit resource", 
i t  is best if the excessive money in the National Bank of Bulgaria is used for directly financing 
the deficit in the state budget! What is more tragic, however, is that  these people really mean 
this! Such an interest significantly harms the basic economic interest of the population and is 
unacceptable in a market economy. 
Of a similar nature is the policy regarding the companies. On the one hand, they are oppressed 
by the total control through the lev, and on the other hand by means of the negative credit 
policy. The interest is considered first of all as a means for retaining some income for the bank 
and for passing i t  through the banks t o  the budget. It  is almost a rule that  the company money 
in our banking system do not bear an interest higher than 1%. Very few are those accountants 
who are able t o  open deposits where the interests are higher. The companies cannot keep their 
money anywhere else. A monopoly position exists, also used by the banking system, and through 
i t  by the budget, for exerting tremendous profits. In accordance with this is also the assumption 
in the Law of the budget for the taxation of profits of companies with 80%! The companies 
have no interest in keeping money and therefore it is natural that  instead of money (which 
does not bear interest) they prefer t o  keep large quantities of materials and products, mostly 
raw materials, which naturally creates a shortage of these materials. While in the developed 
countries the ratio between the interest received by the companies for their money in the banks 
and the interest paid with them is about 1:2 or 1:3, in Bulgaria it is 1:50 or even 1:100. This is 
an  abnormal situation-the money does not belong to  the state, i t  is created t o  serve all agents. 
The low interest, the few opportuilities for receiving interest a t  all, including the taxation of 
interest payments are some of the reasons for the demoiletization of our economy, for keeping 
over-stocks, for the unfinished constructions, for the slow rates on the introduction of new 
production facilities-ill a word, for what is called an anti-economical approach. At the same 
time i t  is also the reason for the lack of economic thinking. This two-way relationship is extremely 
important because it reproduces itself on ,211 levels 
The interest structure applied in our country, which is a direct consequence of the already 
rejected but still firmly applied approach from the past, is unprofitable for all agents-both for 
the population and for the compa.nies, The fact that the interest rate does not secure a minimum 
return on the money in the banks, in order to compensate the inflation, brings about the direct 
depreciation of the money. Apart from everything else, this does not help us t o  solve the other 
problems of our financial system-for example the reconstruction of the social security activities 
by basing i t  on the principle of accumulating funds. It is particularly important for the  firms t o  
have various opportunities for keeping money in the banks in various forms-as time deposits, 
cheque deposits, etc., as they stimulate them t o  dispose quickly of the  finished products, to 
reduce the stocks, etc. In the  developed countries the money available t o  the  companies bears 
interest even if they are just kept for one single day. In their bank accounts they only keep the 
money they need for payment during the day and nothing e l s e t h e  remainder is transferred t o  
those deposits that  acquire interest. 
For the solution of these serious problems i t  is necessary t o  solve the problem of the  mdis- 
trdbution of functions within our banking system. 
The National Bank of Bulgaria must undertake the functions of a pure emission bank, similar 
to the central banks in the developed countries. It must not serve as a main channel through 
which the money passes, some of i t  remaining on the bottom in order to  assist the  budget. It  
is also necessary to  eliminate the monopoly of the State Savings Bank on the mobilization of 
personal savings. The servicing of firins and of the population must be taken entirely by the 
commercial banks and of course by some other specialized financial institutions. The National 
Bank of Bulgaria must not perform similar functions. The State Savings Bank will thus find 
itself in competition and will have to  increase the intel-est rates in order t o  be competitive. This 
will eliminate the unnecessary segmentation of the financial market-for the firms and for the 
population. 
What should the Nalional Bank of Bulgaria do? First of all i t  must be separated from the 
Government and from the  Party, to  which it has been subordinated so long. Even with the  
amendments in the Constitution this is already a fact. It  has t o  depolitize itself-its President 
must perform his functions without being connected with any of the political forces. He has 
t o  be a person whom the people trust. This is not a formal requirement. The NBB has t o  
undertake its basic function-to fight inflation, even if it will have t o  constantly oppose the 
opinion of the Ministry of Finance and even of the Council of Ministers. Its policy, which should 
by all means be announced in advance, must be something that  everybody will have t o  take 
into account-this refers t o  the Government, the syndicates, the companies, etc. The struggle 
against inflation is fought through the regulation of the money emission and through this the 
volume of the loans, but only with economic tools, and not through decisions, rules, letters, 
and other forms of administrative management. The global practice during the last decade and 
also earlier shows that only through income regulation (regulation of wages in our case) i t  is 
impossible t o  harness the inflation. The solution has t o  be sought somewhere else-through 
the  direct control of the quantity of money by means of the specific tools that  are available for 
the central banks-the discount rate which corresponds t o  the reinvestment of the  commercial 
banks in our country by the  basic rate-not only marginal reinvestment; the  Federal Reserve 
System, and the most popular tool-the transactioils in the open market. The latter is a t  the  
moment not possible, as we have not yet the necessary conditions-the bonds and securities are 
just appearing. The participation of the NBB in the new banks with its capital is not a means 
for flexible management and influence on our banking system. The most important channel for 
cutting down the inflation tendencies (if we exclude the direct production of money) is to  cut 
the channels for direct financing of the budget on the part of the National Bank. What  can 
the budget do in this situation-if needed it could issue bonds and sell them a t  such an interest 
which will secure real buyers. Finally, it could turn t o  the commercial banks for loans, but based 
on the market principle. The National Bank may participate in this process only for a short 
t i m e i n  order t o  fulfill the temporary needs of the budget, since the other approaches require 
more time. 
The NBB can really exercise a very strong influence on the national economy. Indeed, in the 
last couple of years there was a certain movement of the center of central s tate regulation by the 
Government t o  the direction of the Central Bank (in the developed countries). This influence, 
however, is achieved only with economic means-through the interest rates, the exchange rate 
and the  access t o  capital. What is most important, however, is t o  exclude any opportunity for 
the  appearance of unexpected rules, decisions, etc. In order t o  avoid this, aU functions and 
activities of the banking and financial institutions, including those of the National Bank, should 
be defined in the law, The laws must be adopted after extensive discussions, taking into account 
the  interests of everybody, if these laws have t o  work, and not wait for amendments which are 
made so often nowadays. They must be considered by the companies and by the'saving public. 
As a first step in the elimination of the "information blackeningn in this field is to announce all 
figures and other information regarding the activities of our banking system and t o  appoint new 
heads of the National Bank of Bulgaria and the Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank, who should be 
persons not involved in political life, however painful this may be. The  banks are the last place 
where political activities should develop. 
The creation and maintenance of speedy, efficient and flexible banking procedures is also 
within the competence of the NBB. It is necessary to overcome as soon as possible and t o  
reject the accepted fornl of payments, t o  introduce the cheque form with a perspective for a 
real future computerization (a.nd not pseudo-computerization as we have now) of the banking 
process, similar t o  the practice in tlie developed countries. The creation of a multi-banking 
system also requires the introduction of clearing payments among the banks. This is not an 
easy task for our banking system but i t  is a necessary one. The separation of our banking 
practice from the global tendencies is getting bigger and bigger. 
An advanced ba.nking system is really an achievement of global civilization, and if we arti- 
ficially avoid such a. system, this will be a t  the espense of the people. The key place in such a 
systenl is occupied by the cominercial banks. They are those who have t o  entirely undertake the 
servicing of the populatioil and of the companies. La.st year there was a very wrong tendency 
t o  create a.s many commercial banks a.s possible, and this in parallel with the  existing struc- 
tures (the local branches of the national bank). For our country this is not necessary, i t  is even 
harmful. This will slow down the process of creation of a real money market considerably. For 
our scales i t  will be enough to  have 15-20 commercial banks, and even this figure is too high. 
They have t o  be universal banks, with the right to  accept deposits and to make payments, to  
trade in securities and currencies (the latter should probably be done only by some of them). I t  
is very important for these banks t o  have a network of branches all over the country. We must 
not be afraid that  a part of these banks will have 20, 25 or 30 branches. If they have these 
branches, they will really be able t o  do their job well. Internal competition among the banks 
is acceptable only if they are strong, well capitalized and proposing a wide range of services, 
and of course if they have good relations with the international markets. The current laws set 
requirements too low for capital that  a bank must have (7 million leva). There is nothing worse 
than weak commercial banks (this includes insufficiently qualified personnel), poorly capitalized 
(i.e., ready t o  go bankrupt) and not possessing a good network of branches in the country. Such 
banks would be unable t o  act, some of them will yield to  the influence of the companies they 
service, and there are still totalitarian structures-of people and institutions who have nothing 
t o  do with banking. Such banks would be in difficulties when they want to  act on the market 
principle, they will slow down the pa,yments a.itd will be dependent on each other. What is to  be 
done in order t o  move from the present. systenl to  tlie desired one? The a.nswer is not easy, but 
we must look for it. One year ago t h i ~ ~ g s  were easier, but the creation of many formally inde- 
pendent commercial banks will prolo~ig tlie process. The goal should be to  turn the commercial 
hanks into an assistant, a partner and a consultanr of the firms, and not as their controller and 
admi~iistrator. 
The main problem of the new system is the creation of an inter-bank money market, the NBB 
being excluded from its role of mediator in the movement of the main financial flows which it 
plays now. The  NBB has to  finance our banking system only marginally, interfering in this way 
and through its intervention also on the dimensioli of the interest rate and on the  income curve. 
Tt is not enough t o  give commercial banks the riglit t o  accept deposits from the population or 
t o  allow credits. A long time ahead the State Savings Bank will have a priority in this field 
mainly due t o  i ts  developed system all over the country-particularly if i t  has offices in all towns. 
Therefore i t  is more important t o  create a link between the SSB and the  commercial banks, with 
the interest in their credit relations being formed on a competitive basis. Only in this way, and 
not purely administratively, as some people are trying t o  do, will i t  be possible t o  raise the 
interest rates of the deposits t o  a n  acceptable level. If the interests on the  deposits for houses 
have t o  be kept low, this has t o  be done a t  the expense of the funds centralized in the  budget. 
The  main thing here is t o  allow free formation of the interest rates on the interbank short-term 
deposits, which must be able t o  fluctuate quickly according t o  the changing conditions of the  
capital market, and all other interest rates of the banks will adapt t o  it. This rate gives the 
margin for the deposit rates and the minimum for the rates on the bank loans with regard to  
the clients of the banking system. The competition between the banks must make the banking 
services cheaper and more efficient. 
In this direction it is necessary t o  act for the creation of a market of securities in the country. 
First of all i t  will be necessary to  create the securities. Here too, we are very much behind the 
others. We must not believe in the illusion that  only with the effort of the legislation the 
problems will be solved automatically. For example, some people want to  have a law of the  
stock exchange a t  any price. This law can wait. It is more important to  move along the path 
we have chosen. Tbe state and the companies must really issue securities, and not talk about 
them. 
Tlie development of a relevant financial sphere in our country will be a condition for the 
success of our general market reform. However, convertibility will not be reached only through 
the financial system. It is the most important element which is indispensable if we want a price 
reform and free price formation. A commodity market cannot exist, nor can there be market 
prices, unless there is a rather well developed financial sphere. 
There is, however, a very essential point here. What is more tragic and is symptomatic of 
the period we are in, is that  even an elementary financial culture is absent, especially on the 
highest level-the level of the decision-makers. This explains the majority of the accumulated 
problems. The lack of this knowledge is also present in those who are employed in the system, 
who are obliged to  do everything possible in order to  prevent the mistakes of those who make 
the decisions for them. This very specific culture is an exception, but not a rule. Contrary t o  
the other spheres, in this field i t  is possible within a short time t o  make a rather good advance. 
All our western partners express a strong wish t o  assist us with training which will be free for 
us, in the construction of a fiscal and banking system that  will be suitable t o  our conditions and 
in the  provision of the information infrastructure. There are really good opportunities which we 
could use, if we wish. 
Japanese Economic Development 
and Policy Framework: 
An Experience 
in the Reconstruct ion 
and High-Growth Period 
Heizo Takenaka, 
Keio University, Japan 
From the postwar I1 reconstruction period t o  the 1960s the Japanese economy achieved an 
average annual growth rate of over 10% which was high not only in comparison to  other countries, 
but historically for Japan as well. It was during this period that  the foundation was set for the 
country t o  become a.n economic giant. Inasmuch as some of the most characteristic economic 
mechanisms of the current Japanese system trace their roots t o  that  period, an understanding 
of it is therefore indispensable to  an understa.nding of the Japanese economy as it stands today. 
This paper outlines how postwar reconstruction was accomplished, and provides an analysis 
of the mechanisms of the high growth period as they began t o  suriace in the 1960s. 
Postwar Reconstruction 
The Second World M7ar (the Pacific War) ended for Japan in 1945. The loser in the struggle, 
the economic toll on the country was enormous. Fully one quarter of all Japanese assets in 
terms of fixed capital and facilities had disa.ppeared, a.nd eighty percent of its ships had been 
lost. I t  was by no means an easy task to  live in a country with as little land as Japan and a 
population of 72 million t o  feed, and this was no doubt obvious t o  everybody. Expanded military 
expenditure during the final periods of the war had caused rampant inflation, and the lack of 
foreign currency coming in severely limited trade, which in turn resulted in extreme shortages of 
materials. The desperate state of the economy a t  the time can be seen clearly from the indexes 
shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. The Japanese Economy before and after the Second World War 
1934-36 1946 1949 
Real GNP ( Yen 1 Trillion) 12.7 7.8 10.4 
Private Consumption 7.2 4.5 6.2 
GNP Deflator 1 .O 45.7 236.1 
Priva.te Sa.vings Rate (%) 10.2 - 3.4 - 8.3 
Source: National Income St.at.istics, e1.c. 
Japan's postwar econonlic reconstruction, then, got off to a misera.ble sta.rt. In spite of this, 
the period saw m a n y  important policies put into effect. 
Agx-icultura.1 R e f o r m .  Agricultural reforms brought an end to  share-cropping and boosted 
agricultural incomes. Farmers had more of a desire t o  raise crops, which caused their pro- 
ductivity to  increase (it should be noted, however, that  the appearance of a poor, landed 
peasant class lowered the average cultivable acreage per head, which is one of the  reasons 
Japanese farmers are so inefficient today). 
D i s m a n t l i n g  t h e  Zaibatsu:  Decentra l iza t ion.  Industry was decentralized, with spin-off 
and newly created corporations bringing about stiffer competition. The heads of zaibatsu- 
affiliated companies were replaced, and the foundation was laid for more democratic man- 
agement styles. Opening up of shares for public trading helped democratize ownership, and 
created the base for today's financial markets. 
E m p l o y m e n t  o f  G r a d e d  P r o d u c t i o n .  Graded production was a policy enacted to deal with 
the shortage of raw materials and funds that  had been caused by severely limited trading. 
These resources were allocated en masse t o  industries that  were most "importantn from a 
national standpoint. This, in practice, meant that  bank loans were concentrated in steel, 
electric power, chemicals and other industries that  formed the basis for industrial develop- 
ment. These sectors were also given favored tax treatment and enjoyed various other policies 
designed t o  foster their gro~vth. Graded production was actually only used for a very brief 
period directly following the end of the war, but the philosophy behind i t  has made itself 
felt in later industrial policy. 
'Phe postwar policies for the revitalization of industry made an enormous contribution t o  real 
economic activation, but they also caused run-away inflation. Excessive government intervention 
in the private sector caused corporate management to  become lax. This in turn prompted a 
clamp-down on finances in 1949, in wllicll the government unveiled a variety of policies designed 
t o  rationalize industrial activity. These policies became known as the  "Dodge Line" after the 
name of an American hlinister invited to Japan in the capacity of advisor. Their aims were: 
(1) To control fiscal expenditures in order to achieve a "small government" 
(2) To review subsidies to corporations, p1a.cing more emphasis on market mechanisms and en- 
couraging household savings dra.\ving a clear line between government and private activities, 
and 
(3) To do a1va.y with price controls and double-standard foreign exchange, producing a free and 
competitive donlestic market, and making it possible for the Japanese economy t o  make a 
comeback. 
'The "Dodge Line" forced private corporations to take responsibility for themselves in what 
was now a free, competitive environment. They were given the incentive to  rationalize them- 
selves, which was to become one of the deciding factors in the high-growth period that  began in 
the 1960s. 
There was another factor that  supported the postwar economic recovery-the Korean War 
that  took place in the 1950s. The Dodge Line was an  effective policy in terms of holding 
down inflation and allowing market mechanisms to recover, but i t  also brought about fears of 
deflationary pressure due to  tightly controlled fiscal policies. With the  outbreak of the  Korean 
War, however, America began buying a variety of goods and services from Japan, most notably 
military-related goods. The "special demand" thus created removed any deflationary effects 
that  the Dodge Line would have had, and helped Japanese economic development t o  get into 
i ts  stride smoothly. By 1951, mining and industrial production has recovered t o  pre-war levels, 
and 1952 sa.w consumption rise to  a level as high as i t  had ever been previously. The Japanese 
Econonlic Planning Agency publislled an Annual Econonlic Report (so-called "Economic White 
Paper") analyzing economic trends. In 1956, it reported, "We want to emphasize that  we are 
no longer in the p0stwa.r era, but have entered a period of new ecoi~omic growth." and, in fact, 
in the years that  follo\ved, Japan \va.s a.ble to  a,chieve high economic growth on a scale rarely 
seen in the history of the world. 
The ~'echanisms behind High Growth: 
The Shimomura Theory 
In 1960, Hayato Ikeda, a member of the Liberal Democratic Party, became Prime Minister 
and presided over the first Ikeda Cabinet. Ikeda himself had entered politics after years in the 
Ministry of Finance, and was very well versed in economics. He gave a new direction t o  Japanese 
policy, publishing a plan t o  double the national income in ten years, and setting Japan firmly on 
the road t o  high growth. The theoretical support for his plan came from Dr. Osamu Shimomura. 
Shimomura is know as the first economist t o  introduce Keynes' "General theoryn t o  Japan, 
and was one of the most avid Keynesians the country produced. At the same time, most 
economists and policy makers predicted that  the high growth rate Japan was experiencing 
would eventually slow down. Shimomura, however, held that  the Japanese economy would show 
extremely high growth which would continue long-term, and that  i t  was quite possible that  the 
national income could double in about ten years. 
Shimomura's ideas were widely known in Japan as the "Shimomura theoryn, though their 
basic framework came from Harrods' economic growth model (Shimomura, 1961). Let us assume 
there is proportional relationship between production (Y) and capital stock ( K ) ,  which we will 
express as 
I</I' = c 
where 
C = Ca.pita1-Output Ra.tio 
The capital output ratio is the inverse of capital productivity. The lower this ratio, the more 
effectively capital is being put t o  work. Changes in production are, therefore, proportional t o  
changes in capital stock. 
where 
I g  = Gross Business Fixed Investment 
d = Replacement Investment Ratio 
If AI'/I' and I / Y  are replaced by g and r respectively, then we get 
where 
g = Economic Growth Rate ( A y /  y )  
t = Investment Ratio ( I g l Y )  
d = Repacement Investment Ratio ( I t l I g )  
C = Captial - -Output Ratio 
I t  is therefore necessary t o  look closely a t  variables d, r and C when considering the possi- 
bilities for growth of the Japanese economy. 
For our purposes, we will start  with d. Shimomura forecasted that i t  would range between 
16-19% for the 1960s. The actual value for d between 1951 and 1959 was 11-13%. Based on 
this informa.tion, he predicted that with the rise in income level, the rate a t  which equipment 
wore out would increase, and with it the need for replacement investment. Looking a t  variable t 
(investment-GNP ratio), Shimomura predicted tha,t the aggressive managerial posture adopted 
by Ja.pa,nese corporations would support the continua.tion of the high 12-15% levels. He believed 
that  the entrepreneurs in Japan had the "animal spirit" talked about by Keynes, and was 
low enough a t  1,  emphasizing that if  ca.pital utilizaiion were high enough it would make high 
econ~mic  growth possible. In response, Shimonlu ra (1 960) compared and analyzed economic 
data  from other countries and argued tliae the capital-output ratio rises as economies grow, and 
because of that ,  it would be impossible t o  maintain high growth for very long. 
In Table 2, a comparison can be found between the high growth forecasted for Japan by 
Shimomura, and what actually took place in the 1960s. It can be seen that  the Japanese 
economy was supported by active corporate investment activities and a high degree of investment 
efficiency. Actual growth figures are extremely close t o  those predicted, and Shimomura's "1" for 
the capital-output ratio was right on the mark. This was one of the things most characteristic 
of the Japanese high growth period. 
T a b l e  2. Shimomura's Forecasts and Actual Economic Growth 
1960-65 1966-70 
Shimomura's Forecasts 
d 16.0 % 19.0 % 
l/c 0.85 0.90 
r 15.3 % 12.6 % 
g 11.3 % 9.5 % 
Actual Figures 
1 /C 0.86 0.94 
r 14.7 % 16.7 % 
g 10.6 % 11.2 % 
Source: Takenaka (1984) 
Factors Supporting High Growth 
The Shimomura theory was based on the Harrod/Domer economic theory of "warranted growth 
rates", or the maximum growth rate possible when production factors (in this case, capital) 
are being used fully. In order for economic growth t o  be possible, based upon the Shimomura 
theory, however, various conditions needed t o  be met as well, and we will now take a look a t  
some of the main factors tliat support the high growth seen by Japan. 
The first point to  consider is how it was possible t o  a.chieve extremely high investment rates. 
According to  Minami (198l), the most important factor in investment decisions by Japanese 
corporations a t  that  time were the real rates for return on capital, and costs (in terms of real 
interest rates). The Bank of Japan's cheap money policy helped keep interest rates low, but 
profitability rates were probably more important in the long run, according t o  Minami. What 
made high rates of return on capital possible was the speed a t  which technology was progressing. 
In spite of the fact that  the period saw slight rises in the share of labor and a tendency for the  
rate of value added t o  capital t o  decrease, the rate of return on capital maintained high levels, 
forming a favorable environment of corporate investment. 
Statistics show just how important technological progress was t o  the development of the 
Japanese economy. Analysis using the source approach indicates that  almost half of the  approx- 
imately 10% annual growth can be explained in terms of increased capital spending, but another 
30.-40% appears to  be due to  technological progress. Though a late comer t o  industrialization, 
Japan was able t o  bring in state-of-the-art technology and posessed a labor force that  was able 
t o  deal with it. This made rapid teclinological progress possible. At the same time, dynamic 
changes were occurring in the industrial structure. Tlie resources for production were shifting 
t o  the most efficient industries, which, from a macroeconomic point of view, spurned even fur- 
ther technological progress. Calcula.tions by Iiosai and Ogino (1984) show that  approximately 
one third of the technical progress seen a t  this time call be explained by the shift t o  efficient 
industries. 
Another important factor supporting high investment rates was the high rate of savings, 
which was the source of the funds invested. Fortunately in Japan, there were sufficient national 
savings t o  maintain high investment. High-growth tends t o  level out income distribution and 
cause a decline in savings, but i t  is worth pointing out that in spite of that ,  high savings levels, 
in macroeconomic terms, were maintained in Japan. Interestingly enough, savings were high 
despite the fact that the Bank of Japan's chea.p money policy kept the interest on them low. 
Another characteristic factor in Japan's high economic growth was the low capital-output 
ratio, which indicates that  capital was highly productive. One reason for this, as already stated, 
was the high rate of technological progress. At that time, Japanese corporations considered 
capital to  be the embodiment of new technology. In fact, according t o  calculations by Watanabe 
and Egaitsu (1967), from 1959 t o  1962 approximately 70% of all technological progress was 
indeed embodied in capital. 
In this connection, uCapital Stock Vintage" (the average age of capital) is often used as an 
index of how effective capital is, the higher i ts  quality becomes. As is shown in Table 3, the 
capital stock vintage in Japan was 10.2 years in 1960. By 1965, however, the figure had been 
cut t o  8.6 years, and by 1970 i t  had been reduced even further t o  7.3 years. 
T a b l e  3. Vintage of Ca.pita1 Stock in Japan (Years) 
1960 1965 1970 
All industries 10.2 8.6 7.3 
Manufacturing Industries 8.0 6.5 5.9 
Source: The Japan Development Bank 
There are other factors behind Japan's high growth period which should also be pointed out. 
First on the list is the existence of plentiful, higli-quality labor. Human resources are the main 
fountain of all economic development. In Japan's case, this was augmented by the fact that  labor 
came from the same cultutal stock. Tlie country's homogeneous, higli-quality labor resources 
gave a tremendous boost to  ecollomic a.ctivities and especially factory production. The second 
factor to  be emphasized is the chea.p exchange ra.te, which helped protect fledgling industries 
and increase exports. In 1949, shortly after the War, the excha.nge rate was fixed a t  Yen 360 t o  
the dollar, a rate which was maintained until 1971. Between 1955 and 1970, wholesale prices in 
Japan rose only 16%. By contrast, US wholesale prices saw a 25% rise. This means that  the 
real value of the yen against the dollar dropped about 9% during the decade. The exchange rate 
was raised t o  Yen 318 t o  the dollar in 1971, tlie year President Nixon curtailed the exchange of 
dollars for gold. The changes in currency valuations were not enough t o  adjust for the industrial 
competitiveness between the two countries, howe\rer. The yen remained undervalued through 
the early 1980s. 
Economic Structure and Policy during the High Growth Period 
In this section the main features of the Japanese economy in the high-growth period of the 1960s 
and the role economic policy played in their maintenance will be discussed. 
Until Japan recorded its first large surplus in 1969, trade followed a clear pattern of having 
deficits during growth periods and surpluses during slumps. This meant that  when trying t o  
expand the economy, for example, using a policy of fiscal and monetary expansion, the limits 
t o  what could be a.ccomplished in terms of tlie international balance (commonly called the 
"international bala.nce ceiling") soon became apparent, and a.ggregate demand once again had 
t o  be suppressed. Tlie so-called "Stop-and-Go" policy is cha.ra.cteristic of fiscal and monetary 
policies during t1ia.t time, but it also indica.tes some of the structural problems in the Japanese 
economy, namely, t1ia.t it 1ia.d poor foreign currency reserves and wa.s under a certain amount of 
constraint in terms of its internatioiial ba.lance. 
Secondly, the period is; characterized by vast differences in the productivity and wages paid 
by large corporations and their smaller counterpa.rts, which caused a kind of "double struc- 
ture'' to  appear. In the 1960s, small corporations with between one and forty-nine employees 
accounted for 49% of all employment. By contrast, this figure was 17% for the United States 
and 11% for Great Britain. One of the factors was that while large corporations were able t o  
use their credit to  obtain bank loans easily, the overall lack of funds made i t  difficult for smaller 
businesses to obtain financing. This in turn led t o  differences in the capital-labor ratio. Large 
corporations with high capital-labor ratios enjoyed the merits of their scales, and were able t o  
boost their productivity by introducing the latest technological advances. But even under the 
double structure, small businesses could accumulate capital because of high economic growth. 
Furthermore, the diversification of people's needs reduced many of the scale merits traditionally 
enjoyed by large corporations, weakening them into the 1970s. 
However, the existence of a double structure in the Japanese economy was later t o  have 
a great influence on the country's labor markets. Generally, large corporations had access t o  
modern technology introduced from overseas, but in order t o  use i t  t o  produce goods they had 
t o  assure themselves of a skilled labor force. Smaller corporations, by contrast, tended t o  be tied 
to  older, more traditiona.1 technology, and could therefore function even with unskilled labor. 
Shorta.ges in skilled labor caused polarization t o  occur, wages rose a t  plants where skills were in 
demand and held steady or fell a t  pla.nts where they were not. When this happened, one of the 
ways in which ma.jor corporatiolls fought back was to  put into effect the lifetime employment 
system. The technological level of sma.ller corporations eventually rose, and i t  is possible that  
this was the reason why the lifetime employment system subsequently gained such popularity. 
Another aspects of policy that should be coilsidered are the unique ties that  developed be- 
tween government and industry during the high-growth period. Japanese government/industry 
relations can generally be thought of in terms of industrial policy. Economists debate just what 
exactly industrial policy is and whether or not it is very effective, but those arguments will 
have to  be left for another occasion. Suffice it to  say that several important policy mechanisms 
were put into effect in the 1950s and 1960s. One of these was the Industrial Structure Council 
which the hfinistry of 1nternationa.l Trade and Industry (MITI) established in the early 1960s. 
The council is made up of leading figures from academia and business, who exchange opinions 
on what direction Japa.nese industry should take in the future, and produce a vision of how 
the industrial structure should stand. I11 actual fact, however, it functions as a forum where 
representatives of industry and government can adjust their opinions and develop a social con- 
sensus on the direction in which the country is to  head. From the time of i ts  inception t o  the 
present day, the council has formed the ba.ckbone of MITI'S administrative efforts. The vision i t  
produces is, to  corporations, a guideline with a consensus behind i t ,  and reduces the uncertainty 
and risk involved in individual managerial decisions. 
In 1953, the Fiscal lnvestmeilt and Loan Program was introduced, and quickly became 
a unique system of Japanese public finance. This system is a little complicated, but in a 
nutshell, funds from the postal savings program (administered nationally by the Ministry of 
Posts and Telecommunication) were used t o  make loans and investments in addition t o  the 
general budget, which is based only on government tax income. There tended t o  be a lack of 
funds in the reconstruction and high-growth periods, so the system allowed the government t o  
adjust their distribution, thereby giving it control over the distribution of the resources necessary 
for production. 
The Development of Industry in the 
High Growth Period 
Finally some mention should be made of trends seen in the industries representative of the 
postwar reconstruction and higll-growth periods. First on the list is steel, which forms the basis 
for other industries. By 1953, the industry had recovered from its devastation during the Second 
World War, topping the 1943 pre-war record for crude steel production. At the time, Japan 
was producing about 80,000 tons of crude steel a year, while American production stood a t  
100 million tons. Japan overtook that  of Great Britain in 1961, and of West Germany in 1964, 
placing Japan as the number two steel producer in the world, ranked in the same league as the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 
The home electrical appliance industry is a typical example of high growth in the consumer 
goods area. Japanese families experienced the "First Home Appliance Boomn in the  latter half 
of the 1950s. Black and white televisions, washing machines and electric refrigerators sold like 
hot cakes as the country tried t o  catch up with the standard of living enjoyed in Europe and 
the  United States, and the  industry saw yearly growth rates of 48%. The  three products were 
known a t  the time as the "three essential status symbolsn in a phrase that  was a play on words 
about the three divine (Shinto) symbols of the Japanese throne. Televisions had appeared in 
37% of all households by 1960, just seven years after broadcasts had begun (1953). Then in 
the  1960s, there emerged a new impetus. Color televisions, coolers (air-conditioners) and cars 
became known a t  the "Three C'sn and led the age. 
Finally, the automobile industry should be discussed. At the end of the war there were only 
110,000 cars in Japan. By 1960, the number had grown t o  2.2 million, and by 1970 i t  had 
burgeoned to  17.8 million. It sliould be kept in mind, however, that  the production of passenger 
cars which are the maillstream of today's automobile industry did not overtake that  of trucks 
until the mid 1960s. High growth brought about an increase in personal income, which in turn 
made it possible for the market for durable goods to  expand. The existence of these "trigger 
industries" made high macroeconomic growth possible. 
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Currency Convertibility: 
When and How? 
A contribution t o  the Bulgarian debate1 
Eduard J .  Bomhofl, 
Emsmus University Rotterdam 
Introduction 
Economic growth in Bulgaria ha.s been stagnant since 1989, inflation is increasing and the lev is 
rapidly losing its value in terms of other currencies. In March 1990, the Bulgarian authorities 
declared a moratorium on the country's external debt. Under these difficult economic circum- 
stances, an intense debate has been engaged about the appropriate future monetary policy of 
the nation, and many new options are open now that  Bulgaria has been accepted in the 1990 
annual Meetings as a member of the IhlF and the World Bank. 
It would be ina.ppropria.te for a first time visitor t o  Bulgaria t o  offer firrn advice on policy for 
a country on which little resea.rcl1 has been published and for which the past, in any event, no 
longer provides much guidance 'a.bout the future. Currency convertibility and monetary policy 
have to  be discussed under conditions of great economic and political flux, not only in Bulgaria 
itself, but also in a.11 of its ex-Comecon tra.ding pa.rtners. Nevertheless it may be of some use t o  
recall a number of arguments that  are important for deciding upon the date of the transition t o  
convertibility as well as the form in which convertibility might take place. 
Timing of Convertibility 
Within one year of the political changes of November 1989, a consensus has formed in Bulgaria 
that  the lev must become a convertible currency. Officially this has been underlined by the 
acceptance of Bulgaria as a member of the IMF which stipulates in Article VIII of its Articles 
of Agreement: "no member shall without the permission of the Fund impose restrictions on the 
making of payments and transfers for current international transactionsn. However, according 
t o  Article XIV member countries may preserve temporarily the existing limitations and controls 
on current payments. As members of the Fund, however, countries must strive to  make the 
transition to  convertibility when economic conditions make this possible. 
Bulgarian economists differ about the timing of a move t o  convertibility. Dimitrov writes: 
LLDifferent views have been voiced. Some understand convertibility solely as the product of a 
balanced and strong economy, postponing the problem to  the indefinite future. Others plead for 
'Revised version of a lecture at the second International Varna Seminar On the Way to Convertibility in 
Central and East European Countries, October 1990. Professor Dr. Todor Valtchev, Dr. Vencislav Dimitrov and 
Professor Nesho Tzarevski provided useful insights about the Bulgarian economy. John Williamson and other 
Seminar participants gave stimulating con~n~ents.  Tlie views in this paper are solely my own. 
its immediate introduction, despite esisting shortages and imbalances in tlie economy-seeking 
convertibility *as a means to economic lecovery, despite inherent risks". 
A realistic debate about the timing of a move to  convertibility on current accounts must 
take into consideration that  foreign currency already plays an important role in all Central and 
Eastern European economies. US Dollars and DMarks are not only widely accepted in urban 
areas, but may even be tlie preferred medium of exchange for many residents. This seems t o  
be the essential difference between the situation in Eastern Europe today and, for example, in 
Western Europe after World War 11. The other crucial difference with other times when countries 
contemplated making their currencies convertible is that  in Eastern Europe the transition from a 
collectivist t o  a market economy has been agreed in principle but still needs t o  be implemented. 
It seems t o  me that  these two factors together make earlier views about the timing of the change 
t o  convertibility no longer directly applicable to  Eastern Europe today. 
Here are some well-known traditional arguments for caution: 
r Political uncertainty and the general wish t o  diversify one's portfolio may induce residents 
t o  move part of their savings to  foreign countries. With currency convertibility the implicit 
costs of doing so are mucli reduced, even if tlie currency is only convertible for transactions 
on current accounts. Over-invoicing of imports, under-invoicing of exports and a variety of 
other legal or illegal means are available once tlie currency becomes convertible currency for 
trade and tourism. It may be in tlie national interest, however, to  stimulate domestic savings 
and t o  discourage, for a t  least some time, iiiteriiational diversification of domestic wealth. A 
non-convertible currency may make it mucli more costly to  transfer part of domestic wealth 
a broad. 
r Tourists going allroad nlay use valual~le foreign currency and, once again, invest their wealth 
or even their talents in foreign countries. A non-convertible currency allows for political 
control over outward-bound tourism. 
All such arguments against early convertibility invol-be substantial political control over eco- 
nomic transactions a.nd important 1inlita.tions on the freedom of contracts between domestic 
residents and foreigners. Sonle points a.ssociated with postponing the move t o  convertibility 
follow: 
r If the government has the power to  allocate foreign exchange, this will easily become a 
source of corrupted practice and will involve a bureaucracy t11a.t is costly not only in the 
direct budgetary sense but also because vital imports may be delayed through excessive red 
tape. 
Domestic entrepreneurs may judge that black market activities and smuggling may offer 
attractive rewards, but there is a difference between the private and social benefits of such 
activities. 
Distorted domestic relative prices that are out of line with world prices complicate business 
life for domes tic firms and have social costs. A convertible currency makes distorted domestic 
prices far more visible and may even prevent continued distortions because of substitution 
effects both in production and consumption. For instance, in Western Europe the past few 
years have shown how much discipliiie is imposed on domestic governments in the area of 
taxation because of further integration of the financial, labor, and goods markets in the 
European Community. We observe a clear convergence of Value Added Tax rates as well as 
of income tax  schedules not because the different politicians have come t o  agree about the 
optimal structure of taxation, but because tlieir residents will move either their purchases 
or their work effort abroad if induced to do so by glaring differences in rates of taxation. 
Possibly of all these arguments the final argument against postponing the transition t o  
convertibility should dominate. For, the transition to a market economy will suffer if domestic 
relative prices differ substantially from world prices. or if there is persistent political uncertainty 
about the continuation or termination of such distortions. To impose domestic relative prices 
tha t  are more in agreement with world markets collditions will initially impose heavy adjustment 
costs on consumers and producers. Families have become used to subsidization of food and some 
basic commodities. The benefits of more realistic prices do not appear immediately; the costs 
of reduced subsidies hurt directly. For that  reason alone, removal of distortions in relative 
prices will stimulate strong political opposition on the consumer side. Producers will have t o  
make equally hard adjustments if import relative prices and subsidies change. A very important 
advantage of currency convertibility is that  the speed with which domestic relative prices adjust 
t o  conditions in the world market no longer depends on domestic political conditions but is 
imposed from abroad. 
External disciplining has worked well in putting some constraints on taxation policies in 
the  European Community; i t  may also be the most feasible way t o  achieve a more sensible 
structure of relative prices in the economies of Eastern Europe. With a convertible currency the 
whole world market is on your side if you wish t o  remove distortions in relative prices. Because 
future prosperity requires a market economy, and a market economy in turn presupposes realistic 
relative prices and far fewer distortions, immediate currency convertibility may help t o  import a 
relative price structure that  could be politically impossible to  obtain through individual domestic 
political decisions. 
I should also like to  suggest that the bias in favor of large firms and against small firms 
and new entrepreneurs may be an additional very important argument to  remove control over 
foreign exchange from the central authorities. In my own country, the Netherlands, politicians 
belonging t o  the two largest political parties are now actively debating the amount of government 
support tha t  would be needed t o  help Philips, the struggling electronic firm. And this within 
a context of strong economic growth, a very tight labor market and an unsustainable large 
budget deficit. Government subsidizatioil of Philips implies higher taxes t o  the detriment of 
other firms and potential new entrepreneurs. However, in the "market" for political influence 
large existing companies have a more coilceiltrated power in favor of subsidies than those who 
eventually pay the budgetary costs. I11 addition, Professor Hayek's warning that  governments 
have no comparative advantage in guessing which future activities are most promising (and 
would best be served with foreign exchange) apply with full force. Finally, political control over 
foreign exchange imposes unavoidable heavy distortions in the domestic credit market. Some 
companies may find it easy to  generate cash flow or to attract capital in order t o  expand, but 
they enjoy the political connectioils that  are helpful in obtaining foreign exchange. A "shadow" 
market in foreign exchange will appear in which firms and individuals will try t o  obtain licenses 
to  import. However, there will be a varying degree of political control over this "market", leading 
to  an uncertain and inefficient set of constraints on firms' activities. 
The Soviet Union and some of the other ex-socialist economies have promoted cooperative 
forms of organization for smaler  enterprises. Some cooperatives are spin-offs of larger state- 
owned firms; others have arisen to  perform tasks that were neglected in the past. As long as  
domestic relative prices remain grossly distorted, managers of state firms may take a personal 
pecuniary interest in a new cooperative and deal with these smaller privately-owned satellites 
in ways that  are socially harmful even though individually profitable. For instance, a state firm 
may sell subsidized inputs to  a cooperative which then subsequently sells its output a t  a realistic 
price. News reports from Eastern Europe suggest that such practices are strongly disliked by 
the public, which suspects big-firm managers to  have a selfish interest in some cooperatives. 
By contrast, other cooperatives may be eliminated by state firms that  have exclusive rights t o  
foreign exchange or cheap government-provided inputs and compete with the cooperative in 
consumer markets. It would be regrettable if the transitioilal phase to  a market economy was 
greatly hampered by these two different types ofprobleills and this may be one additional reason 
to  favor policies such as immediate convertibility of the currency that lead to  a realistic relative 
price structure. 
The  transition to a market economy will witness the establishment of many small firms which 
have to survive a synibiosis with a number of extremely large enterprises, either state-owned or 
not yet privatized. It i s  essential that the new firms a i d  cooperatives can compete on equal terms 
with the state-owned conglomerates. This ~equires that the so-called soft budget constraint for 
the state-owned enterprises is replaced by a binding budget constraint. In other words, losses 
must have consequences also for socialized firms. Additionally, the rule of law obviously must 
apply not only to  the new privatized firms and cooperatives, but also t o  the state-owned business: 
bureaucratic favoritism has no place in a true market economy. It would be naive t o  forget that  
politicians and bureaucrats have a natural tendency to  give more weight to  the problems of 
large existing firms than t o  the difficulties facing new and unknown enterprises. But, the design 
of institutions and policies shoilld counter this bias as much as possible. Within this context, 
an immediate move t o  convertibility of the currency makes much more sense than continued 
bureaucratic allocation of foreign exchange t o  businesses and individuals. 
Form of Convertibility 
First, a brief review of the different options that are open to  a small economy which makes its 
currency convertible. Table 1 shows four different versions of fixed exchange rates; Table 2 four 
ways to  implement flexible excha.nge rates. 
Table 1: Fised Ra.tes 
1) "Automatic Central Bank" (Hong I<ong) 
2 )  Currency Union (Belgium-Luxemburg) 
3) Fised by multiilational a.greement (E.M.S.) 
4) Fised unilaterally (Austria, Norway) 
Table 2: Flesible Ra.tes 
1) Allnost no interventions (no sterilization) 
2)  "Leaning a.gainst the wind" 
3 )  M'ide, secret target zones 
4) Crawling peg with very frequent adjustments 
Many of the small trading nations of Western Europe have opted for some form of fixed 
exchange rates. Obviously, these couiltries have concluded that  their national economy is not 
an optimum currency area and that they sl~ould provide their citizens and business firms with a 
system in which foreign transactioils with a t  least some major trading partners can be conducted 
with little or no currency risk. hlembership of the EhlS is increasing, because German dominance 
has delivered low and stable inflation for many years. If a new member country ties its currency 
t o  the DMark in a manner that  is viewed as credible by the financial markets, the country 
"buys" the reputation from the Bundesbank. As long as Germany continues t o  dominate the 
system, the reputation of its Central Bank is a public good that can be provided t o  new members 
without diminishing its supply to  the old members of the EMS. 
For new members, the "quality" of the na.tiona1 money may improve through a tie-in with 
this German dominated system, and credibility may be purchased more cheaply than if the 
Central Bank 11a.d to obtain a strong reputation for anti-inflationary policies on its own. 
On the other side of the ledger there are obvious transitiona.1 costs as the new EMS-member 
must a.djust to  lower infla.tion. Also, dornest,ic politicial~s give up the possibility to  use the 
Central Bank for stin~ulating the economy in an election yea.:. Such misuse of the Central Bank 
in  order t o  generate a "political business cycle" is a temptation in all countries t ha t  set their 
own monetary policies. One of the  important advantages of a system such as the EMS for the 
citizens of the participating countries is t ha t  the common monetary policy will not be under as 
much of a threat  t o  play i ts  par t  in promoting re-election of sitting governments as in  the case 
in which each country implements i ts  own monetary policy. 
Given all these advantages of a common monetary policy and a common inflationary pa th  
for participating member countries, should one advocate some form of cooperation between the  
monetary authorities in the  small economies of Eastern Europe and the  Bundesbank? Note 
first t ha t  countries may unilaterally decide t o  couple their monetary policies t o  those of the  
Bundesbank o r  the provider of any other major currency. Austria is a good example. T h e  
Austrian money market has been integrated for many years with the  German money market 
and the  Austrian monetary authorities can conduct open-market operations in  DMark. This  
system does not require any form of approval by the German authorities and has resulted in  a n  
exchange rate  between the  Austrian Schilling and the DMark tha t  is as stable as the  exchange 
ra te  between the  DMark and any of the EMS-partners. Hence, we can discuss whether the  
economies of Eastern Europe should try t o  emulate the Austrian example without having t o  
wait for consent by the current membership of the EMS. 
Some influential experts have advocated an even stronger form of fixed exchange rates. 
Professor Allan H. hleltzer2 has advocated a monetary authority for the Soviet Union along the  
lines of the Hong Kong Example. He writes: 
"Credibi1it.y for the new monetary policy can be achieved most effectively if the new system is seen 
to be a major departure from the old, and the opportunities for discretion are severely restricted. 
The public must be convinced that the central bank and government will honor their commitment 
to avoid inflation. I suggest that this is done most effectively if you restrict the government's 
monetary role by establishing a monetary autlrority like the Hong Kong or Singapore Monetary 
Authority. In such systems the exchange rate is fixed. The authorities are empowered to issue 
money only if they receive convertible currency, and they must withdraw money when they lose 
convertible currency. They collect. seigniorage, but they have no discretionary authority to change 
the quantity of money and no legal means of doing so. hloney can only be issued to the extent 
that the country earns convertible currency. 
This system has several advantages. Most important is the durability of the commitment. 
Like Ulysses, in the ancient Greek legend, you will have bound yourself tiglrtly. There are other 
advantages. Let me spell out a few. First, t.he system focuses attention on the need to compete 
in world markets. Efficiency in int.ernationa1 markets begets domest,ic efficiency, and increased 
domest.ic efficiency encourages esp0rt.s. Second. domestic prices would adjust toward world levels. 
If the exchange rate is fised on t.he dollar or the mark, dornestic commodity prices will move toward 
US or German prices for goods of the same qua1it.y. Third, interest rates will fall toward the world 
level. At first. there would be a risk premium but the premium would decline as confidence grows 
that the system will be maintained. Fourth, budget deficits would be limited. All borrowing, 
whether denominated in domestic or foreign currency, would have to be financed from domestic 
or foreign saving ... This would be a strong commitment. The closer you come to it, the more it 
will be believed. A mixed system in which the exchange rate is fixed but adjustable will be less 
credible. If people doubt your commitment to monetary stability they will charge risk premiums 
in interest rates and wages to pay for possible inflation." 
In this strong form of fixed exchange rates, credibility and stability a re  purchased and 
achieved more quickly than under any alternative scheme. However, the  fixed exchange ra te  
implies t ha t  domestic inflation is influenced by world inflation so tha t  not only domestic rela- 
tive prices t ha t  a re  imported from abroad-a very desirable matter-but also domestic absolute 
prices and a.re no longer under much control by the domestic authorities. For a developed 
economy with a, stable or or a t  most sloivly changing economic system, this may not be  a dis- 
advantage. For instance, if there is macroeconomic pressure on average wage costs in industry 
in the Netherlands t o  decline relative t o  production costs in Germany, the magnitude of such a 
decline will be a.t most a few percentage points. Given tha.t German wage rates increase a t ,  say, 
'h1onetary Reiorm in the USSR, hloscow Address. September 17, 1990. 
3-5 % per year there is sufficient raoni to  obtain a somew hat lower rate of increase in Dutch 
wage costs for one or two years and the desired adjustment in relative cost levd may be obtained. 
Jn Eastern Europe, the economics are currently engaging in an almost unprecedented eco- 
nomic transformation and i t  is impossible too predict where cost levels will turn out  to  be next 
year, in five years and in ten years time. This uncertainty is starkly reflected by considering cur- 
rent black market exchange rates and relative wages in Eastern Europe, neighboring countries 
such as Turkey and Greece, and the higher developed economies of Western Europe. At current 
black market exchange rates i t  would appear wage costs in Eastern Europe are a small fraction 
of those in, for instance, Turkey with the differential increasing even further a t  this time. From 
a longer term perspective, which would base relative cost levels on fundamental factors such as 
educational levels of the work force, institutional stability, infrastructure stability, infrastruc- 
ture, and natural resources, i t  might be extreme t o  expect a continuation of the situation in 
which wage costs in, for instance, Bulgaria are five times lower than in the industrial sector in 
Turkey. Hence, there cannot biat be extreme uncertainty about the proper wage cost levels in 
the economies of Eastern Europe over the next several years. 
Under such circumstances fixing tlie nominal exchange rate imposes all necessary macroe- 
conomic adjustments on nominal wages. It might be necessary to  alter nominal wage levels by 
very substantial amounts over several consecutive years. This, in my view, will impose great 
hardship on wage earners and will also make it inipossible in the meantime to  ask wage earners 
t o  engage in longer-term nominal contracts such as home  mortgage^.^ 
What about fixing the exchange rate for a briefer period and without going t o  the extreme of 
the Hong Kong model? Early evaluations of tlie Polish experiment strongly suggests that  fixing 
the exchange rate for a longer period on tlie basis of tlie niost recent black market exchange rate 
results in an initial undervaluation. For, the black market exchange rate was formed in a period 
of great uncertainty about the future exchange rate regime and possibly during conditions of 
incipient hyperinflation. Currency substitutioli will be extremely important under such circum- 
stances and the demand for domestic money very low. 111 fact, estimates suggested that  two 
thirds of the curreiicy circulating in Poland was foreign currency rather than domestic currency. 
Additionally, fixing the exchange rate will not reduce domestic inflation as measured in domestic 
currency t o  world levels overnight. Probably domestic inflation will continue t o  be substantially 
above world inflatioii aiid this agaiii will i~ifluellce tlie initial setting of the fixed exchange rate. 
Combining these two factors may well result in a severe uildervaluation which is costly because 
i t  leads to  wrong decisioiis by producers and consumers and is in itself a source of inflationary 
pressure. This would suggest great caution i11 fixing tlie exchange rate for a longer period of 
time and not necessarily following the most recent black market rate. 
There is an obvious trade-off between attempting to achieve immediate credibility for the 
monetary authorities through fixing tlie exchange rage but imposing great costs on the labor 
market, or opting for a less fixed exchange rate regime which will be easier on wage formation 
in the labor market but implies that  credibility for monetary and exchange rate policy will take 
longer to  achieve. 
At the other extreme end of this spectrum would be a purely floating exchange rate. This has 
not been the institution of choice for the trading nations of Western Europe, the sole exception 
being Switzerland. In North America, however, Canada has maintained a floating exchange 
rate with respect to the US, even though the United States is a more dominating trading and 
%ome form of indexation of savings and mortgages contracts would help: under indexation the real rate of 
interest, is fixed when the claim is bought or sold in the primary market, and additionally inflation is compensated 
for once or twice a year. It must be possible to combine indexed lotig-t.erm savings with indexed home mortgages, 
but it will be difficult for the banks to assume ally mistnat.cli of maturities in silcl~ all indexed market under a 
fixed exchange rate with great uncertainty about future rat.es of inflation. For banks, under a Hong Kong type 
system, managerial instruments dominate noniillal (non-indexed) reserves. It. is hard to see how banks could then 
offer indexed mortgages to new home owners, wit.llout. some governmental institution providing insurance of all 
default risk on such assets as well as providi~ig help wit.h any mismatcll between indexed savings and indexed 
mortgages. 
investment partner for Canada than a.ny nation in Western Europe with respect t o  Germany. 
Hence, a floating exchange rate is a feasible option, but most smaller nations prefer a fixed 
exchange rate with a major partner or participation in a fixed exchange rate system such as the 
EMS. For Eastern Europe a pure float would appear t o  have an overriding disadvantage, namely 
that  i t  would be viewed as indicating a lack of discipline in the area of fiscal policy. Currently, 
statistics on budget deficits and the way in which they are financed are scarce and of poor quality 
so that  international financial markets are very uncertain about the fiscal policies being followed. 
The transition t o  a market economy generates continuing uncertainty about budgetary policies 
for many more years: how quickly will subsidies be abolished, how easy will i t  be for displaced 
workers t o  find new employment, how much infrastructure is required to  at tract  foreign direct 
investment and t o  make a more attractive home for domestic savings, and finally, how much of 
the government's expenditures can be covered with domestic taxation? None of these questions 
will have predictable answers for several years to  come. 
If the authorities choose a floating exchange rate i t  will be regarded as a sign tha t  they do 
not wish to  give up the option of covering part of future deficits through money creation with 
its consequences for the value of the currency. Because the monetary base as a stock is small 
in respect to  the a.nnual uncertainty regarding the government budget deficit, any news about 
future budget deficits and the extent to which they may be financed through the Central Bank's 
creation of new money will have a major impact on the market's expectation of the future 
monetary base. Hence, great uncertainty rega.rding the exchange rate will result and the foreign 
value of the currency will fluctuat,e with ea.ch piece of news regarding future budgetary policy. 
Such uncertainty about exchange rate moveme~lts even in the very short run will be costly for 
businesses and individuals. 
Real Rates of Interest 
A common policy mistake in many developing couiltries has been for the authorities t o  intervene 
in the credit market a.nd t o  depress real ra.tes of interest. On the surface, such actions provide 
borrowers with a, reduced cost of ca.pita1, but the policy makes no sense because it reduces the 
amouilt of savings. Hence, the supply of credit through the official sector of the economy falls 
so much short of the demand a t  the government influenced interest rates, that  credit rationing 
becomes a necessity, with all its disadvantages of political bias in fa.vor of large established 
enterprises and risk of corruption. At the same time, an informal "curb" market for credit will 
develop in which borrowers who can not be satisfied on the official market will try t o  at tract  
funds a t  higher-possibly even illegal-ra.tes of interest. Such a two-tier credit market is hugely 
inefficient. 
The government should not be afraid of a high real rate of interest, because with stable 
political and legal conditions, the current scarcity of capital should imply a very high marginal 
real return on new capital and hence, a real ra.te interest tha t  is high by the standard of the 
capital-rich industrial countries. Experience in several developing countries has shown that  
deregulation of the credit market and a move towards higher returns for domestic savers coincided 
with a take-off of economic growth. 
During the transition t o  a market economy the authorities may wish t o  either establish a 
national savings bank or to  issue guarantees for the return on savings attracted by the  private 
sector or foreign-owned banks. If there is a national savings bank, the authorities therefore have 
t o  set a rate of interest for domestic savings. If the rate of inflation over the relevant horizon 
is uncertain it may be sensible to offer a guaranteed real rate of return and to  compensate the 
domestic savers afterwa.rds for the a.ctua.1 ra.t.e of inflation, using a scheme similar t o  that  of the 
indexed national savings in the United I<ingdom." \,l?ith a rate of exchange that  is fixed for 
'The real rate o i  return on indexed retail savings in the Uli is very slightly positive; simultaneously the UK 
authorities have issued i~idexed gover~~ment  debt since 1981 on wl~icll real rat.es o i  return have varied irom 2% to  
sliglltly above 4% per anllunl. 
long periods, domestic short-term interest rates n o  longer are free policy variables, because the 
authorities will have to  follow a target for the stock of international reserves. To the extent t o  
which the domestic banking system needs to  be provided with net foreign assets, solvability of 
the domestic banks will also constrain the freedom to  alter domestic rates of return on savings. 
With short-term rates needed as instruments to  mainta.in the fixed exchange rate, the authorities 
will have less chance t o  follow policies a t  the long-term end of the yield curve that  provide high 
and stable rates of return t o  domestic long-term savers. 
By contrast, a more flexible rate of exchange allows for far greater freedom in following 
an interest rate policy that  is targeted towards encouraging domestic savings and discouraging 
currency substitution into foreign currencies or capital flight .' 
With the resource cost of the Hong Kong type system so much larger, because the country 
Bas to  borrow t o  set up i ts  central bank and commercial banking system rather than attract 
capital for investment in fiscal infrastructure, and given the tremendous uncertainty regarding 
the medium-term evolvement of real wage costs, a rather more flexible system seems a d ~ i s a b l e . ~  
However, a more flexible exchange rate does not mean that  fiscal deficits can conveniently 
continue t o  be financed through money creation or that  the need t o  move to  a domestic structure 
of relative prices that conforms better to  world ma.rket conditions is less urgent. 
In my view, the best transitional regime for the countries in Eastern Europe may be a rather 
flexible fixed rate or a rather fixed flexible rate: eitlier a. unilateral fix for a relatively brief period 
or a crawling peg system with quite frequent adjust.ments. Under either system the domestic 
banks can opera.te with reserves deiiomiiiated primarily in domestic currency and there is no 
need for the nation as a whole to  allocate foreign reserves to  serve as reserves t o  the banking 
system. In a Hong Kong type system or in any other version of long-term fixation of the exchange 
rate and full convertibility on current account, the domestic banks will only be able t o  grow 
if a substantial part of their capital and reserves eitlier consists of foreign currency or can be 
coiiverted into such a little notice and with little cost. 
Currency Reform--A Historical Case Study 
After \.llorld V7a.r I1 the Netherlands regained its freedom in Ma.y 1945. A new civilian govern- 
ment came into office at, the end of June. Between July and la.te September a thorough currency 
reform was enacted. It goes without saying that p0stwa.r conditions were in many ways differ- 
ent, both politically and ecoiiomically, from the situation in whicli the ex-socialist countries of 
Eastern Europe find themselves today. But, the currency reform coped with a very substantial 
"monetary overhang" and was supported democra.tically. Also, Hollaiid had t o  rebuild i ts  econ- 
omy with very little foreign fina.ncia1 assista.nce while simultaneously fa.cing a drain on resources 
because of its costly initial resistance t o  the independence movement in Indonesia, a former 
Dutch colony. 
An authoritative a.nalysis of the 1945 currency reform was published in 1973 by the re- 
sponsible ex-Minister of Finance, Pieter Lieftinck who, after leaving the Netherlands, had a 
distinguished career a t  the Ih4F and the World Bank.' When Lieftinck became Minister of 
Finance shortly after the war, national income was estimated by the Dutch authorities t o  be 5 
billion guilders, but private sector estimates a t  that time were seven or eight billion, evidencing 
50bviously a devaluating exchange rate leads to higher domestic interest rates, but the 'spikes" in interest 
rates, particularly at the short end, that are so typical for the final stages of a fixed exchange rate that becomes 
harder and harder to defend can be avoided. 
6U'alt.ers and Hamke have also argued in favor of a Currency Board rather than an independent Central 
Bank for the ex-socialist countries. Professor Tew pointed out. the two problems with such a proposal-how does 
the Currency Board acql~ire its foreign assets?; do Commercial Banks also have to own large stocks of foreign 
assets?-in an intervention in  the London "Financial Timesn (February 13, 1990). 
'"The Postwar Fillallcia1 Rehabilitation of the Net.l~erlands". The Hague. Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. 
a substantial uncertainty about the transactions demand for money.' The  money supply a t  the 
war-end amounted t o  11 billion guilders, over four times as much as a t  the start of the war 
in 1940. With national income in current guilders slightly below the 1938 level obviously the 
income velocity of money was unsustainably low. At the same time, i t  was widely felt tha t  much 
of the increase in the money stock had come into the hands of black market operators or war 
profiteers, so that  a proportional shrinkage of money balances would not be a "just" solution. 
Lieftinck writes: "On July 9, 1945, as a first measure against hoarding of money made in 
the black market, all 100 guilder notes were withdrawn from circulation. Subject to a brief 
time limit, the facility was opened for holders of such notes, to be credited for the  amount on 
a blocked bank account" (the 100 guilder note was the largest denomination in circulation a t  
the time). On September 26, 1945 the government withdrew all bank notes in circulation and 
blocked all bank deposits. At the same time the existing bank secrecy law was suspended. "This 
measure was intended t o  serve three objectives. The first was t o  bring into the  open all money 
holdings, in  particular those improperly acquired during the years of foreign occupation ... The 
second was t o  register all liquid assets for the purpose of tax  assessment under the existing t ax  
legislation and the special reconstruction taxes that  were going to be imposed. The  third and 
most important objective was t o  re-establish an appropriate relationship between the  quantity 
of goods available and the supply of money in circulation". 
During the week following the currency withdrawal and blocking of bank deposits, each cit- 
izen received an identical small nominal amount of money and later that  same week additional 
money was released t o  finance wages earned over the week. In subsequent weeks the  govern- 
ment continued to  release money for wage payments as well as special releases to  meet firms' 
requirements for working capital. Bank credit remained subject to  licensing and often required 
investigation of all blocked accounts owned by the firm. In Lieftnick's words: "By the  end of 
1945 the ratio betweell national income and the amount of money in circulation had almost 
returned t o  its pre-war level". 
"The g~vernment  opelled different options for the remaining blocked money: 
(1) Continua.tion of these holdings on blocked account in the hope and expectation of future 
relea.ses. 
(2) Transfer of limited a,mounts to a. medium-term sa.vings a.ccount. 
(3) Use of these holdings for payment of tax arrears incurred during the occupation. 
(4) Use of these boldings to fulfill obligations in respect to  the new special reconstruction taxes 
to  be imposed. 
(5) Subscription to long-term, low interest bea.ring Government loans." 
Because the last three options were most popular, the blocked money became available t o  
the Treasury, "where it was held and only gradually released for public spending according to  
the growing needs connected with the rehabilitation of the economy". 
As a result of these measures, the income velocity of money which had fallen t o  approximately 
0.3 during the war and 0.45 in the summer of 1945, rose t o  almost 2 (very similar to the  1938 
level) in December of 1945 and remained very stable around that  level for the next four years. 
The nominal money supply had been reduced from 11 billion guilders in May 1945 to 4.1 billion 
guilders at the year-end. "Thereafter it rose steadily and i t  was practically stabilized at the 
level of around 7.2 billion guilders in 1948". Wholesale prices increased by 25-30%. Real wages 
were virtually stable. 
I quote from Lieftinck's description of the a.ccompanying tax reform: 
"Since during the war pears tax evasion had been pract,iced on a large scale and tax assessment 
had run into a backlog, supplementary t,as declarat.ions were imposed with respect to  all existing 
direct taxes, and provisional t as   assessment,^ were made covering the year 1944 and the first eight 
months of 1945. I n  order t.o speed up the collect.ion of tas arrears and in anticipation of the 
'In 1938 national income at  market. prices equaled 5.4 billion guilders; the war had reduced national income 
t o  approximat.eiy 3 billion guilders in  early 1945 (annual rate). 
announced: rcconstr~~ction taxes, a system of voluntary and obligatory tax deposits (advanced 
payments to the Treasury) was introduced which by the end of 1946 amounted to over 1,800 
million guilders. To supplement the revenue from normal taxes, two special reconstruction taxes 
were imposed: 
) A *called capital increase levy on the accrual during the war years of all personal wealth 
(money holdings and other assets taxable under the existing wealth tax), at a rate of 50 to 
90% differentiated on the basis of a propriety test of the nature of the acquisition and the 
amount of the increase. 
(2) A s~ca l l ed  once-for-all capital levy on all personal wealth at the end of the war, at  a rate 
of 4 to 20% by application of a progression scale. 
The collection of these special taxes, the total yield of which amounted to over 3,000 million 
guilders, was spread over a number of years, and to the extent that they were not paid out of 
blocked accounts these levies contributed considerably to counteracting otherwise generated new 
inflationary pressures. With a view to making the Government budget a better policy instrument 
to the circumstances, its structure was for the time being modified. Instead of the traditional 
division in two parts, a current account and a capital account, the current budget was divided 
into an ordinary account, an extraordinary account, and a separate budget chapter for the newly 
established Agricultural Equalization Fund. The ordinary account covered normal recurrent ex- 
penditure. The extraordinary account covered all expenditures that were directly connected with 
those functions of the Government that were undertaken to cope with the dislocation of the econ- 
omy,'including war damages, and, therefore, were considered to be of a temporary character (the 
administration and liquidation of the war heritage). The budget of the Agricultural Equalization 
Fund served to give an estimate of the balance of the cost of farm and consumer subsidies and 
the yield of agricultural export levies, the former being required to ensure a reasonable remuner- 
ation to the farmers while at the same time keeping the food bill of the consumers down. Its 
actual outcome was  highly dependent on changes in world inarket prices; and given the objectives 
just mentioned, the balance of this account could not be predicted reliably. The capital budget 
maintained its traditional character of covering expenditures that increased the durable assets 
of the public domain and the revenues derived from those assets. Particularly the introduction 
of the extraordinary account in t.he current budget proved to serve an extremely useful purpose 
because it avoided the mixing up of recurrent and non-recurrent expenditures, facilitated a special 
surveillance and an appropriate phasing of the latter, and embodied a constant reminder that 
those expenditures were temporary and should be abolished as soon as possible". 
The Dutch Goverilment was not fa.ced in 1945 with widespread use of foreign currency. Also, 
convertibility of the guilder was postpoiled until the nest decade. In the 1950s the European 
Payments Union (EPU) remained the iilstitutiollal mechanism for international payments until 
late 1958. The  return to  convertibility was postponed for so many years in Western Europe 
because of a perceived "dollar shorta.geV. This term only makes sense if one assumes as general 
dol1a.r o\rervaluation of the West Eur0pea.n currencies during the immediate postwar years.g 
Became in Eastern Europe unofficial markets provide information about the  exchange rate 
between local money and the DMark or US dollar, there should be no excuse for establishing 
an exchange rate that would undervalue the DMark or Dollar to  such an extent that  i t  would 
make sense t o  speak of a DMark or Dollar shortage. Hence, the historical experience in Western 
Europe with the EPU in the postwar period does not offer many indirect lessons for Eastern 
Europe today, apart from the obvious one that  i t  is hazardous t o  fix exchange rates in periods of 
great economic transition. However, the Dutch experience with a currency reform immediately 
after the war is of interest as a historical case study of the removal of a monetary overhang 
larger than a full year's national income in a way that  was democratically acceptable. 
Need for a Nominal Anchor 
During the transition to  a market economy forecasts of nominal illcome a t  market prices will be 
subject t o  large forecast errors. At the same time, the income velocity of money will depend on 
'See: Peter Bofinger: "A Mult.ilateral Payments Union ior Eastern Europe?". Discussion Paper nr. 458, Centre 
for Economic Policy Research, London 1990. 
trends in economic growth and inflatioll, as well as on the availability of money substitutes, both 
in the form of domestic saving accounts and in the form of foreign currency. The Polish example 
has shown already how quickly the importance of foreign currency for domestic transactions can 
change over time, and this will make estimates of the velocity of money even more hazardous. 
With both national income and velocity being so hard t o  forecast, how can the Central Bank 
provide a nominal anchor for the economy if one rejects the option of fixing the exchange rate 
for a long period as I have done in this paper? 
Perhaps the Dutch example may offer a useful suggestion. Lieftinck suggests in his book 
that  the authorities were able to  make continuous estimates of a t  least a very large proportion 
of national income by monitoring trends in wages. During the first few months after the current 
reform the Central Bank apparently set a path for the money stock on the basis of its estimates 
of wages paid t o  workers.1° If indeed the quality of up-to-date statistics on wages is clearly 
superior t o  the statistics on output or domestic sales, then i t  may make sense for a brief period 
t o  use estimates on the incomes side for setting monetary policy. Assuming the authorities will 
continue t o  determine wages in the socialized sector, i t  should be possible t o  allow for free wage 
formation in the privatized sector of the economy and t o  free almost all domestic prices whilst 
maintaining a perspective on nominal developments in the economy by monitoring very closely 
trends in wages. During this first stage, an anti-inflationary policy would effectively mean a 
consistent policy on wages in the nationalized sector. In the Dutch case, the income velocity of 
money became remarkably stable from the end of 1945 onwards, i.e., no more than 8 months 
after the war. Once velocity has stabilized, the Central Bank could try t o  target the rate of 
growth of an appropriate monetary aggregate, using the type of feed-back rule advocated by 
many monetary economists." 
Conclusion 
T h ?  East Eur0pea.n na.tions are discussing co.~vertibility of their currencies under exciting but 
very difficult political conditions. The moveme~~t  towards political and economic freedom should 
in my view include the transitioil t o  a fully convel.tible currency, and I have tried to  provide 
some arguments in fa.vor of making the currency convertible as soon as i t  is politically feasible 
to  conduct a fiscal policy t11a.t does not require i i~f la t io~~ary finance of the budget deficit. Many 
of the points in this paper were well espressed in a recent conference contribution by Hahn-Been 
Lee, a.-former ~ e ~ u i y  ~ r i i l l e  hlinister-of South Korea who spoke on "The change in the East 
Block" .12 
"Once the Europeans achieve equalization of domestic prices with external prices, they will gain 
the confidence of their people, who will then be able to trust their own currency .... Once peo- 
ple begin to have that valuable trust in  their o\r7n currency, they begin to adopt the habit of 
saving, making investment possible. Saving is a prerequisite for the privatization of state-owned 
industries. Only after such successful economic management does popular democracy have a fair 
chance at stability. .." 
''In addition, as shorvn in the quotati011 above. the Central Bank helped to provide credit to enterprises. 
"See for example: B. hlccallum, Monetary Tileor!., hlachlillar~, 1989. 
'ZWall Street Journal, July 13, 1990. 
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Introduction 
The problem of Bulgaria's external debt became particularly important under the conditions 
prevailing during the economic crisis the country is experiencing a t  the moment. The debts and 
receipts to  and from other countries are an important factor not only in the search for the road 
t o  convertibility of the Bulgarian lev, but also in the search for economic, financial, and political 
stability. 
In order to  overcome the economic crisis, it is necessary to  seriously consider the financial 
policy of the country and t o  ta.ke steps t o  reduce our external debt, t o  restructure and reschedule 
the payments, in order to  secure the normal servicing of the debt. All this would be impossible 
to  do without the significant support of other countries and assistance of the creditors. 
In this short presenta.tion I shall focus on two p i n t s :  
(1) Analysis of the situation with the esteri~al  debt, and 
(2) Steps t o  be taken in the credit policy of Bulgaria. 
Understanda.bly, more a.ttention will be given to  the necessa.ry a.ctions on the part of Bulgaria, 
hoping that  our foreign pa.rtners will reveal the forms and the possible scales of the required 
external assistance. 
Analysis of the Situation 
I t  is important to  stress a t  the very beginning that due to  the critical level of industrial de- 
velopment and a number of other reasons Bulgaria often used external credits in i ts  past and 
this is not the first time i t  bears the burden of these debts. I t  would be enough t o  point out 
the great difficulties from the debts accumulated in the period after the liberation from Turkish 
domination until the global economic crisis 1929-1933 when, together with a number of other 
European countries, i t  became bankrupt . 
The Bulgarian economy was quite shattered and very backward immediately after the Sec- 
ond World War. In order to  restart its economic development and to  restructure the national 
economy, Bulgaria had to attract additional financial resources from other countries. Being un- 
able to  receive considerable external credits from the West in the first postwar decades, Bulgaria 
directed i ts  efforts in obtainiilg credits from the USSR and some East European countries, and 
in this way they played a positive ]-ole in our ecoilomic development a t  that stage. The credits 
were given a t  favorable terms and were used al~llost esclusively for investment purposes. They 
were not sufficient, however, and some of the projects created with their assistance were not on 
a good technological level. The result of this was that in spite of the accelerated development 
of the p roduc t io~~  forces, ecoilonlic efficieilcy was coilsiderably lo~v.  R'ith full employment of 
the whole labor force, the raising of the standard of living went quite slowly, especially in the 
last two decades. In spite of this., the credits (v:hich were repaid) helped in the creation of 
considerable production facilities. 
Only as late as the 1960s and especially in the 1970s did some opportunities to  use credits 
from Western countries emerge, though they were not always offered a t  favorable conditions 
(this refers particularly to  the very short, repayment periods). Bulgaria began to  receive loans 
from its Western partners, but unfortunately did not work out a clear and scientific concept 
for the policy t o  be applied in order to  use them efficiently. Loans could be received without a 
requirement for a maximum efficiency in the investment of the money for building up modern 
production facilities which match the global standards in the key sectors. Nor was there any 
consistent structural policy for economic development. 
As a result of these circumstances, the loans obtained were used mainly t o  cover the short- 
ages and the imbalances in the economy created by the centralized administrative system and 
the unbalanced, in some cases voluntaristic planning. In spite of the large, for the scale of the 
country, foreign debt, the latter did not create highly efficient and globally competitive produc- 
tion in any of the branches. A significant portion of the loans was used for the construction 
of prestigious, but not efficient production facilities like the plants for heavy machine building, 
metallurgy and other large plants. Another part of the loans was used for the import of goods 
needed t o  fill the gaps that  appeared as a result of the imbalances, the poor planning and the 
incompetent centralized management of the national economy. Even in the last couple of years 
Bulgaria became a regular importer of agricultural products, mainly cereals and fodder. Other 
goods are also imported which could be produced locally if the economy was better structured 
and the producers were properly stimulated. Unfortunately, it can be concluded, that  a part of 
the resources obtained through loans from other countries were invested in the building-up and 
equipment of projects which were designed to  serve the needs of a limited number of people. 
Though their amount is not very big, this was lavishness that we should not have afforded. 
According to  official data, more than 80% of tlie external loan:, were not used for the creation 
of production facilities, but for personal and productive consumption. Two thirds of them were 
directed to  productive consun~ption-import of raw materials, auxiliary materials and spare 
parts. The personal consumption includes the import of consumer goods, fodder, herbicides, 
raw materials and intermediate products for the production of consumer goods. 
Only about 20% of the loans were used for importing equipment and machinery for pro- 
duction innovation. This amount includes also the 600 million dollars for the financing of our 
participation in the building up of the "Yamburg-\Vestern USSR border" gas-pipeline which 
guaranteed the delivery of considerable quantities of gas until the year 2010. 
As a result of the inconsistent credit policy, the esternal loans did not contribute to  the 
creation of modern production facilities which could help the satisfaction of the domestic demand 
and the increase of esports. This would have increased the hard currency revenues and would 
have assisted the repayment of the loans and even the formation of small hard currency reserves. 
The loans were only used for temporarily overcoming the accumulating effect of the negative 
economic factors and phenomena, but not for their elimination. Thus the negative factors 
in the economic life, though hidden temporarily, were accumulating all the time. Economic 
achievements and high rates were widely demonstrated. Statistics did not perform its  role 
either. It used t o  announce that  unlike Poland, the USSR, and other countries, the Bulgarian 
economy was developing successfully. This was done t o  show a false level of success by the 
totalitarian leadership and the administrative system. 
This self-deception prevented us from drawing realistic conclusions of the real conditions 
of the country even in the 19SOs, when we could already learn from the lessons of Poland, 
Romania, Yugoslavia, and other countries in connection with their problems of external debt 
and the inefficient use of loans. 
One of the theoretical justifications of the almost uncontrolled use of tlie external loans 
was the presence of inflation of the currencies in which the loans were received. There was an 
understanding that it is profitable to receive credits which will be paid later with devaluated 
dolla.rs, DMs, pounds, etc. The theoretically sound principle that inflation is favorable for the 
debtors and unfavorable for the creditors was a.pplied to draw a wrong political conclusion. The 
policy of actively drawing loans was justified in this way, without giving sufficient attention to 
the effect from each particular loan. 
Indeed the devaluation of the foreign currencies can be favorable for the debtors, but only if 
the loans are used efficiently and-what is very important-if a t  the same time as the devaluation 
there is an increase in the prices of our exported products. At the present moment, however, 
the quickest changes take place in the prices of new products which embody technical progress, 
but we export very few of them. For that reason in the majority of cases, Bulgaria is not able 
to sell at high prices on foreign markets. The debts are paid with currencies received from the 
exports of goods a t  prices which increase very slowly.and even remain unaltered for a long time. 
In the case of imports the situation is reverse. Importing advanced machinery, equipment and 
technologies, Bulgaria has to  pay rising prices that grow even quicker than the inflation rate. 
Therefore the terms of trade deteriorate. 
Inflation also affects the external loans in another aspects. The higher the inflation rate, 
the higher the interest rates. The interest rates under conditions of inflation is not only a 
manifestation of the price of the service. At tlie same time it also compensates the creditor's 
loss which results from the depreciation of tlie real value of the debt. Tlie high interest rates, 
when the economic conditions are deteriorating, make it still more difficult for Bulgaria to service 
its debts. 
Because for a long time the external debt was kept secret, no full analyses have been published 
about the terms of our esternal loans-sources, utilization, interest, due times, structure, etc. 
No information is availa.ble either rega.rding their efficiency. The official statement was that the 
external debt is about 10,4 billion dollars. It was also announced that the main part of the 
external debt was accumula.ted in the period 1985-1989. 
According to information from some external sources and from our pl.ess during the last 
couple of months, Bulgaria's external debt in hard currency has increased since 1970 as shown 
in Table 1. 
Obviously, the debt increa.sed considera.bl y in 1975-1979, then in 1980-84 it fell considerably, 
a.nd in 1985-89 it strongly increased again. The last sweep upwards is due to the attempts of 
the totalitarian regime to hide, with the assista~ice ofexter~ial oans, the acceleration with which 
Bulgaria was moving to a serious crisis. Tlie gross debt in 1981 was 2,l billion dollars and the 
net debt was only 700 niillio~i dollars, which wa.s not so bad. The debt was also rather normal 
in 1985. Only three and a half yea.rs later it grew by 7 billion and thus became an enormous 
burden to the economy. It might be enough to point out that in 1985-89 the hard currency 
expenditures of Bulgaria were 23 billion dollars and tlie revenues were only 15,7 billion dollars. 
According to  international practice, the acceptable normal level of a foreign debt is when 
its servicing requires 20-25% of the current receipts of the country. The main source for hard 
currency for Bulgaria is the export to the developed countries and to some of the developing 
countries. The exports to industrially developed countries was about 1 billion dollars annually 
(in the period 1986-89), with a declining tendency in recent years. The exports to developing 
countries in the same period was around 1,5 billion dollars annually, and a part of it was delivered 
on credit or paid according to clearing, barter, and other bilateral agreements. In this situation 
the real annual receipts from exports in hard currency are no more than 2 billion dollars. Even 
if we accept the criterion for debt servicing with 25% of the hard currency receipts, Bulgaria 
has about 500 millioii dollars available ior this purpose. 
Given the situation oi  tlie internatioiial fiiialicial ma.rkets, it is possible to assume that 
the a.verage interest on the Bulgarian esternal debt is about ;-a% annually. This means that 
Bulgaria has to pa.y 700-800 million leva. interest each gear, whicli is about one-third of its total 
receipts in hard currency. According to our esti~nates, in the period 1970-1990 the total amount 
of the interest calculated 011 its foreign loans is allnost equal to the current debt. 
-- ..- .-.. . . .-.- 
Years Gross Debt 
...-.- 
Net Debt 
1970 0.7 0.6 
1971 0.8 0.7 
1972 1 .O 0.9 
1973 1.1 1 .O 
1974 1.8 1.4 
1975 2.7 2.3 
1976 3.3 2.9 
1977 3.8 3.3 
1978 4.4 3.8 
1979 4.6 3.9 
1980 3.6 2.9 
1981 3.2 2.4 
1982 2.8 1.9 
1983 2.4 1.2 
1983 2.1 0.7 
1955 3.5 1.4 
19S6 6.2 4.8 
19S8 8.0 - 
1989 10.0 - 
1990 10.4 - 
Source: ECE, 1987-88, N 7, p.3. (0. The 
data for 1989 and 1990 are from the Bul- 
garian press.) 
Together with the interest, the country must also meet the coming maturities. If we accept 
the most optimistic version, namely that  the average term of pa.yment for the loans is 5 years, 
then each yea.r we have to  meet maturities a.mounting t o  about 2 billion dollars. This is an 
amount equal to the tot,al sum of the average annual receipts from exports of the country in 
hard currency. The amount paya.ble in 1990 a.s per March 31, 1990 (before payments were 
frozen) was 3,4 billion dollars and the amount payable in 1991 is 1,8 billion dollars. Analysis 
shows that  the receipts in ha.rd currency, from exports and from other activities, are not sufficient 
for servicing the debt. These circumstances forced the government t o  make a decision in April 
1990 t o  stop paymeilts on tlie principal of our external debts and t o  concentrate efforts on the 
payment of the interest only. The Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank stopped payments of maturities 
of all kinds of credits-short-term, import credits, credits for financing of investment projects, 
and also medium and long-term financial credits. This was a step which undoubtedly shook the 
reputation of the country as a reliable partner. Problems with imports, and severe difficulties 
in obtaining new external loans emerged. 
The receivables of Bulgaria as per June 30, 1990 from credits given to  other countries ac- 
counted t o  2,2 billion dollars. These are credits to  some developing countries, among which Iraq 
ranks first. The major part of these amounts are not payable. 
Bulgaria's main creditors are the FRG, Japan, Austria, the UK, and France. 
New Problems Facing the Bulgarian 
Credit Policy 
The need to overcoine tlie crisis situation in the field of foreign debt is an extremely difficult 
problem for Bulgaria. It will require a long-term program based on a well considered monetary 
and credit policy. The measures to  o\'erconle the debt crisis must be an integral part of the 
stabilization program for a long period of time. The core of this program must consist of 
measures for the systematic increase of hard currency i~icomes and a considerable limitation of 
the expenditures, in order t o  secure a balanced and active balance of payments. It is already 
necessary in the early years to  reach a positive balance in the current payments which will be 
sufficient for paying the annual interest and will allow us to  direct some, though small amounts, 
towards the repayment of a part of the principal. Thus further growth of the debt will be 
stopped and i t  will gradually start to  diminish. 
Such a turn is not easy for an economy which is undergoing a crisis. It will require a lot of 
efforts for the successful realization of the economic reform which must be done at a minimum 
social cost. Realistically speaking, such a turn in the conditions of the balance of payments 
cannot be reached within one or two years. Undoubtedly, the amount of the debt will continue 
t o  increase in the short-term perspective as a result of the unpaid interests and also because of 
the use of external assistance. The goal is t o  prepare conditions for barring the  growth of the 
debt further, and later t o  move t o  a reduction of its growth and then a gradual reduction of 
the debt itself, in order t o  create conditions for its normal monitoring and servicing. A gradual, 
well considered, transition would be better than shock producing measures, as they might have 
unpredictable consequences for the economy which is in a difficult situation. 
In connection with the development and implementation of a new credit policy, it is funda- 
mentally important to  eliminate the unnecessary and harmful practice of considering the public 
debt a state secret, as this makes i t  impossible to analyze the economic efficiency and the rea- 
sonableness of obtaining external credits. It  is quite clear that  the credits cannot be a secret for 
the creditors and their banks. The secret is kept only from the Bulgarian nation. The secrecy 
allowed opportunities for arbitrary decisions, without the knowledge of the public. I t  makes i t  
possible t o  receive loans without assessing the consequences, without analyzing the efficiency of 
the use of the loans and their terms. If there is a full transparency in the financial and credit 
policy, the public will always know not only the exact amount of the debt, but also the terms of 
each particular credit-amount, maturity period, interest, goal, and method of payment. Ev- 
erybody will be able to  judge about the efficiency of each loan. Thus, the poor economic results 
could not be masked with the assistance of external loans. The publicity increases the public 
influence on the economic, fiscal, and credit policy of the country. I t  allows not only the banks 
and the governmental financial authorities, but also scientific institutes, experts, etc., t o  assess 
the efficiency not only of tlie credits used, but also of the whole economy and economic policy. 
There is no doubt, that  had the Bulgarian public been regularly informed about the inefficient 
use of such large external loans, it would have opposed them much earlier and would not have 
allowed the uncontrolled realization of a thoughtless credit policy which brought the external 
debt of tlie country to  i ts  present critical level. It  is also necessary to  eliminate the secrecy 
of some other information like: inflation and money circulation, balance of payments, hard 
currency and gold reserves etc., as they are needed for making an analysis of the real economic 
conditions. 
Of great importance for the long-term stabilization program and for the economic reform is 
the question about the further development of the foreign economic relations of Bulgaria and 
the conditions for obtaining foreign assistance. 
In the first place, a t  this point in time i t  would be wrong, in our opinion, t o  underestimate 
our economic relations with the USSR and the other CMEA countries which have three quarters 
of our foreign exchange. It is necessary to  preserve tlie market shares we have gained in these 
countries in order to be able to satisfy our needs for raw materials, fuel, energy, and consumer 
goods. A part of tlie raw and other materials imported from these countries can be, after being 
processed, exported again bringing in more hard currency. 
The Soviet market and the markets of the other ChlEA countries are also important for 
us in connection with the forthcoming introductioll of the system of payment in hard currency 
instead of in transferable rubles. The preservation of our positioli in our relations with the CMEA 
countries can open better opportunities for obtaining hard currency which will be an additional 
source for repayment oi our external debts. At the same time we should not underestimate the 
danger of a reverse situation. If our balance of payment with the CMEA countries deteriorates, 
there is a real danger that  the debts in convertible currency might seriously increase. 
There are reasons to  expect that  Bulgaria's financial conditions will deteriorate considerably 
from the transition to payments in hard currencies among the CMEA countries. Negative 
consequenccas are expectc?d in two directions: 
e Terms of trade will get worse, and 
e Exports will be limited. 
The deterioration in Bulgaria's terms of trade with the CMEA countries and mainly with 
the USSR will be manifested when the current international prices start  t o  be applied in the 
mutual exchange of commodities. Bulgaria's imports from the USSR are dominated by products 
with high international prices: oil, gas, raw materials, etc. The situation becomes even more 
complicated now with the new rise in the oil prices in connection with the developments in the 
Persian Gulf. The major part of Bulgaria's exports to  the USSR consists of products which 
are not competitive and their prices may fall. All this means that  we must expect considerable 
deterioration in the Bulgarian terms of trade with the USSR. The same thing is expected with 
~ S F R ,  GDR (which is now part of united Germany), Hungary, and Poland. 
Together with the deterioration in the terms of trade, there are reasons t o  expect a consid- 
erable cut down in the Bulgarian trade with the CMEA countries when the payments start  t o  
he performed in hard currency. It is quite realistic to  expect a reduction in Bulgarian exports. 
As a result of these factors, it is obvious that  there will be a deterioration in the Bulgarian 
balance of payments. I11 order to  soften a t  1ea.st pa.rtially these consequences, Bulgaria tries t o  
reach an agreement with the separate CMEA countries for a gradual and step-by-step transition 
to  payments in hard currency at current interna.tiona.1 prices, within a period of 2-3 years. Along 
with this, other mutually beneficial solutiolls are considered in order to  avoid eventual clashes. 
Of great importa.nce for Bulga.ria, in its attempts to  overcome the crisis of the external debt 
are its relations with the developed industrial countries. The problem of reaching a turn in the 
tendency of the growing external debt is directly related t o  Bulgaria's balancing i ts  payments 
wit11 the industrially developed countries. This requires the iilclusion in the long-term program 
for stabilization of the economy, of efficient steps for strong stimulation of exports and all other 
activities creating hard currency revenues, a.s well as a reduction of the expenditures in hard 
currency. 
In spite of everything, in the coilditions of a deep economic crisis i t  would be unrealistic to  
expect that  the problems of Bulgaria.'~ esternal debt could only be solved through the limitation 
of the ha.rd currency expenditures and the stimula.tion of incomes. It would be difficult t o  acti- 
vate, restructure, and develop the economy as well as increase its efficiency without considerable 
assistance from outside. Otherwise the process would be slow and difficult, with heavy social 
consequences. I t  is necessary t o  point out once again that  the realization of a n  efficient program 
for the strengthening of the economy without serious social clashes will inevitably require, in 
the first years, new debts and financial assistance, and this will increase the debt still further. 
This means that  the external debt will not only remain very high, but will continue t o  grow. It 
is desirable t o  linlit this growth by increasing the efficiency from the use of not only the new 
credits, but also of all hard currency resources. 
According t o  the available data  the major part of the obligations are t o  banks and are short 
or medium term. This means t,lla.t now, a.nd in the nest two or three years, the main part of 
the debt has to  be paid is inlpossible, a.s it a1rea.d~ became clear. Therefore the first 
immediate task is to push forward the negotia.tions for rescheduling the payment and, where 
possible, for reducing the interest. The negotiations could be held both with the banks and 
with the governments of individual countries who call contribut,e in different ways. I t  would be 
very helpful if the governineilts of sollle couiltries decide to  allow long-term loans to  Bulgaria 
a t  favorable interest and other t,erms, and to  use the amounts for paying the short-term loans 
whose interests are very high. It is very important t o  negotiate also with the Club of Paris about 
allowing concessions within the frames of international plans and agreements. 
All these steps could only produce a real effect if they secure the rescheduling within a longer 
period of time a t  improved terms and interests. What has been done so far will neither assist 
Bulgaria to  overcome the crisis, nor normalize its economic relations with Western countries. 
Along with the measures for rescheduling, restructuring, and improving the terms, i t  is 
necessary t o  take immediate steps for obtaining new loans from foreign governments and in- 
ternational organizations, in order t o  use them for the realization of the economic reform and 
the stabilization program. In this respect the first task is t o  arrange the inclusion of Bulgaria 
in the International Monetary Fund and in the International Bank for Reconstruction and De- 
velopment. These organizations will not provide us with large financial resources. However, 
Bulgaria's participation in them will play a positive effect on its international prestige. In the 
coming years we shall also rely on concrete assistance from these organizations. The preliminary 
procedures have already been discussed. 
Bulgaria is a co-founder also of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
F'rom this bank i t  is possible t o  expect additional sources for reconstruction and modernization 
of a number of enterprises, as well as for restructuring the economy. 
Apart from the international organizations, additional resources in hard currency can also 
be requested from the governments of those Western countries who have lively economic rela- 
tions with Bulgaria. Some countries already declared their readiness to  give Bulgaria financial 
assistance. Very promising is the statement the EC Foreign Ministers gave a t  the beginning of 
April 1990, about extending the list of the East European countries which will receive financial 
assistance, including Bulgaria. Another thing that  could be done is to  distribute obligation loans 
through banking consortiums and to  use the obtained resources both for paying the short term 
debts, and for new investments. 
It is necessary to  use all forms of attra.cting capital from other countries, for creating joint and 
other companies, etc., as this would enhance the development of Bulgaria's economic relations 
with other countries, will increase its economy and its exports, and will contribute to  the growth 
in its hard currency reserves. All this will facilitate the movemeilt away from the economic and 
financial crisis. 

The Foreign Exchange Constraint 
in a Liberalizing Economy 
John Williamson, 
Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C. 
Introduction 
This paper summarizes standard theory regarding the foreign exchange constraint in a mar- 
ket economy, and then examines the relevance of this theory for the problems confronting the 
liberalizing economies of Eastern Europe. 
The Concept of a Foreign Exchange Constraint 
A simple model of the balance of payments on current a.ccount may be specified as: 
where 
B = balance on current account 
I.' = real income 
Q = capacity output 
c = competit.iveness 
The model is illustrated in Figure 1. 
A foreign exchange constraint exists if (with current c a.nd Q) the maximum sum F available 
to  finance a current account deficit is less than OB*. Such a constraint prevents the economy 
operating a t  full capacity OQ. Output has to  be cut by (l/m)(B* - F ) ,  where m is the marginal 
propensity t o  import. 
A foreign exchange constraint can be relaxed in two ways. 
Foreign Finance 
Additional foreign financing, an increase in F ,  has the obvious short-run benefit of diminishing 
any gap between B* and F and thus permitting the economy t o  operate closer to  Q. If the 
increase in finance takes the form of aid or is accomplished via debt reconstruction, i t  is a pure 
gain. 
Fea.sible levels of foreign borrowi~ig and aid are const.~.ained by wha.t the rest of the world may 
be ready t o  supply. But, eve11 within the limits of what the rest of the world may be willing to 
supply, the llatio~lal interest in foreign borrowing ]nust be assessed in an intertemporal context. 
Failure to  make sucli an assessllle~lt has frequently led to devasta.ting costs-as in much of Latin 
America, in Bulgaria, and, the most dramatic ca.se of ~llisuse of the international capital market 
of all: in R.omania under Ceausescu. Such an a.ssessnlent has t o  balance: 
Figure 1. Dependence of Balance of Payments on Current Account 
Figure 2. Expenditure Swit.ching 
The benefit of relaxing the foreign exchange constrailit (or, if the economy is already oper- 
ating a t  iull capacity, the rate o i  return on the additional investment undertaken with the 
foreign borrowing, as analyzed in tlie two-gap model) 
The benefit of building up reserves, wliich should typically be held a t  about 3 or 4 months' 
supply of imports, and certainly need t o  be a t  such a level prior t o  any declaration of 
convertibility 
The cost of eroding creditworthiness and precipitating a debt crisis (something that ,  accord- 
ing t o  a traditional rule of thumb that  seems t o  have some empirical support, can happen 
when the debtlexport ratio exceeds 200%). 
Expenditure Switching 
Expenditure switching means a shift of domestic and/or foreign expenditure toward domestically 
produced goods. It has the effect of shifting BB up. Possible sources: 
Tighter import controls 
A more competitive real exchange rate1 
Improved non-price competitiveness. 
Question 1: How do tlie lags of these three i~istruments compare? 
Import controls call act rapidly. Devaluatioii requires something like 2 or 3 years, and the full 
effects may take longer still, until exporters call respoiid to  changed price incentives. Non-price 
competitiveness depends on restructuring: this is the key to catching up, but the process is very 
long-term, involvi~lg perhaps 2 to  20 years. 
Question 2: Can real devaluatio~i fail to  eliminate a foreign exchange constraint? 
In the short run, the answer is yes, for the reasoii just given: devaluation takes time t o  work. 
In the medium run, there are certain limits on the maximum sum that  a country can transfer 
abroad, but a sufficiently competitive real exchange rate can enable it t o  approach that  limit. The 
constraint on use of tlie exchange rate coines from tlie danger of macroeconomic destabilization. 
An ultra-competitive excliange rate will be highly recessio~lary if not accompanied by monetary 
expansion (cf Poland) because of tlie real balaiice effect; but, if there is monetary accommodation 
as happened in some Latin American cou~itries (ci  Brazil), the result can easily be hyperinflation. 
Question 3: Can tighter import coiit1.01~ substitute for real devaluation? 
In the short run, it is difficult to  deny that inlport controls-such as those resulting from 
the denial of convertibility-may give a better outcome. In the medium run, import controls 
are a thoroughly bad idea: they distort resource allocation, they preclude foreign competition, 
they invite rent-seeking behavior, and they typically erode tlie government's fiscal position. We 
are thus confronted by an intertemporal trade-off: abolition of import controls (convertibility) 
promises long-run gains a t  the cost of short-run difficulties. But this does not necessarily mean 
that  a government will always be wise to  make the courageous decision of abolishing import 
controls and establishing convertibility immediately. A premature plunge may lack credibility, 
precisely because the public knows that  it can be reversed and that  reversal will bring a short- 
run easing of the situation. An incredible declaration of convertibility invites an import surge 
( a  phenomenon several times witnessed in Latin America) as the public tries to stock u p  on 
foreign goods while this remains possible; tlie import surge may then make the maintenance of 
convertibility impossible. 
Question 4: Is there a case of gradual liberalization of import controls? 
In my view tlie answer is yes. Import-competing enterprises need time to  adjust to  the 
new situation they face, includi~ig a large increase in the prices of energy and materials t o  
' T l ~ i s  is the standard instrument in a market economy. Import controls have already been abandoned, save 
for the support given 1.0 a few industrial cripples like textiles and agricult,ure, wliich will not. vary one way or the 
other with the state o i  the balance o i  payments. .And wllat should be done lias (hopefully) already been done to  
look aiter the long-run efficiency o i  t.he economy. 
world market levels. Some will adjust successfull:, if given time. Others will not, but even in 
those cases it makes no sense to drive enterprises out of business so long as they are capable 
of producing positive value-added a t  world prices, 1111til the new export industries can absorb 
the factors they release. An immediate move to near free trade threatens t o  close down many 
enterprises simultaneously before their factors call be absorbed elsewhere. The right strategy 
is to  establish con\reetibility as a part of the coordinated package of measures on "M-Day", the 
day the economy moves t o  a market economy, but to  accompany convertibility by a tariffication 
of all impart restrictions and then to  reduce those tariffs gradually over the next, say, 5 years. 
The Third Oil Shock 
Suppose that  the economy is initially in macroeconomic equilibrium as in Figure 2 when the 
price of oil rises dramatically. If the  economy is heavily dependent on imported oil, as they 
all are in Eastern Europe excluding the Soviet Union, the effect will be t o  rotate BB down t o  
R1 B1. Matters will be more difficult still if the economy was not initially in macro equilibrium, 
if i t  loses export markets in Iraq as well, or if it was receiving debt repayments in oil from Iraq. 
The optimal response to  such a situation in a market economy is to  devaluate, t o  finance any 
interim deficit that  may arise until devaluation call "work" by borrowing from the international 
capital market (or, if necessary, the IhlF), and to  let output decline only to  the extent that  
may be needed to make the real devaluation "stick". This reaction presumes that  the country 
is internationally creditworthy or has adequate unused borrowing rights a t  the IMF, that  its 
enterprises respond to  price incentives, and that enterprises that  are viable in the long-run but 
face short-run liquidity problems will be able to  borrow from a competitive banking system. 
Unfortunately all three assunlptions seem rather doubtful in the context of the liberalizing 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Clearly it makes sense in these circulnstances to search out all possible sources of aid and to  
seek a favorable debt reconstruction (in \vllicll context i t  may be worthwhile to  revive Bulgaria's 
pre-war claims on Germany, which were apparently not settled in the London Debt Agreement 
of 1953). Beyond what can be accomplisl~ed there, it may be necessary to  accept a lower level 
of output until such time as esports rise or the oil price falls. The key question is whether i t  
makes sense to  abandon the quest for convertibility until the foreign exchange constraint can be 
mastered, as the West European countries did in comparable circumstances in the 1940s. On 
that  question my mind is still open: convertibility seems to  offer much greater advantages in 
Eastern Europe today than i t  did in Western Europe 40 years ago. where the basic infrastructure 
of a market eco~lolny was already in place and there was no comparable need to  import a price 
structure (and substalltially less threat from corruption). 
The Reform and Stabilization 
Program of the Czechoslovakian 
Government 
Pave1 Klima, 
Prime Afinister's Ofice of the CSFR 
The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 11a.s decided to move to  a market oriented economy and 
to  be more closely integrated with the world economy. The a.nalysis of economic and social 
development and comparisons with the development of neighbors in Europe, which was done 
after the "velvet revolution" provided a. lot of evidence about problems and inefficiencies resulting 
from past policies. The allocatioil of resources through central planning rather than the market 
mechanism that  took place during almost all the postwar period has resulted in a long-term 
decline in productivity, a loss of inter~latioilal competitiveness and also a decline in the standard 
of living. 
There is broad public support for ra.dica1 reorientation of the economy. At the same time, 
i t  might not yet be clear, if there is really a deep and broad understanding about the impact 
of the transition to  a, market economy on the ecoilomic and social life of the society. Relatively 
high levels of persona.1 and social consumption ha.ve been achieved at  the expense of investment. 
The starting positio~l for trailsitio~l to  a market economy could be evaluated in comparison 
with some other ChlEA couiltries as n o r e  or less favorable: 
Irrespective of a sustai~ied decline in the growth rate during the last 15 years, there was still 
an increase of NhlP 11y 1,3% in 1989 
The prudent monetary and fiscal policy, aiid wages and price policy made i t  possible to  keep 
a very low inflation rate for a long period of time-some 2-3% annually; this figure does not 
include "depressed" inflation 
A relatively low external debt-7.9 billion US$ in 1989 with a debt service ratio of 19,4% 
In 1989 there was a slight increase in exports t o  the countries with convertible currency 
The budget deficit in the fiscal year 1988189 was relatively small. 
The main inherited problems (besides the damaged attitude of people to  economic life) could 
include the following: 
Obsolete industrial assets and a one-sided structural orientation t o  heavy branches of indus- 
try; an undeveloped infrastructure 
1na.dequate involveme~lt in the interila.tiona1 division of labor and cooperation with developed 
countries caused by less conlpetitive industrial products 
A complicated environmental situa.tion. 
Czechoslovakia. 1va.s one of the most industrialized countries before World War I1 and its 
achievements must be therefore coinpal-ed with countries such as Austria and Belgium. The 
forty years of "economic esperiment" wit11 tlie centrally planned management system was un- 
successful. 
The more or less favorable initial situation is however now complicated by relevant external 
events beyond the Government's co~itrol such as: the disintegration of the CMEA market; 
payments in convertible currency (rather than paylng in transferable rubles) for foreign trade 
between CMEA countries a t  international prices; Middle-East crisis followed by an increase in 
the price of crude oil. 
There is a general understanding in the Governmen?, The Federal Assembly, and the public in 
general, that  the economic reform, being understood as a systemic and institutional reform and 
fundamental restructuring of the economy, must be promoted as quickly as possible. Although 
some economic reforms had been initiated earlier, the process of reforms has greatly accelerated 
since November 1989. In 1990 a significant number of changes, new laws, and regulations have 
already been introduced. In May 1990 a "concept paper" on all reform issues was prepared; in 
September the Scenario sf  the reform was delivered to  the Federal Assembly by the Government 
and approved. 
The package of reform measures and policies, that  can be implemented t o  a great extent 
simultaneously, includes: 
(1) Tlie creation of a i~iacroeconomic framework for economic reform-stabilization policy, re- 
form of the t a s  system, new budget rules. 
42) Changes of ownership in the economy and demonopolization-so-called small privatization 
and restitution, big privatization, setting up the "State Property Fund". 
(3)  A major liberalization of domestic prices, 1iberaliza.tion of foreign trade operations, and the 
opening of the economy. 
(4) "Internal convertibility" of the Czechoslovakian currency (Koruna), which includes the lib- 
eralization of current account transactions and a unified exchange rate responsive t o  supply 
and demand. 
( 5 )  The provision of an adequate social safety net. 
(C) An adequate structural policy. 
The other measures which a.re t o  be promoted a.s part of the above mentioned policies are: 
promotion of private sector act.ivities, fiaa.ncia1 sector reform, a program for restructuring state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) and the privatiza.tion of a. pa.rt, of them, changes in the "rights and 
sesponsibilities" of the managers of SOEs, and last but not least, the encouragement of foreign 
direct investments. 
An internally consistent macroecono~nic franiework is understood t o  be a prerequisite for suc- 
cessful structural adjustment. %lie reforni policy aimed a t  changing the behavior of consumers, 
investors, and enterprise ma.nagers can only be successful if i t  takes place in a macroeconomic 
environment conducive t o  and supportive of such reforms. Accordingly, the Government has 
given priority t o  the elaboration of a macroeconomic framework within which i ts  sectoral reform 
policies, organizational, institutional, foreign trade, and financial reforms can be successfully 
unfolded. 
The main priority followed is t o  avoid both inflation and unnecessarily high unemployment. 
Avoiding excessive external indebtedness is another objective. These objectives should be pur- 
sued with a mix of fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies. 
Overwhelming state ownership on the means of production proved itself ineffective world- 
wide and will no longer be the only type of property in the country (common with the cooperative 
property); the constitution was alrea.dy changed and private property is again allowed in eco- 
nomic life. In the first sta.ge of privatization the majority of the sta.te owned enterprises will 
be transformed in the form of joint stock compa.nies with the possibility of privatization. The 
process of privatization and its details a.re still a ma.tter of consideration, but i t  is clear that  the 
sectors of reta.il markets a.nd services might be fully privatized in the near future (in the frame 
of so-called small privatiza.tion). 
The foreign ca.pita1 is needed to  pa.rtici1)at.e in the priva.tiza.tion because of a lack of domestic 
capital and as a.ssistance to  revitalize the old-fa.shioned industrial structure. All rights and 
guarantees t o  the foreign investors are provided in Czechoslovakian legal documents, as well 
as in international agreements on protecting investors from the respective foreign country. By 
this agreement the Czechoslovakian side is, in fact, giving a guarantee for free repatriation 
of the profit share or capital outside the country. Appropriate conditions to  attract foreign 
direct investments are now being elaborated in the field of legislation and by selecting the state 
enterprises for pilot programs of privatization with foreign capital participation. 
The private enterprises without limitations on capital volume or number of employees are 
now encouraged by law. 
A radical approach t o  the solving of the price-problem has been chosen. The price system 
based on the domestic costs applied for long periods of time, caused a discord between the 
internal structure, the level of prices and world market prices. Even more, internal cost-based 
prices are distorted so that  there is no link between Ufactory gate" (wholesale) prices and retail 
prices. The price problem is t o  be solved in two steps: 
(1) A centrally controlled price remedy (including taking into account the impact of the transi- 
tion t o  a freely convertible currency accounting system between CMEA countries)-the price 
remedy is already taking place a.nd should be accomplished in the first part of 1991. 
(2) Price 1iberaliza.tion on most of the products is also due to  take place early in 1991; there is 
full understanding of the fact that  price liberalization must be preceded by demonopolization 
of the enterprise structure. 
A strong obstacle to the price reform, to  the opening of the economy and to  the country's 
involvement in the international division of la.bor, to tlie a.ttraction of foreign direct invest- 
ment a.nd t o  joint ventures, is tlie domestic currency unconvertibility; therefore a program for 
reaching the "internal convertibility" of the Czec1~oslova.kian Koruna is prepared and should be 
implemented early in 1991. The successful run o i  this program is, o i  course, preconditioned by 
an expansion in the volume of foreign trade being carried out in convertible currency, with an 
appropriate excha.nge rate policy and also wit11 necessa.ry foreign exchange reserves. It is also 
desira.ble to  be backed with stand-by convertible currency resources to  be able t o  intervene in 
the excha.nge rate level when tlie demand ior convertible currency exceeds the possible supply. 
A relatively convenient s i t u a t i o ~ ~  1ia.s been created by Czechoslovakia's re-entering the world 
finance institutio~ls (IhlF, World Bank, European Ba.nk for Reconstruction and Development). 
The Government's long-range goal is to  reach tlie unlimited convertibility by meeting the 
obliga.tions of the IhlF's Article VIIl. However, due to the contemporary economic situation it 
is possible to  introduce the current account collvertjbility only, giving domestic residents the 
right t o  buy foreign exchange a t  the officia.1 exchange rate in order t o  finance current account 
transactions, i.e., purchase of goods or services from abroad. 
The implementation of such a concept of convertibility (called in domestic papers as Uinternal 
convertibilityn) is based upon: 
a The compulsory sale of foreign exchange export incomes by the resident economic agents 
t o  the banks a t  the official exchange rate being set up on the basis of demand and supply 
gua.ranteed purchase of the foreign excha.nge resources against domestic currency t o  cover 
payments abr0a.d. 
a Elimination of the circula.tion of foreign currencies in the Czechoslovakian economy. 
a Setting up the control of the foreign exchange balance through macroeconomic interventions 
(restrictive budgetary a.nd monetary policies) and with the possible application of incentives 
stimulating foreign exchange supply and restricting tlie demand (import surcharge, restric- 
tion in the use o i  the foreign escl~alige by citizens and to supply the consumer market with 
imported goods, import licei~ses for certain comniodities, custo~ns duty, export bonuses). 
a Intervention o i  the Central Bank on the foreign eschange market enabling a long-term ex- 
change ra.te stahiliza.tion using celitral ioreign escliange reserves or eventually loans from 
abroad. 
An important issue related to the establishincnt of the internal convertibility is the specifi- 
cation of the initial level of the ex~hange  rate of tlrc Czechoslovakian Koruna to  the convertible 
currencies, which would ensure the lauilclling of the new system and enable its stability for a 
long enough period of time. The initial level of the exchange rate must also reflect the feasible 
impact of the devaluation on the internal prices, which must, from the one side, send the right 
signals to  initiate illdustrial restructuri~lg according to  the relations on the external market; 
these relations are to  be transformed through the exchange rate level into the  domestic econ- 
omy. From the other side, the  new internal prices of inputs t o  the economy derived from the 
level of the  exchange rate must be only just a manageable obstacle for producers in branches al- 
ready matching the requirements of the competitors' effectiveness. The state of foreign exchange 
reserves available for foreign exchange market interventions must also be taken into account. 
The  setting up of the initial level of the exchange rate of the domestic currency is  a multi- 
criterion task, where the particular criteria are of an economical, social, and political nature and 
some of them are mutually contradicting. Suggestions made for the determination of the  initial 
exchange rate level differ, but the very probable value is about 24 Koruns t o  one US$, which 
represents about 50% devaluation of the domestic currency. In the debate about the issue there 
are voices supporting even higher devaluation. They are motivated by the expected high demand 
on the foreign exchange if the internal convertibility will be introduced with an overvaluated 
exchange rate, when there is a lot of domestic money circulating in the economy due t o  the 
previous unconstrained monetary policy. However, some economists, from the other side, do 
recommend to  f o l l o ~ ~  the revaluation strategy. Their main concern rises from expectations, that  
the high devaluation will inflict unmanageable inflation. 
Tlle reform of the ballkiilg system is already going on, the emission and credit functions of 
the Central Bank were split between the Central Bank and crediting banks; the Central Bank 
obtained real control over tlle amount of money in circulation and over the equilibrium recovery; 
the reform project supposed that  the number of crediting banks will be increased (3-4 banks 
until now); foreign parti:ipation in ballking business will be possible in a later stage of the 
reform. 
An importailt part of the refornl program is to  work out the legal and organizational frame- 
work. In the first half of the year more than 60 decrees and laws have been enacted by the 
Federal Assembly. The inlportant legislatioll which creates conditions for commercial activity, 
for privatization, and for the eco~lomic behavior of all (state and privately owned) enterprises, 
should come into force on January 1, 1991. 
Let us mention some of those acts already in force: 
(1) Act on joint-st,ock compa.nies 
(2) Act on the state enterprise 
(3) Act on the private enterpreneursllip of the citizens 
(4) Act on foreign economic relations 
(5) Act on enterprises with foreign capital participation 
(6) Act on foreign exchange 
(7) Act on state bank 
(8) Act on crediting bank and insurance companies 
(9) Act on taxes. 
In the final state of prepara.tion are: 
(1) Act on securities 
(2) Act on budgetary rules 
(3) Act on employn~ent 
(4) Act on privatization 
(5) Act on the land 
(6) Act on prices control and on cartels 
(7)  Act on competition 
(8) Act on import duty 
(9) Act on collective (triparties') ta.lks. 
The complexity of the transition maneuver towards the market economy needs careful control 
in order t o  ensure t11a.t development will not follow the "crises transition trajectoryn. Ln the 
~ S F R  the reform of the management system is deeply interconnected with the urgent issue of 
restructuring the industry, which was postponed several times in the past. The decision about 
"correct allocation" of investment for restructuring, which should be done in accordance with 
the Government's intention to  be involved in world economic relations in a more harmonized 
manner and t o  move t o  a far more open economy, needs a great deal of coordination with the 
outside world. 
Such a decision, which is t o  be taken on the macro- and microeconomic level, would be 
worked out much more precisely and easily should the developed economies pass through a 
period of growth. Such a prospect is, however, hardly t o  be expected within the next 2-3 
years, even if the integration of (West) Europe opens a new prospect for growth, thanks t o  the 
large-scale economy effect which is expected t o  take place. At the same time, one must not 
underestimate the emerging new global destabilization factors like the crisis in the Persian Gulf, 
or the situation in the Soviet economy, to which the Central and East European countries and 
Czechoslovakia a.re especially very sensitive. The program of the stabilization of the economic 
development, aloilg ~v i th  the non-crisis tra.jectory in this context, plays the basic precondition 
for the success of the reform a.s a. whole. 
The stabilizatiol~ policy of the Government in context with the measures for an economic 
reform program is ba.sed on: 
(1) hllacroeconomic restrictions; the goals a.re stipula.ted as: 
a Zero increase of volume of money circulated in the economy 
a State budget witli a small surplus witliill the 1-1,5% range of budget expenditures 
a Possible range for credit 1oai.s stipulated as minus 2% to  plus 1% of thy 1989 level. 
I11 1991, when most of the prices will be liberalized, internal convertibility will be in- 
troduced and many import restrictions relaxed, the n~acroeconomic restrictions will, from 
the one side, be even stronger than in the year 1990 (the danger for transformation of the 
internal money surplus to  the external debt will be higher) but on the other side, monetary 
and financial policies will be n~uch more flexible to  ellcourage the necessary restructuring. 
The State budget will be created with a surplus 2-2,5% of total expenditure. 
Despite all these restrictions, the state budget will provide the resources needed as a 
social guarantee coilnected with the valorization of pensions, with re-qualification and un- 
employment. 
(2) The reform of the t a s  system will start to  play a stabilization role. The reform will proceed 
in a number of stages. The final market compatible shape of the tax system will be in the 
year 1992. The basic role in the system will be played by the value added tax and the other 
taxes, like consumer tax, import tax, and corporate tax. 
In 1990, the turnover tax rates will be mostly unified (there will be 4 basic turnover tax 
rates instead of an individual one for each group of products). 
In 1991 the number of profit tax rates will be reduced from four (75%, 65%, 55% and 
50%) t o  two (50% and 55%). 
In 1992 the necessary legislati011 will be adopted so that  the new tax system will come 
into force on January 1, 1993. 
(3) In connection with the "pruning down" of the state budget (in some cases up to  90% of profit 
was taxed aiid tlie huge budgetary means were consequei~tly redistributed in an administra- 
tive manner) the role of local budgets will be increased. The new budgetary rules will ensure 
the local budget "self service'' and will define tlie financial relation between republics. 
(4 )  Further suggestions on stabilizatioi~ nleasures for tlie period 1991-92 will be derived from the 
progress made in an adaptation of tlie econoiny t o  the market place conditions, especially 
to  internal convertibility a.nii eventual devaluation of the dornestic currency with an impact 
on the prices of inputs, on an increasc in  crudr! oil prices, and progress in the restructuring 
program. 
(5) The realization of the program of restructuring will inflict a growth in unemployment. The 
Government is taking measures to alleviat,e the ilnya.ct by 
Revitalizing the private sector and small businesses, especially in the service sector; i t  
is expected that  by the first half of 1991 some 300-400 thousand new jobs could be 
created. 
Developing the sacial safety net. 
The success of the economic reform will be highly influenced by the  palitical development in 
the country. Democratization of life in our society is still revealing new phenomenon and i t  is 
therefare difficult to  make a precise prognosis. 
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The Plan of the East European 
Payments Union and the Future 
of Regional Economic Cooperation 
in Eastern Europe 
Sa'ndor Richter, 
The Vienna Institute for Comparative Econonlic Studies 
On 1 January 1991 the most important specifics of the CMEA ceased to  exist. The three 
decades of cooperation based on detailed state level coordination of mutual deliveries, artificially 
created prices, bilateral clearings settled in transferable rubles is over. What comes next? 
Differentiation gains mome~itum in the European CMEA area. The GDR disappeared in 
October 1990. Poland, Czecl~oslovakia and Hungary opted for a determined transition to  mar- 
ket economy, quick privatization, and intended to apply for full membership in the EC. The 
governments of Bulgaria and Romania could not really decide t o  what extent they should intro- 
duce elements of western type democracy and market economy. The Soviet Union triei to tackle 
with its aggravating political and economic crisis without any special emphasis on maintaining 
the volume of trade with its former allies. 
In the last decades there has been inter-industry type trade between the individual East 
European economies and the Soviet Union. East European countries delivered mainly manu- 
factured products in exchange for mainly primary energy and raw materials. East European 
manufactured products have been overpriced and a substantial part of them cannot be marketed 
outside the CMEA region. The shift t o  hard currency settlement of payments will, most proba- 
bly, lead to  huge deficits in the "small" East European countries' trade with the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet surplus in 1991 alone was expected to  amount to  10-15 billion US$ still before the 
Gulf crisis. High oil prices will bring about additional burdens for the East European countries 
and additional incomes for the Soviet Union. 
As the burdens of transition to  hard currency settlement of payments became obvious for a 
wider circle of western experts the idea of calling into being a regional payments union was raised. 
This institution, called Central European Payments Union (CEPU), would be a multiclearing 
system, similar to  the European Payments Union (EPU) that  was organized after World War 
I1 in Western Europe. The EPU had been supported financially by the USA in the framework 
of the hllarshall Plan. The CEPU is also designed to  generate external financing, namely the 
support of the industrialized countries of the world. The core of the idea is t o  hinder a dramatic 
decline of mutual trade among the members of the dying CMEA and t o  give impetus t o  trade 
creation witliin the region wherever it is possible. The center of the multiclearing system, 
most probably located somewhere in West Europe. would make efforts to  smooth away trade 
imbalances, creating in this way the presumed preconditions for a higher level of intra-regional 
trade. 
Before going into details of the CEPU a c~.ucial question, namely which countries would be 
members of the multiclearing system. must be ans\rvered. The narrowest circle would comprise 
the radically reforming countries: Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. A wider version would 
include Romania and Bulgaria as well. According to the broadest version the CEPU would 
include the five countries mentioned and the Soviet Union. The composition of the CEPU is the 
critical point of the construction. 'The CEPIJ with the Soviet Union is a completely different 
organization than without it. 
Trade between the "small" East European countries is typically intra-industry trade where 
mostly manufactured products are exchanged. Trade imbalances are traditionally low. Accord- 
ing to  ECE da ta  total imbalances in mutual trade of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the GDR and 
Poland amounted t o  288 million US$ in 1989 with a total trade volume of approximately 7.7 
billion US$.* Respective data  for these countries without the GDR but including Itomania and 
Bulgaria may not be substantially different. As Table 1 demonstrates, the share of the "smalln 
East European countries in each other's foreign trade is surprisingly low. Taking these low 
trade shares, the rather similar composition of exports and imports, and finally the traditionally 
balanced mutual trade, I see no reason for anxiety about menacing with imbalances after the 
shift t o  hard currency settlement of payments within this group of countries. After the  shift 
to  hard currency settlement trade volumes may decline but imbalances can not be expected t o  
grow, Furthermore, the experience of regional integrations in Latin America demonstrate that  
an increase of mutual trade between countries a t  a medium level of development is not usual, 
even if i t  is encouraged. Thus, we call raise the question whether it is really worth setting up 
an international orgallization to  smooth away trade inbalances of the expected magnitude? 
After the introduction of hard currency payments lasting Soviet trade surpluses are expected. 
Thus the CEPU with the Soviet Union's membership would help the East European countries t o  
maintain their imports from the Soviet Union. The East European countries would pay for the 
commodities imported from the Soviet Union in clearing money. The Soviet Union could spend 
these incomes only within the clearing circle, namely in the East European countries. However, 
multilateral clearing can not cope with a long lasting one-sided imbalances where deficit and 
surplus, respectively emerges always wit11 the same countries. When the initial fund is expended 
the system ceases to function. 
Is it good to  give a helping hand to  the East European countries so that  they can carry on 
their exports to  the Soviet Union? (As long as the reserves of the clearing center last.) On the 
one hand, the answer is yes. A lower level of unenlploynlent and less under-utilized capacities will 
be the result. On the other hand, most of the enterprises in East Europe that  have specialized in 
the Soviet market are big, inefficient, uncompetitive state owned enterprises. The danger would 
be imminent that  the most uncompetitive economic agents of the region will be encouraged by 
western financial assistance to  avoid adjustment by preservillg their comfortable market. 
Is the financing of the CEPU the lnost effective way of western support? Most probably not. 
The economies of East Europe should survive the coming critical years and not the less efficient 
segment of their state owned industry. (An illustration from Hungary: in the first six months of 
1990 the production of enterprises employing more than 300 people declined by 12%, whereas 
the production by economic agents employing less than 50 people increased by 150%). 
A more efficient way of western support could be: 
e Easing the debt service burdens 
a Setting up special funds t o  help privatization 
o Setting up funds to  promote the export of medium-sized and small enterprises. 
Participation in the CEPU belongs t o  the competence of the governments. But how could 
the domestic regulation of trade be solved? If hard currency imports will be liberalized in the 
countries concerned, why would a.ny import.er bug, let us say a more expensive Polish computer 
instead of a. Sout.11 Iiorean one, only because the former is "cheaper" a t  the macro-economic 
level? Are there market mecl~anisms to  tackle t,l~is problenl? 
'Economic Survey oi  Europe 1988-1990, 11X New j'ork, p. 3-76, 
Without the CEPU, East European products will have to  be priced according t o  their 
price/performance ra.tio from 1 January 1991. They will compete with western supply, mainly 
in the Soviet ma.rket. The Soviet Union will be willing to buy goods of inferior quality only a t  
an a.ppropriate low price. With most East European commodities this "equilibrium" price will 
not cover production costs. Economic agents in East Europe will have the option t o  go to  third 
markets but certainly the adjustment to  western quality standards and the reduction of costs 
can not be saved this way, either. Taking into consideration the present chaotic circumstances 
in the Soviet Union a diversification of sales (as well as purchases) of East European enterprises 
that  are too dependent on the Soviet market seems t o  be rational. Even the best company 
adjustment program may prove to  be a failure if i t  is based solely on the fragile Soviet market. 
For East Europe an increase in exports to  the west is the crucial factor. The war against 
the CMEA legacy can only be won in the battlefields of the OECD markets. After a temporary 
reduction, mutual trade may increase, moderately, again, but its composition will hopefully be 
completely different from that  today. 
If not the CEPU, then what else? Is there still a way for intra-regional economic cooperation? 
There are alternative ways for the diversion/creation of trade. Technically the most logical 
solution could be the creation of a provisional Ea.st Eur0pea.n customs union with a high initial 
discrimination towards non-members. High tariffs should gradually be diminished according t o  
a schedule set up before the customs uilioil starts its operation. However, a t  the present level of 
mutual distrust it would be absurd to  propose this solution. The creation of a free trade area 
(EFTA) seems to  be more feasible. 
There are western fears rega.rding the future of East Europe. One or more economies of the 
region may collapse and then social tensions may lead to an uncomfortable level of instability 
in the region and the M'est can not be indifferent t o  this, particularly Europe. Rising oil prices 
increa.sed the probability of this scena.rio. Even more importa.nt is that  Western support, if 
any, be targeted to  areas where it can be best used. According to  my view, i t  is not the CEPU. 
There may be anot,her reason for M'estern concern, na.meiy the vision about some East European 
countries aggressively penetrating the OECD ma.rkets by artificially low priced commodities. 
First, the region's countries do not have any means t o  fiilance such "cheap" exports by subsidies. 
Secondly, even if the "small" Ea.st European countries wanted to  earn all the dollars in the OECD 
area., wha.t they need to buy is Soviet oil, the necessary "penetration" would be "peanuts" 
compared t o  tota.1 OECD imports. Furthermore a.n export drive targeted a t  the West would 
also induce ma.ssive imports from the \'Vest. 
Table 1. Share1 of individual countries and groups of countries in total trade of countries 
observed 
-- 
- 
E x p o r t s  
Tot a1 C S F ~  POL H U N  ROM BG USSR 
CSFR (1989) 100 8.5 4.0 1.8 2.3 30.5 
POL (1989) 100 5.4 1.6 1.1 1.6 20.5 
HUN (1989) 100 5.1 3.2 1.5 0.7 25.1 
ROM (1985) 100 2.6 3.5 2.4 1.7 21.4 
BG (1989) 100 4.4 3.9 1.4 2.1 65.8 
USSR (1989) 100 9.1 8.4 6.1 3 -9 9.0 
- 
Group A Group B Group C 
CSFR (1980) 12.4 16.6 47.1 
POI, (1989) 7.0 9.7 30.2 
HUN (1989) 8.2 10.4 35.6 
ROhl (1985) 8.5 10.2 31.6 
BG (1980) 9.7 11.7 77.5 
TJSSn (1980) 23.6 36.5 36.5 
-- 
I m p o r t s  
Total CSFR POL HUN ROM BG USSR 
CSFR (1089) 100 8.6 4.8 1.7 2.2 29.7 
POL (1980) 100 5.6 1 .G 1 .O 1.2 17.9 
HUK (1080) 100 5.2 3.3 1.6 0.9 22.1 
R o l l  (1985) 100 3.3 5.5 2.8 3.0 22.4 
BCJ (1980) 100 5.0 4.8 1.4 1.9 53.6 
USSR (1980) 100 0.2 10.3 6.7 3.4 10.1 
Group A Group B Group C 
CSFR (1989) 13.3 17.3 47.0 
POL (1989) 
HUN (1989) 
R o l l  (1985) 
BG (1989) 
USSR (1989) 
- 
Group A: CSFR, POL, H U N  
Group B: Group A + BG, ROhl 
Group C: Group B + USSR 
Based on national currency 
Source: National Stat.ist ics 
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